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0. Preconceptions: Subjections, Objections and Interjections
0) This is  an “authorship” study of New Zealand artist  Joanna Margaret 
Paul, with specific reference to her “experimental film” works. Though I will draw 
on  a  wide  range  of  theorists,  my  overall  approach  is  what  Laura  Marks  calls 
“intercultural  cinema.”  For  Marks  the  term  “intercultural  cinema”  refers  to  a 
specific “genre” or “movement” of experimental films created by authors caught 
“between two or more cultural regimes of knowledge.”1 Intercultural film-makers 
include feminist, queer, indigenous and immigrant authors (any “minority” which 
possesses its own “regime of knowledge” and makes experimental film) living in 
“Western  metropolitan  areas,”2 whose  dominant culture  is  capitalist,  masculine, 
“hegemonic, white and Euro-American”3 (a second regime of knowledge). What 
draws intercultural  cinema together  (and indeed,  one  could  argue,  experimental 
film  in  general)  is  an  oppositional  stance  toward  capitalist  ideology,  the 
commodification of the art object and the uniformity of classical narrative forms. 
As David Bordwell  and Kristen Thompson write,  experimental  films are “often 
deliberate  attempts  to  undercut  the  conventions  of  commercial  narrative 
filmmaking”4 and, as Marks writes, intercultural cinema “flows against waves of 
economic neocolonialism,” and is “suspicious of mass circulation...  [as] making 
commercial cinema still involves significant compromises.”5
1) The paragraph you have just read asks three questions, which will form 
the structure of this introduction: 1) Who is Joanna Margaret Paul, and how are her 
films examples of the “genre” intercultural film? 2) What is an “authorship study,” 
and how does intercultural cinema shift the “function” of authorship? And, 3) What 
does  an  “intercultural”  reading  of  Joanna's  films  from  the  perspective  of 
1 Laura Marks, The Skin of the Film [SoF] (Duke University Press, 1999) p1. Marks refers to intercultural cinema first as 
a “movement” and then suggests that it might be considered a “genre.”
2 Marks, SoF, p1.
3 Marks, SoF, p7.
4 David Bordwell and Kristen Thompson, Film History: An Introduction (McGraw Hill, 1994) p191.
5 Marks, SoF, p9 & 3.
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“authorship” practically entail in terms of textually analysing Joanna's films? Marks 
does not  explicitly  give an account  of  “intercultural  authorship,”  discussing the 
movement as a “genre” brought together by a (political  and aesthetic) “tendency” 
to  “reject”  mainstream  cultural  production.6 Having  said  this,  I  find  Marks' 
interweaving of Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Walter Benjamin's thoughts is 
suggestive of an authorship theory which explores, expands and explodes what it 
means to be an “author” in terms of experimental film-making. In this introduction 
I aim to tease out the personal, political and poetic implications of intercultural 
cinema  in  terms  of  authorship,  drawing  predominantly  on  Marks,  Foucault, 
Benjamin and Annette Kuhn. This will lead to the “body” of the essay, a textual 
analysis of my experience of Joanna's films from an intercultural,  metaphysical, 
noological  and  phenomenological  perspective,  framed  by  the  work  of  Deleuze, 
Marks and Vivian Sobchack.
2) Laura Marks' The Skin of the Film (as with this text) is heavily influenced 
by Deleuze's approach to cinema. Marks, like Deleuze, refers to a wide range of 
authors  and  disciplines  (from  modern  physics,  philosophy  and  semiotics,  to 
cooking,  sewing and theology)  and  introduces  a  great  deal  of  specialist  terms, 
drawing  on  Deleuze's  vast  taxonomy  of  cinematic  “signs.”  As  Donato  Totaro 
writes, “Deleuze's postmodern style is part of its appeal – playful, mercurial, and 
open to creative interpretation. Terms that are meant to carry critical weight are 
introduced offhandedly and then left hanging for pages. One neologism gives birth 
to  three  others.”7 Some  terms  are  introduced  and  then  forgotten,  never  to  be 
mentioned again.8
This approach may seem, at the outset, to be scattered and impressionistic. 
However, for Marks, like Deleuze, the intent of this approach is to create terms 
which are not only used in the text (in my case, to analyse the experimental films of 
Joanna Paul)  but  also  useful to  the reader  in  their  subsequent  experiences  with 
experimental cinema and cultural production in general.
6 Although Marks does write, “the genre allows films to be read... as authorial texts,” (SoF, p7) she never accounts 
directly for the ideological problems surrounding authorship as a critical discourse.
7 Donato Totaro, Gilles Deleuze's Bergsonian Film Project. Internet WWW page, at URL: <http://www. 
horschamp.qc.ca/9903/offscreen_essays/deleuze1.html> (version current 1/1/2008).
8 Such as “matter-images” and “light-images” in The Movement Image, Deleuze's first book on cinema.
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3) This is what Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari refer to as a “tool box.” As 
Brian Massumi writes, “the reader is invited to lift the dynamism out of the book 
entirely, and incarnate it in a foreign medium, whether it be painting or politics. 
The authors steal from other disciplines with glee, but they are more than happy to 
return the favour. Deleuze's own image for a concept is... a “tool box.” He calls this 
kind of philosophy “pragmatics” because its goal is the invention of concepts.”9 
Barbara  Kennedy  suggests  that  Deleuze's  cinematic  concepts  offer  “a  new 
vocabulary in contemporary film-philosophy...  creat[ing] refreshing plateaus and 
different vocabularies for us to think about film.”10 However, these terms are not 
fixed, or fully determined. As Jason Sperb writes of Marks' use of Deleuze's terms, 
“One should try to build upon them, and perhaps even discard [them] entirely when 
done — in the way that scaffolding is removed after the building is completed.”11 
For Deleuze this leads to a philosophy of “becoming” (rather than being) which 
“drives” (rather than desires)  the “body” of this  text.  During the course of this 
analysis we will  become woman, animal and film (among other things). But first, 
let us become acquainted.
9 Brian Massumi, “Translator's Foreword: The Pleasures of Philosophy,” in Deleuze and Guattari [D&G], A Thousand 
Plateaus [TP] (1980: Continuum, 2004) pxv. Pragmatics is a term Deleuze lifts (in part) from C.S. Peirce. See also 
Deleuze and Foucault's discussion of the “tool box” concept in “Intellectuals and Power,” in Michel Foucault, 
Language, Counter-Memory, Practice (Cornell University Press, 1977) p208. Foucault also “preferred the... metaphor of 
the toolkit. Foucault invited his readers... to pick up what they found usable and ignore or discard the rest.” Jana 
Sawicki, “Queering Foucault and the Subject of Feminism,” in Gary Gutting (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to  
Foucault (Cambridge University Press, 2005, 2nd edition) p379.
10 Barbara M. Kennedy, Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation (Edinburgh University Press, 2000) p27.
11 Jason Sperb, Laura Marks: The Skin of the Film. Internet WWW page, at URL: <http://dr-mabuses-kaleido-
scope.blogspot.com/2007/05/laura-marks-skin-of-film_15.html> (version current 1/1/2008).
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1. Personal Affects: Qualities and Powers
“The personal is the political.”12
“We are surrounded by things which make our lives shadowy... While I don't 
have a television, don't like CDs and refuse plastic bags at the supermarket, it's 
true that I too inhabit that shadow world.”13
Joanna Margaret Paul not only made films but drew, wrote poetry, painted, 
made photographs,  sculptures  and curated exhibitions  (among other  things).  As 
Anne Kirker writes, “early on Joanna Paul adopted a multidisciplinary approach.”14 
Joanna was the daughter of “creative and forward-thinking parents”15 Janet  and 
Blackwood Paul, whose small  press published some of New Zealand's 'seminal' 
modern-literature.16 Janet was an exhibiting “modernist” painter, and Joanna was 
surrounded  by  experimental  art  and  philosophy  from  a  young  age.  As  Joanna 
writes,  “the  Phaidon  art  books,  the  Plischke  furniture,  the  whole  furniture  of 
modernism. Taken for granted, enjoyed, repudiated.”17
Both her sisters are also artists. Becoming an artist was something that came 
naturally in Joanna's family. Joanna remembers, “it was easy for me in the 60s & 
bred to it,  to feel  Cézanne as an influence sucked dry.  I  respect  [my mother's] 
meditations  on  Cézanne,  her  discoveries,  the  landscapes,  Chinese  painting,  the 
12 Deborah Shepard, Reframing Women (Harper Collins, 2000) p125.
13 Joanna Margaret Paul, in Gregory O'Brien, Lands and Deeds: Profiles of Contemporary New Zealand Painters (Godwit 
Press, 1996) p77.
14 Anne Kirker, New Zealand Woman Artists: A Survey of 150 Years (1986: Craftsman House, 1993) p199.
15 Emma Bugden and Greg Donson, “Introduction,” in Bugden, Donson, and Gregory O'Brien (ed.), Beauty, Even: Joanna 
Margaret Paul 1945-2003 (Wellington City Gallery, 2004) p5.
16 “From 1965 to 1969 the firm published some good books now regarded as 'seminal' and some foolish ones. Few were 
'good selling titles'. We had no capital reserves but the Blackwood and Janet Paul Ltd Catalogue for 1965-66 shows 26 
titles as 'NEW'.” Janet Paul, “Hints of Becoming,” in Margaret Clark (ed.), Beyond Expectations (Allen & Unwin/Port 
Nicholson Press, 1986) p19.
17 Joanna Paul and Allie Eagle, “Letters from Room to Room,” in Marian Evans, Bridie Lonie & Tilly Lloyd (ed.), A 
Women's Picture Book: 25 Women Artists of Aotearoa (GP Books, 1988) p94.
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Tao.”18 Significantly, in her early twenties ”Joanna studied both painting... English 
and  philosophy  at  Auckland  University  in  the  1960s.”19 As  Marks  writes  of 
intercultural  and  experimental  film-authors,  “Most...  are  familiar  with 
contemporary critical theory – indeed, steeped in it,”20 meaning that the author also 
“assumes  the  interestedness,  engagement,  and  intelligence  of  its  audience.”21 
Joanna not only made “art” but (like many experimental film-makers) also wrote 
aesthetic theory and philosophy informed by critical (as well as creative) thinking. 
Although relatively unknown as a film-maker, Martin Rumsby notes that Joanna 
was also the “first woman of experimental film-making in New Zealand... between 
1970 and 1982 she made over 30 experimental films and became the first New 
Zealand film-maker after Len Lye to create a body of experimental films and also 
the first to do so in New Zealand.”22
Joanna  made  her  films  entirely  by  herself.  They  are  all  “short”  by 
conventional standards (the longest of Joanna's films,  Port Chalmers Cycle, runs 
between 17 and 20 minutes, depending on the speed it is projected at; most run for 
around 3 minutes, the length of a standard roll of film). Joanna dominantly worked 
on  the (then)  recently  developed super8mm film,  intended for  “home” use.  As 
Sheldon Renan writes, “eight millimetre is even less expensive than 16mm, and its 
equipment is  now the easiest  of all  to come by.  Traditionally 8mm has been a 
home-movie  medium,  as  well  as  one  for  beginners  in  creative  film-making. 
Recently, however, accomplished film-makers have begun to explore (and explode) 
8mm.”23 Renan cites American super8 film-makers Stan Brakhage (an influence on 
Joanna), Robert Branaman and Ken Jacobs. To this list we can add the films of 
New Zealand film-makers Derek Cowie,  Ronnie van Hout  and Joanna Paul  (to 
name just a few).24
There are no actors, as such, in Joanna's films, and no people at all appear in 
half of them. Those people that do appear are Joanna's friends and family. The 
18 Paul and Eagle, p95.
19 Bugden and Donson, p5.
20 Marks, SoF, p13.
21 Marks, SoF, p19.
22 Martin Rumsby, “A Place Near Here” (2003) p3. Originally published in Illusions #35 (Winter, 2003). However, I am 
referencing an expanded version sent to me by Martin in 2004. She was most well known as a painter and poet.
23 Sheldon Renan, The Underground Film (E.P. Dutton, 1967) p23.
24 Rumsby, p2.
17.
objects and places which Joanna pulls into focus are all drawn from her personal  
life  (houses she has visited, places she has been, things she has seen). These are 
common practices for experimental,  intercultural authors.25 The content of Joanna's 
films ranges from quick montages of places (Gravestones, Gardens, Remnants of a  
Demolished Wharf), cities (Auckland 1971,  Round Picton,  Port Chalmers Cycle), 
houses  (Bosshards  House,  Aberharts  House,  Details  of  a  House  Interior),  and 
landscapes  (Barrys  Bay,  To the  Bay);  to  films  which  push  the  image  towards 
abstraction  and  the  limits  of  perception  (Roses,  Aramoana);  to  films  depicting 
women  and  children  (family,  friends  and  her  daughter  Maggie)  engaged  in 
everyday activities  (a  woman irons  the  washing  in  Task,  a  child  draws  crayon 
pictures in Maggie Documentation, someone unpacks a bag in Bag, a woman gets 
dressed in Jillian Dressing). As Rumsby writes, “Paul's films varied from personal 
documentary,  to  lyrical  landscape  to  ritualised  performance  in  work  that  often 
spoke of the domestic situation of women.”26
Irrespective  of  their  differences,  Joanna's  films  repeat  two  fundamental 
affections: 1) they are all completely silent, and 2) they all lack a conventional, 
linear narrative. As Joanna writes, “Silence is essential  for visual concentration; 
fiction action anecdote or contrivance of any kind are rejected.”27 In a long line of 
experimental  film-maker/theorists  (including  Germaine  Dulac,  Maya  Deren, 
Nathaniel  Dorsky,  Stan  Brakhage)  Joanna  refers  to  her  films  and  paintings  as 
“visual  poetry,”28 in  rejection of  mainstream narrative forms.  As Marks  writes, 
intercultural  cinema  “suspend[s]  the representational  conventions that have held 
narrative cinema for decades.”29 This begs the question: why does experimental 
film  oppose  the  mainstream  film  industry?  In  the  first  place,  the  mainstream 
industry is  perceived as a capitalist mechanism, interested primarily in monetary 
gains (rather than self-expression, or social change). This in itself is not necessarily 
problematic, but may becomes so when we take into account that historically the 
25 Renan, p25, and Stephen Dwoskin, Film Is (Peter Owen, 1975) p23.
26 Rumsby, p2-3.
27 Paul, “Shibusha,” in Corinne and Arthur Cantrill (ed.), Cantrills Filmnotes #47/48 (1978) p10. My italics. Intercultural 
cinema is “marked by silence.” (Marks, SoF, p21)
28 Paul, “Shibusha,” p10; Paul and Eagle, p92; and particularly “Notes on a Poetic Language” [NPO], in Sport #9 (Spring, 
1992). As Stephen Dwoskin writes of Dulac, “for her the ideal film would be one that brought into force rhythmic 
movement without any dramatic characters... a symphony of vision and the poetry of seeing.” (Dwoskin, p26-7)
29 Marks, SoF, p1.
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mainstream industry has been criticised for being sexist, racist, homophobic and 
Eurocentric (both in terms of the distribution of jobs  in the film industry and the 
stereotypes which exist in the films produced by this industry).
For this reason experimental film has always been a “genre” (or movement) 
made up of various “minorities” repressed by the “state” they live in, who are often 
denied entry into the mainstream film industry. Historically “white males” have 
dominated positions of knowledge and power and, as Claudia Moscovici writes, 
“women, slaves, ethnic and racial minorities, and the working class all tend to be 
more or less historically and conceptually excluded from full citizenship”30 (which 
includes the rights of authorship within mainstream culture). Joanna, as a feminist 
woman living in  New Zealand in  the 1960s and 70s,  was part  of  a “minority” 
culture,  living in a  dominantly male,  white,  heterosexual culture.  Annette Kuhn 
notes  that  women,  for  instance,  “had  fewer  opportunities  than  men  to  involve 
themselves  in  film  production,  particularly  in  the  commercial  film  industry.”31 
Where they could get “work” they were invariably in positions of less power (and 
therefore less earning potential) than men. As Deborah Shepard writes, “from the 
1970s woman have been drawn to experimental film as an alternative medium for 
expressing  radical  ideas.”  Shepard  continues,  “Multi-media  artist  Joanna  Paul... 
used the medium to explore her personal world. As a member of the feminist art 
movement in Christchurch in the 70s she was encouraged by the feminist validation 
of the domestic  arena which was summed up in the slogan 'the personal  is  the 
political'... she said: 'Painting for me as a woman is an ordinary act – about the 
great meaning in ordinary things.'”32
* * * *
Without  intending  to  ask  questions  or  make  problems,  in  the  above 
paragraphs I have done both in equal measure, unpacking what Michel Foucault 
calls the 'author-function' and invoking the concept of authorship. In describing a 
film-maker  by  'name',  as  the  sole  creator  of  a  film,  I  move  beyond  a  casual 
30 Claudia Moscovici, From Sex Objects to Sexual Subjects (Routledge, 1996) p3.
31 Annette Kuhn, Women's Pictures: Feminism and Cinema (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982) p8.
32 Shepard, p125.
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reference  (Joanna's  proper-name)  to  a  'functioning'  critical  concept  which 
categorises, complicates and capitalises on the name of an author. Joanna's films, I 
have argued, are intercultural, experimental, feminist and poetic, all of which, in 
some form or another, reject the “mainstream” industry (in Joanna's case, as a film-
maker,  Hollywood  cinema)  and  the  mass  commodification  of  art.  Firstly,  this 
rejection functions as a reaction to the omission of high powered jobs for and the 
negative stereotyping of, minority “regimes of knowledge.” Secondly, experimental 
cinema rejects  the  dominant,  clichéd  and  predictable  narrative  constructions  of 
mainstream film.
However, according to Foucault, the practice, or discourse, of “authorship”33 
functions to  reinforce the  repression,  discipline and  punishment of other authors 
and the  commodification of art in general. As David A. Gerstner writes, Foucault 
argues  that  the  “bourgeois  construct  of  authorship...  the  master  author...  was  a 
discourse  secured  through  a  particular  ideology,”34 a  dominantly  white,  male, 
capitalist  (and  Christian)  ideology.  This  ideology  represses,  disciplines  and 
punishes authors (legally, socially, and historically) who do not have the same ideas 
(ideologies) as the dominant “state.”
For Foucault the author is not a person, but a “function” which “subjects” us 
to a particular way of thinking through artistic discourse. As Gary Gutting writes, 
“Foucault suggests... that the play of  individuals' thought, in a given period and 
disciplinary context, takes place in a space with a structure defined by a system of 
rules  more  fundamental  than  the  assertions  of  the  individuals  thinking  in  the 
space.”35 Foucault's project, in his own words, “has been to create a history of the 
different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made into subjects,”36 
subjected to  capitalist  (or  “state”)  objectives, maintained by “practices” such as 
“economics, technology, politics,”37 and, significant to this discussion, authorship. 
The problem then becomes: am I reinforcing the bourgeois state, the very thing 
33 The ways in which we are used to when discussing the 'discipline' of authorship.
34 David A. Gerstner, “The Practices of Authorship,” in Gerstner & Janet Staiger (ed.), Authorship in Film (Routledge, 
2003) p12. My italics.
35 Gutting, “Introduction – Michel Foucault: A User's Manuel,” in Gutting (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault 
(Cambridge University Press, 1994, 1st edition) p9-10.
36 Foucault in Paul Rabinow, “Introduction,” in Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader (Peregrene Books, 1986) p7.
37 Rabinow, p4.
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Joanna challenged and rejected, by writing about her work from the perspective of 
authorship?
Foucault's (tentative) answer to this problem is to suggest that authors need 
not exist  and that we might consider “discourse” as “authorless.”38 However, as 
Gerstner and Staiger both point out, the issue of authorship is still  important to 
critics who wish to bring attention to a lesser known author whose work, without 
critical attention, may simply vanish into the “archive” without a trace. As Staiger 
writes, the critical “death of the author came at a time particularly nonadvantageous 
for some individuals – feminists, gay and lesbian activists, and antiracists.”39 But, 
on  the  other  hand,  am  I  simply  repressing  other  authors  and  empowering  the 
commodification of Joanna's work in replicating the classical model of authorship? 
Gerstner writes in earnest, “the issue of authorship is certainly perplexing,”40 and 
Foucault himself laments that, “there is a decided absence of positive propositions 
in this essay, as it applies to analytic procedures.”41
However,  I  believe  that  Foucault's  work  provides  a  stable  ground  from 
which to begin an investigation into intercultural authorship. The author has four 
main  functions  according  to  Foucault:  1)  A  legal  function  which  represses, 
disciplines and appropriates the author through contracts, copyright and censorship; 
2) An historical function which determines who is an author (and who is not) and 
what is authored (and what is not), regulated by “dominant” ideology; 3) A social 
function  which  produces  “status”  for  the  author's  name  and  therefore  saleable 
“products” which are useful to the pursuits of capitalism, and; 4) Textual functions 
which determines our “mode of being” toward the text in terms of interpreting 
meaning.42 An  author  does  not  choose to  participate  in  these  “functions,”  but 
participates in them through the very act of authoring and writing about authorship 
within our current cultural paradigm.
38 Foucault, “What is an Author?” [WA] (1977), in Rabinow (ed.), p119-20. “All discourses, whatever their status, form, 
value, and whatever the treatment to which they will be subjected, would then develop in the anonymity of a murmur... 
What difference does it make who is speaking?”
39 Janet Staiger, “Authorship Approaches,” in Gerstner & Staiger (ed.), p29.
40 Gerstner, p21.
41 Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?” in John Caughie (ed.), Theories of Authorship (Routledge/British Film Institute, 
1981) p289. These lines, in the final paragraphs of “What is an Author?” in Caughie, are not contained in the Rabinow 
edition.
42 Foucault, WA, in Rabinow, p108-113. See also Staiger, p28.
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In  my  opening  paragraphs  I  have;  1)  Written  of  Joanna  as  'unifying'  a 
number  of  texts,  who could  be  held  accountable  for  these  texts  (and  therefore 
disciplined and punished by the legal  state);  2)  Said that  she is  an author,  and 
therefore implied that others are not authors; 3) Produced “status” for her (as yet) 
unpublished films by comparing them to Len Lye and writing that she was the 'first 
woman of NZ experimental film', and; 4) Possibly 'subjected' myself to a “mode of 
being”43 toward  Joanna's  texts  (the  “poetic”  and  “feminine”).  In  light  of  this  I 
would argue that Foucault's analysis is not an authorship study and does not address 
the question “What is an Author?” (as the title claims) but rather asks: “What are 
the restrictions which are placed on every author within society, and how does this 
“function” affect (producing qualities and powers) our discourse about authors?” 
Foucault  no longer asks  what an author is “being,” but questions  how a  person 
“becomes” an author in a given society.
In  this  respect  Foucault's  project  is  extremely  useful  to  intercultural 
theoretical  interventions,  in  that  he  illuminates  the  restrictive  structures  which 
experimental cinema (and art in general) was (and is) in the process of rejecting. As 
Jana Sawicki notes, Foucault “shared with feminists a sense of their importance of 
resurrecting “subjugated knowledge,” ways of thinking and doing that have been 
eclipsed, devalued, or rendered invisible within dominant apparatuses of power.”44 
More significantly, Claudia Moscovici points out that Foucault himself illustrates 
that “claiming the universal subject is dead” (as he does for the universal “author 
function”)  is  “only  the  rhetorical  beginning  of  the  difficult  philosophical  and 
political process of modifying exclusionary or dominative political and symbolic 
structures and relations.” In light of this Moscovici suggests that “what kind of 
subjectivity survives or can be generated in its stead – is the rigorous work that... 
needs to be pursued.”45
Gerstner points to Walter Benjamin, working in advance of Foucault (and 
post-structuralism in general), as a possible entry point into the debate surrounding 
authorship and subjectivity. Benjamin sees authorship in a similar light to Foucault: 
43 Staiger, p28.
44 Sawicki, p381-2.
45 Moscovici, p2.
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it is a repressive, disciplinary mechanism, “functioning”46 to “subject” authors (and 
audiences) to state ideology. Though Benjamin was writing in a fascist/capitalist 
state and Foucault is writing in an advanced capitalist state, their descriptions of the 
“author  function”  are  remarkably  similar.47 However,  Benjamin  also  sees  real 
political  power in how an author  personally chooses to interject/interact with this 
structure. This “choice” Benjamin calls a “tendency” at the level of the “means of 
production.”48 In cinema, for example, the dominant commercial mode, initiated by 
the Hollywood studio-system, undoubtedly appropriates the author's name legally 
and  transforms  their  works  into  commercial  products.  Experimental  cinema, 
however, has consistently chosen to develop “their own forms and institutions over 
the years since the 1920s”49  and to “operate entirely outside of the value system 
that we have come to know as the Hollywood construct.”50
Therefore, I propose that if there is a 'master-author' in discourse “that is 
handy for capitalism to promote,”51 then there must also be another type of 'author-
function',  some  sort  of  avant-garde  or  experimental  'author-function',  firmly  in 
opposition to the capitalist ideologies of the mainstream cinema.52 This would be an 
alternative to Foucault's analysis, superimposed over and co-existent with his, in all 
times and places. As long as there has been the capitalisation and suppression of the 
authors  name  there  have  been  authors  working  beneath  the  surface,  in  the 
underground, creating alternative sites of discourse. If we can say that Hollywood 
cinema serves to reinforce what I would call a 'master-discourse', the experimental 
46 Walter Benjamin specifically uses the term “function.” Benjamin, “The Author as Producer,” in Peter Demetz (ed.), 
Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings (Schocken Books, 1986) p770.
47 Many see a direct connection between capitalism and fascism. As Mark Seem writes of Deleuze and Guattari's first 
collaboration, “Anti-Oedipus begins by reviving Reich's completely serious question with respect to the rise of fascism: 
'How could the masses be made to desire their own repression?' This is a question which the English and Americans are 
reluctant to deal with directly, tending too often to respond: “Fascism is a phenomenon that took place elsewhere, 
something that could only happen to others but not us. It's their problem.” But is it though?” Mark Seem, “Introduction,” 
in D&G, Anti-Oedipus (1972: Continuum, 2007) pxviii. As Alex Cox writes, “If you're a fascist in Hollywood, you work 
with great regularity. If you're not, you don't – so I don't.. There is no place in Hollywood for certain directors. It has to 
do with the big corporations owning the studios and being tied to the military-industrial complex.” John Walker (ed.), 
Halliwell's Filmgoers Companion (Harper Collins, 1997) p101.
48 Benjamin, p777.
49 Kuhn, p3-4.
50 Gwendolyn Audrey Foster & Wheeler Winston Dixon (ed.), Experimental Cinema: The Film Reader (Routledge, 2002) 
p1.
51 Staiger, p28-29.
52 As Foucault writes, “Where there is power, there is resistance.” (in Staiger, p48)
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author-function sets up an 'open' or 'free-discourse'53 providing on the one hand, a 
challenge  to  the  dominant-model  and  on  the  other,  new forms  of  pleasure  for 
audiences wanting an alternative to mainstream narratives.54
Foucault points to two definitive moments in which the author functions (to 
reproduce  'master-discourse',  or  produce  'free-discourse');  1)  the  text  “after  the 
fact”55 (there and then) and, 2) what Mikhail Bakhtin would call the text in the here 
and now.56 Functions 'after the fact' (there and then) reflect on those things which 
usually wouldn't occupy your mind while watching the film (such as production, 
distribution, exhibition and certain aspects of reception). Those in the here and now 
are related specifically to the experience of the film and what positions you can 
occupy  as  a  subject  while  viewing  it  (phenomenological).  For  Foucault  it  is 
specifically the “number of signs that refer to the author”57 which cause the author 
to 'function' in the here and now, causing  possible 'subject positions', through the 
use of 'shifters' (personal pronouns, adverbs of time and place and conjugation of 
verbs). It is in this section that Foucault's influence on post-structuralism can be felt 
strongly. For this reason, the following section is divided into two halves: the there 
and then and the here and now.
53 This should not be confused with Pier Paolo Pasolini's 'free-indirect-discourse' which we will discuss later.
54 The use of 'master' and 'free-discourse' is a nod toward the revolutionary ideas of George Hegel and Karl Marx 
concerning the relationship between the 'master' and the 'slave'.
55 Foucault, p288.
56 Gerstner, p13.
57 Foucault, p288.
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2. Tendencies: Political Actions and Poetic Situations
“The precise relationship of the avant-garde to American commercial film is 
one of radical otherness.”58
“The question then becomes: How can one reduce the great peril,  the great 
danger with which fiction threatens our world.”59
The  first  three  of  Foucault's  “functions”  relate  to  the  'there  and  then' 
(concerning the legal appropriation, categorisation and status of the author) while 
the final “function” concerns the textual experience of the spectator in the 'here and 
now'  (shifters).  The  first  series  of  functions  are  what  Foucault  might  call  a 
“genealogy,”  while  the  second  series  of  functions  address  what  Foucault  calls 
“archaeology.”60 I will also argue that Joanna's films do not function in capitalism. 
This is a significant personal-political choice. Experimental films have historically 
been perceived as a “minor” art (in terms of “success” measured in terms of capital, 
audience attendance and investment return). Because of this Joanna's “personal” 
choice to make a form of art which would not make money (which could not make 
money)  is  potentially  a  “political”  choice.  Joanna  made  her  films,  like  other 
experimental film-makers, for  “very little money,”61 without the aid of crews, or 
producers. She is, as Benjamin says, an “author as producer,” shooting, editing and 
organising the screening of her films herself.
Foucault writes that the author-function is 'regulated by the culture in which 
it circulates'. In this case, we may assume that 'free-discourse' is regulated by the 
58 P. Adams Sitney, Visionary Film (Oxford University Press, 1979) pviii.
59 Foucault, WA, p118.
60 “Genealogy,” as Foucault writes, “poses the problem of power and of the body (of bodies), indeed, its problems begin 
from the imposition of power upon bodies.” (Thomas Flynn, “Foucault's Mapping of History,” in Gutting (ed.), p35, 2nd 
edition) “Archaeology,” on the other hand, “indicates a possible line of attack for the analysis of verbal [or visual, or 
musical] performances.” (Foucault, in Gutting, p5, 2nd edition)
61 Renan, p17.
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'counter-culture' in which it circulates.62 So the question becomes: in what ways 
does the production, distribution, exhibition and reception differ from mainstream 
discourse, and challenge the “function” of the 'master author' as the state sees it?
2a. There and Then: Political Actions
0) Firstly, as I have said, the author “functions” legally to produce contracts, 
censorship and copyrights. Joanna, however, does not work with a crew and half 
her films have no humans in them. In those that do have people in them, they are 
her friends and family. Her films require no legal contracts of any kind. However, 
in authoring a work and showing it publicly, you enter into a contract with society.
0.1) Firstly, if you have not had your film censored, then you are subject to 
state intervention should anyone be offended by your production. To get a “rating” 
for a film costs money. For a Hollywood producer this cost would be nominal (in 
comparison to the cost of making the film). For an experimental film-maker, the 
price of rating a film is often much more than the cost of producing the film, thus 
making  it  much  harder  for  them  to legally screen  their  works.  Also,  because 
intercultural, and experimental cinema is often made by people oppressed by the 
state,  their  work  is  also  more  likely  to  contain ideas  which the  state  considers 
transgressive.63 Historically  it  has  been  the  experimental  ideas  of  “minorities” 
which have had the most trouble getting past the censors and whose screenings are 
most often shut down by the authorities. As Dwoskin suggests, this indicates a shift 
from the repressive “laws” of the state, to the “values” of the capitalist state (which 
are,  for him, the “real oppressors”). Dwoskin writes,  “The standard commercial 
outlet would not look at them and the censors would not pass them... So they went 
'underground';  they  wanted  a  free  cinema.”64 In  response,  many  experimental 
62 As Kuhn writes, feminist countercinema, operating as a 'counter culture', “may be defined as film practice which works 
against and challenges dominant cinema.” (Kuhn, p157)
63 “Speeches and books were assigned real authors, other than mythical or important religious figures, only when the 
author became subject to punishment and to the extent that [their] discourse  was considered transgressive.” Foucault, 
WA, in Caughie, p285.
64 Dwoskin, p23.
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exhibitors  screened “films 'privately'  and therefore bypassed the laws regarding 
public exhibition.”65
0.2) Legal “copyright” appropriates the authors work after a certain length 
of time, sometimes while the author is alive, denying them access to their own 
works.  This is done primarily when the artists works are  worth something to a 
“company” who wishes to control the copyright (in order to make money from 
selling  the  author's  work  as  a  mass-produced  product/object).  Joanna's  films, 
however,  are not  owned by a  company. Many of Joanna's  films were given as 
'private' gifts to the people who appear in them, which complicates the notion of a 
legally stable “author” who can be exploited. The titles added by the New Zealand 
Film Archive  after  her  death (which are  the only copies  currently  available  for 
viewing) categorise Joanna's films as 'personal records' rather than 'short films' or 
'experimental films' (or any other category which may have been suitable) further 
distancing Joanna from a legal definition of “authorship.”  As well,  when I  met 
Mary and Jane, Joanna's sisters, before writing this thesis, Mary mentioned that one 
of the films in the collection attributed to Joanna could very well  be authored by 
her. Due to this, I am unsure if Joanna functions successfully to 'unify' the texts 
collected under her name at all.
1. Secondly, the author “functions” to “designate” what kinds of texts are 
considered authored (what is a “quality” product) and who can and cannot become 
an author (who will have access to the “power” of authorship). As Foucault writes; 
“Consequently, we can say that in our culture, the name of the author is a variable 
that accompanies only certain texts to the exclusion of others: a private letter may 
have a signatory, but it does not have an author; a contract can have an underwriter, 
but not an author;  and similarly, an anonymous poster on the wall may have a 
writer,  but  they  cannot  be  an  author.”66 However,  in  “counter-culture”  artistic 
production  these  (illusionary)  restrictions  do  not  exist.  Experimental  art  (and 
cinema)  has  always  worked  to  expand  the  social  definition  of  art,  to  embrace 
mediums  usually  ignored  by  the  mainstream.  This  is  important  not  just  to  the 
counter-culture in general, but also to specific feminist critical practices. As Cook 
65 Dwoskin, p53.
66 Foucault, WA, in Caughie, p284.
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notes, master-discourse traditionally involved the “suppression of certain forms of 
discourse developed by women out of their history of oppression: some examples 
would be embroidery, diaries and letters... the personal diary form, for instance, has 
always been a means of self-expression for women to whom other avenues were 
closed. The suppression of the 'personal'... brings to the surface specific problems 
and contradictions for women.”67 Joanna herself writes that she is “aggressively in 
support of the 'minor' – I like my work to relate to a room rather than a gallery.”68
Many of Joanna's films were, in fact, letters sent to her sister Mary Paul in 
Australia  and her  films also  belong to  the  filmic  diary-form.  As Renan writes, 
“Traditionally  the  8mm has  been  a  home-movie  medium...  recently,  however... 
film-makers... have broken down any supposed barriers that existed between home-
movies and art.”69 All of Joanna's work as an author plays into this function; as a 
painter she worked almost exclusively in water-colour and gauche (both considered 
'amateur' mediums) and one of her major works as a curator was organising the 
woman's exhibition 'A Seasons Diaries', which “began when Joanna Paul read The 
Pillowbook of Sei  Shonagon and asked some women friends to document their 
lives during October 1977.”70 Joanna, and experimental practice in general, worked 
consistently to make previously invisible forms of art visible.
2) Finally, the author functions to produce “status” in our culture. The more 
status the author's name commands, the more “products/objects” they can sell (the 
more they are “worth”). Certain “authors,” for instance, have a particular status 
(more  freedom  to  “act”)  in  the  production  of  a  film.  A  Hollywood 
“producer/author” has more “power,” more “status,” on the set of their production 
than other workers (and therefore gets paid more money). In Benjamin's terms a 
“film set” (he uses a classical  theatre production) is comprised of “complicated 
machinery... gigantic supporting staff... [and] sophisticated effects,”71 all of which 
cost large amounts of money (often millions of dollars) and involve the hierarchical 
67 Pam Cook, “The Point of Self-Expression in Avant-Garde Film” (1977-8), in John Caughie (ed.), Theories of  
Authorship (Routledge, 1981) p272.
68 Paul, in O'Brien, p68.
69 Renan, p23.
70 Marian Evans, “This Used to be the Other Side of a Fence and it's Green Here Still,” in Visual Diaries with 
Contemporary NZ Film and Video Makers (Exhibition Catalogue, March, 1986).
71 Benjamin, p777.
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arrangement of workers from the author/producer down, mimicking the ideologies 
and class struggles of the “state.” For Benjamin (coming from a Marxist position) 
the central problem with capitalism is that it seeks to protect the (so-called) “upper-
classes”  (the  rich  and  powerful;  here,  the  “authors”  of  social  meaning  –  the 
producers, the writers, the directors) and repress the lower-classes (the cleaners, the 
drivers,  the  runners).  The status of  the author  on set  is  identical  to  that  of  the 
bourgeois and upper-class, working to protect their status as author (subjecting the 
workers to a position of non-author) for the duration of production, distribution and 
reception. Joanna's films (like most intercultural, experimental films) as I have said, 
are shot and edited solely by her, and exemplify what Pam Cook calls the 'artisanal' 
mode of film production.72
2.1) As Cook writes, “The film-maker, like a craft worker, is in control of 
all aspects of the process of production and distribution/exhibition, retaining rights 
of ownership over her or his film... it implies a particular mode of production which 
is  small-scale  and therefore,  in  a  capitalist  economy,  lies  outside the  dominant 
system. The 'product' does not have an immediately available market, or audience, 
and is not geared to profit, therefore the means of production must be as cheap as 
possible [and] made by individuals or small groups.”73 This also means that the 
film-maker is never forced by a contracts (or any legal documents) to make their 
film by a certain time, or in a certain way; the artisan is free to work when (and 
how) they please. And since the subject matter is personal and usually focuses on 
“things in their actual life,”74 rather than carefully dressed sets and locations, the 
film-maker  can  work  wherever  they  please.  As  Cook  writes,  “Historically, 
therefore, artisanal production stands in opposition both to the capitalist economic 
organisation... and the structure of labour within the industry.”75 Rather than being 
organised,  the artisan has an entirely  organic working schedule.  Joanna herself 
writes, “I have never worked well in a studio – they seem like dead places to me... 
I'm painting things like the coffee cup after a visitor has left. I am trying to capture 
72 Cook, p272.
73 Cook, p272-3.
74 Renan, p25.
75 Cook, p273.
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an  idea  from  life,  pursuing  it  in  a  poem  or  a  painting  or  a  collage  or  a 
photograph.”76
2.2) The author also gathers “status” socially as a “name,” and this “name” 
can be used to “brand” products. The Hollywood author's name, for instance, is not 
just used to sell their own product (the film) but also used to sell candy bars, soft-
drinks,  popcorn,  merchandise  and  future  movies.  The  mainstream  “film 
experience” does not just include the film itself, but also all the advertising and 
extra expenses (and expectations) which come with it. When I go to a mainstream 
movie, for instance, I like to buy tangy fruits (a kind of lolly). Without tangy fruits 
my  (mainstream)  movie  experience  really  isn't  the  “same”  (homogeneous). 
Experimental cinema, however, is not screened at mainstream cinemas (and never 
has been). There are no candy-bars and no advertisements (and often no seats – 
bring a cushion). I do not  expect anything from the experimental film experience 
before  going.  Every  screening  is  a  potentially  new  and  unknown  situation 
(heterogeneous).  Artisan-films are not made by companies and therefore do not 
'compete' in the marketplace (for “status”). They are “a deeply personal cinema... 
self-distributed or distributed by a small but dedicated group of truly independent 
distributors,”77 usually  friends  or  other  film-makers.  Films  are  screened  in  art-
galleries,  museums,  schools,  living  rooms,  festivals  and  film-archives.  Joanna's 
films,  for instance,  were screened by Martin Rumsby in the 1980s as a  part  of 
'Invisible  Cinema',  in  which Martin  travelled around NZ and Canada  screening 
experimental  films  from  his  backpack.78 Significantly,  Martin  was  a  friend of 
Joanna's,  rather  than  a  business  associate  and  no  'profit'  was  made from these 
exhibitions.
Although there are many more ways in which experimental cinema counters 
dominant  “authorship”  practices,  the  above  relations  should  suffice  to  illustrate 
certain aspects of 'free-discourse', in particular their radical difference to master-
discourse in terms of production, distribution and exhibition. Historically, Joanna's 
choices (and those of most, if not all, intercultural authors) provide an alternative to 
'master-discourse' and the capitalist ideology which invisibly flows through it. But 
76 O'Brien, p68.
77 Foster & Dixon, p2.
78 Rumsby, p4.
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Joanna's films are also experiences to be had in the present tense, not just existing 
as historical (ideological) moments, but also as a radical and personal experiences 
in  the  here  and  now.  This  indicates  a  change  from the  socio-historical  to  the 
phenomenological,  my  focus  shifting  from  social  positioning,  to  spectator 
positions.
2b. Poetic Situations: Here and Now
3) Finally Foucault shifts his attention to the 'here and now', the moment in 
which the spectator receives the text and the potential 'meanings' constructed by the 
text. Foucault argues that the (master) author “functions” to create an  absence of 
the author, an 'empty space' (a “subject-position”) which any spectator (regardless 
of sex, race, age, nationality) can 'fill' with their bodies and minds. It is this 'empty 
space'  which  Foucault  suggests  that  we interrogate,  this  space  which  is  not  an 
'author' but precisely the opposite: it is the author's deliberate 'absence', functioning 
as a “position” which “subjects” the spectator to a particular mode of reading (or 
watching). This 'subject-position' is fixed, and functions to 'unify' the fragments of 
any text into a coherent “statement,” or singular meaning. It also functions to 'unify' 
the  spectator  and  ignores  their  differences  in  terms  of  gender,  sexuality,  race, 
ethnicity, and so on (as it is designed for a 'uniform' spectator).
As with the production, distribution, exhibition and reception, the manner in 
which intercultural cinema 'functions'  in the  here and now is radically 'other'  to 
mainstream  textual  practices.  On  the  one  hand  intercultural  textual  practices 
counter-act those of dominant media practices (as such, I will devote a short space 
to discussing feminist critical responses and general attitudes toward the textual 
operations of master-discourse, before moving on to the manifold ways in which 
experimental cinema 'counters' this). On the other hand, this mode of 'countering' 
may give way to a  new experience, which is no longer 'counter' to anything, but 
'productive' in ways previously invisible.
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Annette  Kuhn observes  that  the dominant-form of  textual  practice has  a 
“highly specific set of rules.”79 She calls this the 'classic realist text' “in relation to 
film  sometimes  called  the  classic  Hollywood  text.”80 According  to  Kuhn  the 
defining feature of the 'classical  realist  text'  is  the effacement of the author (or 
'speaker/seer')  which  “perpetuates  illusionism,  the  notion  that,  in  the  case  of 
cinema, what is on screen is an uncoded reflection of the 'real world'.”81 In terms of 
generating  (or  'reading')  meaning  in  the  text,  this  becomes  problematic.  As 
discussed,  the dominant-form (often) suppresses voices of minority cultures (by 
controlling  who can be an author and what can be considered authored). Then it 
“hides  the  marks  of  enunciation,”  in  which  we  cannot  locate  an  “identifiable 
source,”82 thus effacing the fact that it is a 'vision' (or text) formed largely by white, 
male, heterosexual (and often Christian) authors. This gives the effect of the author 
being both 'absent' (as an idea) and simultaneously 'present' (as ideology).
Kuhn identifies two ways in which this 'illusionism' works as an ideological 
operation.  The  first  is  the  “concealment  of  processes  of  signification,”83 which 
enables  the  audience  to  forget  that  they  are  watching  a  narrated,  authored  and 
ideologically  powerful  image.  No  representational  image  is  without  a  hidden 
dimension, without an ideological power (to conform, to resist, or to create anew). 
The second concerns the available subject positions for the audience to occupy, or 
as Foucault would put it, the manipulation of 'shifters'. Kuhn argues that 'classic 
realist texts' “position their reading subjects as unitary and non-contradictory, and 
thus as neither active, nor as capable of intervention, in the signification process.”84 
That  is,  we  are  given  a  single,  homogeneous  subject-position  to  occupy  while 
experiencing the film in the 'here and now'. These two practices work together to 
efface the 'author' and we, as the audience, are stitched into the film's fabric. This 
process, called 'suture', is central to the classical text and refers to the way in which 
we are bound into the text as subjects “in the form of a stand in... [for] the element 
79 Kuhn, p38.
80 Kuhn, p28.
81 Kuhn, p156.
82 Kuhn, p50.
83 Kuhn, p157.
84 Kuhn, p157.
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which is lacking.”85 The authorial voice.
Kuhn  argues  that  the  'classical  realist  text'  is  a  form  of  'histoire'  (story 
making) “in which the source of enunciation – that absent term, the camera or 
author,  which  controls  the  discourse  and  organises  the  narrative  logic  –  is 
suppressed, the verb tense is an indefinite past of already completed events, and the 
more distant, impersonal pronouns of “he,” “she,” and “it” are engaged.”86 Kuhn 
comments that this has the effect of making “cinematic discourse – the process of 
meaning  production  –  invisible.”87 This  is  problematic  considering  that  many 
feminist  theorists  have  argued  (after  Laura  Mulvey)  that  “mainstream  films 
addressed a male rather than a female spectator and...  [that] female actors were 
objects not subjects, served up for the pleasure of a masculine spectator.”88
Finally, classical realist cinema tells 'stories', building “identification with 
fictional characters” which are often stereotyped and cliché. Kuhn continues, “by 
means of these identifications, the spectator is drawn into the film, so that when 
questions posed by the narrative are resolved by its closure, the spectator is also 
'closed',  completed  or  satisfied.”89 Thus  the  classical  realist  text  has  “one” 
dominantly intended meaning, and treats every audience member as if they had a 
“uniform” relation to the filmic world (positioning us as unitary subjects).90
In  Foucault's  analysis,  it  is  not  only  'histoire'  which  produces  'uniform 
subjects' but also its pair, 'discours'. Histoire, as I have said, is equivalent to using 
the verbal pronouns 'he' and 'she'. In textual 'discours', however, “the enunciative 
source is present... and the discursive relation is foregrounded by the engagements 
of the pronouns 'I' and 'you'.”91
The use of 'discours' and 'personal pronouns' is often seen as a solution to 
the problems surrounding the 'invisibility' of the author. However, though 'discours' 
85 Caughie, p298.
86 Sandy Flitterman-Lewis, To Desire Differently (Illinois University Press, 1990) p14.
87 Kuhn, p18. My italics.
88 Shepard, p126.
89 Kuhn, p157-8.
90 By “one meaning” I simply mean that, for instance, The Terminator (dir. James Cameron, 1980) has one dominant plot 
which can easily be described and therefore sold. A robot which looks like a human goes back in time to kill a woman, 
to win a future war between machines and humans. This is sometimes called “high concept,” indicating a film plot 
which can be easily communicated in one or two sentences. This enables the idea of the film to spread as a “meme” 
(which Richard Dawkins aligns with viruses).
91 Flitterman-Lewis, p14.
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presents a significant difference from 'histoire' in terms of audience experience, the 
'subject-position' (in Foucault's terms) remains  unitary. Many film documentaries 
utilise a voice-over referring to an “I” and sometimes to a “you.” This “I” still links 
together the various fragments of the text into a cohesive statement. Furthermore, 
the term “you” is usually only used in circumstances when “I” am an individual, 
but in textual discourse the term “you” refers to anyone who watches the film, thus 
positioning the audience as unitary, when the audience may be of  any sexuality, 
gender, race or ethnicity. Finally, in terms of authorship, Foucault argues that terms 
like “I,” “me” and “you” (when spoken by the “author” of the text) do not refer to 
the actual author, but to a re-presentation of the author as a character, as a second 
(or even third) ego. The author is therefore still absent to some degree. In this sense 
'discours' does not provide any solutions to Foucault's problems with authorship.
For Benjamin, like Foucault,  while we are subjected to the views of the 
authorial voice (reading the “pre-produced meaning” in the act of viewing) we are 
also (invisibly) subjected to the ideologies contained in the production history of 
the film (the “means of production”). For Benjamin, like many experimental film 
authors and feminist theorists, the question then becomes: in what way can a text be 
constructed which does  not,  1)  Make invisible  the “means  of  production,”  and 
produce the “illusion” of a uniform, coherent world, and, 2) Subject us to a pre-
produced, pre-pared and unitary position? The answer to both of these questions 
relates to the second part of Benjamin's thesis. On the one hand, as I have shown, 
he argues that  the author  might  make  choices at  the level  of production which 
indicate a certain political tendency. On the other hand he indicates a choice at the 
level of the 'text' which has the power to turn the audience into collaborators, to 
“induce other producers to produce.”92 This is what Benjamin called the “audience 
as producer.” Similar to Benjamin's notion of spectators as producers (rather than 
'uniform-subjects') are Kuhn, Gustav Bachelard and Julia Kristeva's conceptions of 
the “poetic,” and Deleuze's “any-space-whatevers” and “time-images.”
How  does  one  create  a  text  which  encourages  the  audience  to  become 
creators, to  become collaborators? Rather than “subjecting” us to an “objective” 
construction of “information” (whether in the  narrative plot of a (hi)story, or the 
92 Brecht, in Gerstner, p13.
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narrated plot of a documentary discourse) Benjamin argues that an author might 
choose to, 1) Produce texts with cheap, publicly available material and make these 
“means of production” visible to the audience in the experience of the text, thus 
reminding them of  how easy it  is  to  become an author  (after the fact)  and,  2) 
Produce texts which actively seek to create confusing, contradictory, non-cohesive 
images, thus suggesting that the author has not answered all the questions raised by 
the  work  and  that  each  spectator  will  have  to  decide  on  the  “meaning”  for 
themselves existentially (here and now). As Gene Youngblood writes, “Because it 
is entirely personal it rests on no identifiable plot and is not probable, the viewer is 
forced to create along with the film.”93 The “uniform subject” is deconstructed and 
replaced with a multiplicitous “spectator-producer,” capable of  intervening in the 
production of meaning. In both cases Benjamin suggests that these texts are “meant 
to  make  the  audience  adopt  a  critical  attitude.”94 As  Joanna  herself  writes, 
“Complexity,  plurality  essential  in  a  contemporary  world  where  there  is  no 
common understood. No common reader.”95
3.1) Joanna's films use the cheapest possible equipment and are made, as I 
have said, by a single person.  Nothing in Joanna's films is  pre-planned, or pre-
pared.  Everything feels  improvised and performed as if  by chance.  The subject 
matter, as I have said, is drawn from her personal life, and could be found in any 
house,  on  any  walk,  through  any  city.  Joanna's  films,  like  many  examples  of 
experimental and intercultural cinema let the audience know, “If one had the desire 
to do it, anyone could make a film.”96 In order to  remind the audience of these 
things Benjamin suggests that one must counteract and constantly challenge the 
'illusion' effect of dominant media by making the “means of production” visible 
through 'distancing'  the audience from the text.  As Kuhn writes,  “Distances are 
created everywhere which are, on the whole, detrimental to illusion.”97 Benjamin, 
drawing  on  Bertolt  Brecht's  work  as  a  playwright  (which  he  uses  as  a  central 
example) describes a text which is a clash of “models,” incorporating title-cards, 
93 Gene Youngblood, Expanded Cinema (Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1970) p64.
94 Kuhn, p161.
95 Paul and Eagle, p95.
96 Foster & Dixon, p3.
97 Brecht, in Kuhn, p161.
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folk-songs,  poetry  and  non-realist  acting  (among  other  things) interjected 
throughout a more traditional narrative.
In Joanna's films I am 'distanced' in one particular way: silence. This silence 
was, in Joanna's words, 'essential' to her cinema.98 Silence distances me from the 
screen and reminds me that the image is not 'real', but an authored construction. 
Joanna's films also distance me in terms of her embodied use of the super8 camera. 
The films shake, move and jolt, just as a camera really does when it is used to 
record memories (rather than when it  is used to create  an 'illusion'  of  the 'real' 
world). There is no point at which I can forget the 'authored' instance, or that this 
film is enunciated by a 'camera eye'. In this sense, I am constantly reminded of the 
camera, and its “means of production” as I watch. Not only this, but because there 
is no particular narrative, or plot, I am given the space to reflect on the production 
of  the  image  (which  would  not  usually  dominate  my  mind  in  a  mainstream 
narrative film).
3.2) How does a text make the audience into producers of meaning? By 
creating the kind of text which has no one interpretation: by making a film which 
resists uniform description. Brecht's clashing of modes, for instance, means that the 
audience is  able  to  reflect  on the construction of  the  text  and their  role  in  the 
production of meaning as they watch the text. As the various interjections (songs, 
inter-titles and so on) are so different to the narrative sequences, they bring to the 
fore the processes involved in producing meaning. As Brecht writes, the audience is 
forced “to think, to reflect on [their] position in the process of production.”99 Kuhn 
astutely points out that there are at least two ways of making the audience aware of 
their  role  in  the  production  of  meaning:  1)  The  'deconstructive'  and,  2)  The 
'feminine', 'open' or 'poetic' model of discourse. Brecht's 'distances', or interjections, 
produce  what  Kuhn  calls  a  'deconstruction'.  As  Kuhn  writes,  deconstructive 
cinematic practice “works by a process of breaking down... the textual operations 
and modes of address characteristic of dominant cinema.”100 However, in producing 
a deconstruction of dominant codes, the purely deconstructive text still signifies a 
semi-unitary viewer. As Kuhn writes, deconstruction has a point to prove, an axe to 
98 Paul, “Shibusha,” p10.
99 Brecht, in Gerstner, p12.
100Kuhn, p160.
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grind, and “in some degree works in the direction of closure, of restricting the range 
of  meanings  potentially  available  [in]  a  text.”101 The  'poetic'  incorporates 
'deconstruction'  but  also  works  to  produce  images  which  move  “towards  the 
construction  of  new,  non  dominant  forms”102 of  cinematic  enjoyment,  and 
“privilege relations of subjectivity which are radically 'other' to the fixity of subject 
relations set up by dominant forms.”103
Similarly, Gustav Bachelard writes that the 'poetic image' “must appear and 
reappear...  in  the  very ecstasy of  the newness  of  the  image.”104 Bachelard,  like 
Benjamin,  sees  the  poetic  image  as  an   unprepared  experience,  which  can  be 
intellectually 'shocking' (“nothing prepares a poetic image”105) having the power to 
“make of the reader a poet.”106 For Bachelard “Poetry... introduce[s] freedom in the 
very  body  of  the  language.  As  a  result,  poetry  appears  as  a  phenomenon  of 
freedom.”107 Here,  this  is  a  freedom from the dominant  unitary subject-position 
(which pervades the dominant forms of textual discourse available to an author: 
histoire,  discours and  deconstruction).  Similarly,  Roland  Barthes  refers  to  the 
difference between “the pleasure to be obtained by closure or resolution” of the 
classical  text  “and  the  'bliss'  (jouissance)  of  the  text  which  challenges  such 
pleasures.”108 How do Joanna's films create “poetic” images? Firstly, I am always 
aware that a camera is looking at the images and that an author is selecting them 
and cutting them together. Secondly, most of Joanna's films use a fragmented style 
of  montage  which  denies  narrative  representation  and  a  close-up  (fragmented) 
mise-en-scene which constantly oscillates between representation and abstraction.
Kuhn, drawing on feminist theorist Julia Kristeva, aligns the possibility for 
a “feminine” authorship practice with the 'poetic-image'. In the first place, “A text 
may embody or  produce  the  poetic  to  the  degree that  it  brings  to  the  fore  the 
processes by which it constructs its own meaning”109 and works against closure (of 
101Kuhn, p16.
102Kuhn, p167.
103Kuhn, p168.
104Gustav Bachelard, The Poetics of Space (1958: Beacon Press, 1969) pxi.
105Bachelard, pxx.
106Bachelard, pxxi.
107Bachelard, pxxiii.
108Kuhn, p17.
109Kuhn, p13. Kuhn is drawing primarily on Julia Kristeva (1976).
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the 'plot') which “is a feature of dominant 'masculine' language, to the extent that 
such a language embodies a hierarchy of meanings, and implies a subjection to, a 
completion and closure of, meaning.”110 Joanna's films are what Kristeva calls a 
'radical  signifying  practice'  “which  challenge  dominant  modes  by  placing 
subjectivity in process, making the moment of reading one in which meanings are 
set in play rather than consolidated or fixed.”111
The more abstract a film becomes, the more the spectator has to draw their 
own conclusions as to what the images mean, the more a spectator has to construct 
meaning  for  themselves  from the  fragments  of  things  seen.  In  terms  of  Gilles 
Deleuze's fascinating study of cinematic signs, central to Marks textual analysis of 
“intercultural  cinema,”  Joanna's  films  are  “time-images.”  Deleuze  begins  by 
analysing  cinematic-images  into  two  kinds:  “movement-images”  and  “time-
images.” In Marks' reading of Deleuze, the “movement-image” refers to the clichéd 
'classical  realist  text'  of  dominant,  Hollywood,  narrative  cinema.112 The  “time-
image,”  however,  characterises  “avant-garde  works  that,  in  their  suspicion  of 
representation, force the viewer to draw upon his or her subjective resources to 
complete  the  image.”113 The  first  two  signs  of  the  “time-image”  are  “optical 
images” and “sound images” (what we see, and what we hear).114 In the time-image 
the  'visual'  and  'aural'  are  deconnected,  foregrounding  the  construction  of  the 
image. The cliché “movement-image” does not cause the spectator to examine the 
difference between what is 'seen' and what is 'heard' (it gives the illusion of being 
'invisibly' or 'naturally' constructed). Joanna's films, as I have said, are silent and 
produce a continual “time-image,” a constant disconnection between the seen and 
the heard. When I listen I hear nothing but the natural sounds of the theatre: other 
audience member's moving around, breathing.  I hear the projector. The repetitive 
clack of the machine seems to sink into the image, giving the flickering pulse a 
kind of mechanical rhythm, her film's  fragmented montage having the effect of 
110Kuhn, p17.
111Kuhn, p12. Kuhn cites Helene Cixous (1980) and Julia Kristeva (1975). My italics.
112Which Marks also extends to narrative and experimental “documentaries.” See Laura Marks, “The Sign of the Times: 
Deleuze, Peirce and the Documentary Image” [SoT], in Gregory Flaxman (ed.), The Brain is the Screen (University of 
Minnesota Press, 2000), p194.
113Marks, SoF, p42.
114Sometimes called 'opsigns' and 'sonsigns'.
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what Deleuze calls an assemblage (rather than a narrative).
It  is worth quoting Marks at length here;  “The optical image, because it 
cannot be explained and mobilised into action, requires the viewer to puzzle over it. 
The inability to recognise an image encourages us to confront the limits of our 
knowledge,  while  the  film's  refusal  to  extend  into  action  constitutes  the  film's 
refusal to “explain” and neutralise the virtual image [into an 'actual', pre-formed 
meaning].115 Because the  viewer  cannot  confidently  link the  optical  image with 
other images through causal relationships, she is forced to search her memory for 
other virtual images that might make sense of it.”116 The optical-image calls into 
play  our  “attentive  recognition”  (rather  than  our  habitual,  “motor-sensory” 
memory).  Marks  continues,   “Attentive  recognition  is  a  participatory  notion  of 
spectatorship, whose political potential shouldn't be ignored. If a viewer is free to 
draw upon her own reserves of memory as she participates in the creation of the 
object on screen, her private and unofficial histories and memories will be granted 
as much legitimation as the official histories that make up the realm of the cliché – 
if not more.”117
Foucault's analysis of “discursive practices” and textual “subject-positions” 
is what he calls an “archaeology.” Marks argues that by making me aware of my 
position in the process of producing meaning, a film is capable of providing a site 
(or  “situation”)  in  which  the  spectator  does  “archaeology,”  in  which  I  am 
encouraged to  do philosophy in order to begin to comprehend the images from a 
perspective of 'meaning'.  Marks'  archaeology finds its tools largely in Deleuze's 
analysis of what might be understood as the 'subject positions' produced dominantly 
in the cliché, 'classical realist text' (movement-images) and the various 'producer 
positions' in avant-garde, experimental cinema (time-images).
115Deleuze contrasts the 'virtual' to the 'actual' state of the image. Drawing on quantum-theory Deleuze argues that the 
“virtual image” exists in a multiplicity of states before “actualising” in the here and now. A 'classical realist text' 
(movement-image) works to “actualise” the image (and to suppress the virtual multiplicity of every image). A time-
image releases the virtual and refuses to “actualise” the image into a known form. As Robert Pastor writes, “In quantum 
physics, multiple possibilities exist—are superposed—and it is not until observation (or, synonymously for this purpose, 
measurement) that the state function collapses to just one of these actualities.” Robert Paster, New Physics and the Mind. 
Internet WWW page, at URL: <http://newphysicsandthemind.net/6.html> (version current 1/1/2008).
116Marks, SoF, p47.
117Marks, SoF, p48.
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3. Representation, Reflection and the Poetic
“Sound people are like water.”118
“How we see what we see—the process of vision—how one ‘interprets roses’, 
the subtle changes of colour or linear direction yielded to an intent gaze, and 
then what happens when one turns one head—never cease to interest me. The 
visual world is inexhaustible.”119
“I  find  the  cinematographic  philosophy  of  Gilles  Deleuze  most  useful  to 
explore  how  intercultural  cinema  performs  a  multiphased  activity  of 
excavation,  falsification,  and  fabulation...  from  deconstructing  dominant 
histories to creating new conditions for new stories.”120
Let  us  very  quickly  recap:  I  am arguing  that  Joanna's  films  are  “time-
images.” In 'movement-image cinema' shots progress according to the “sensible,”121 
according to a comprehensive, linear narrative. The time-image draws attention to 
its own status as an “image” and “assembles” images in a fashion that does not 
produce expected “actions,” or “reactions,”  but foregrounds cinema's  essentially 
fragmented  nature.  As  Marks  writes,  the  time-image  “is  contrasted  with  the 
sensory-motor  image  of  movement-image  cinema,  in  particular  the  cliché,  a 
commonsense,  hegemonic  idea  that  extends  unproblematically  into  action.”122 
Within  “time-images”  the  viewer's  own  resources  are  drawn  upon  in  order  to 
“complete” the image, and they are turned into a self-aware “producer” of meaning. 
In Marks' terms, the time-image leaves a “gap” for each viewer's own “regimes of 
knowledge” to be used in constructing “meaning.” A feminist carpenter who loves 
118Janet Paul, p11.
119Joanna Paul, A Chronology (Exhibition Catalogue: Wanganui, 1989) p5.
120Marks, SoF, p26.
121Marks, SoF, p31.
122Marks, SoF, p46. My italics.
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philosophy,  for  instance,  will  have  different  “regimes  of  knowledge”  than  a 
capitalist  business  manager  who loves  flower  arranging.  In  Joanna's  films,  and 
other intercultural cinema, these regimes of knowledge are equally called upon in 
each viewer. In cliché, mainstream movement-image cinema, on the other hand, the 
“gaps” are closed, artificially sewn together (as in “suture”) and the multiplicity of 
spectators are produced (initially) as a unified “consumer” in a capitalist society. 
When I  watch a  cliché,  mainstream film there  is  no need to  draw on feminist 
politics,  carpentry, business management or flower arranging. In Joanna's films, 
however, I have the option to draw on any of these “knowledges” in my activity of 
collaborating with the film, in my attempt to produce meaning.
Joanna's  “time-images”  are  firstly  'real'  super8mm  home-movies, 
foregrounded by their silence and the unconventional manner in which they were 
screened (and for me, the way they have been transferred to DVD). Joanna's films 
function  as  'real'  home-movies,  circulating  in  the  personal  worlds  of  Joanna's 
family  and friends.  Because  their  “meanings”  as  home-movies  are  private,  and 
inaccessible to me (I wasn't at any of the events depicted in the films and don't 
personally know any of the people) I feel often feel meaningfully 'distanced' from 
the images. These are like what Deleuze calls “recollection-images,” important to 
Marks  readings  of  intercultural  cinema.  As  Marks  writes,  “because  official 
histories,”  which  narrative,  mainstream  cinema  is  one  example  of,  “with  their 
official image repertoires [movement images],  are often at odds with the private 
histories of disenfranchised people, it is recollection-images – such as memories... 
[that] confront the public and the private with each other.”123
But these recollection-images are not within my “regime of knowledge.” As 
a spectator I confront Joanna's filmed recollections, coming face to face with them, 
but as Joanna's films and images are so personal, so much a part of her private 
history, there is no way for me to enter into discourse with them. They do not seem 
to mean anything. As Marks writes, “What is more disturbing is when the optical 
image cannot be connected to any living memory,” or cannot be “recollected” as an 
“image.” Marks continues, “When I  find a high school yearbook at a flea market... 
I confront a virtual image that does not correspond to my [previous] experience... 
123Marks, SoF, p50.
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When attentive recognition fails – when we do not recognise or cannot remember – 
it creates.”124
The optical-image, when it does not extend into recognition, for the public 
audience, dovetails into “seeing,” into a kind of “attentive perception.” As Deleuze 
writes, characters in time-image cinema halt the “action” of the narrative, and “the 
viewer's problem becomes 'What is there to see in the image?' (and not now 'What 
are  we  going  to  see  in  the  next  image?')”125 In  Joanna's  films,  rather  than  a 
character seeing  on screen, the “film's eye” (the screen) is the “character” of the 
film and it is me, the spectator, who is left to finally SEE. But what is it which I am 
left to see? Or, as Marks writes, “To raise the stakes of the optical image, we might 
ask what's the point of “finally SEEING” if there's nothing to see? What's the point 
of having our clichés and preconceptions blown away if we have no subsequent 
course of action?”126 What does it mean to SEE?
In returning me to “seeing,” to “perception” itself I argue that Joanna's films 
foreground  the  act  of  “perception”  itself,  foregrounding  what  Deleuze  calls 
“perception-images” (a way of “thinking” seeing). Perception-images are the first 
register of the “movement-image.” By returning me to visible “movement-images,” 
to  self-aware  perception-images,  Joanna's  textual  choices  perform  a  cinematic 
archaeology which I can re-perform in the experience of the films. There are three 
registers to the movement-image: perception, affection, and action. Deleuze writes 
that, “A film is never made up of a single kind of image... Nevertheless a film, at 
least  in  its  most  simple characteristics,  always has one type of image which is 
dominant: one can speak of an active, perceptive or affective montage, depending 
on the predominant type.”127
Firstly I find that Joanna's films foreground their perception-images, and I 
am drawn to contemplating the nature of perception itself. However, on a second 
viewing I find that the “affection-image” is foregrounded. At other times, I find 
“action-images” foregrounded. In Joanna's style of montage I find all three modes 
of image foregrounded, all at the same time. This style of montage is not unique to 
124Marks, SoF, p50.
125Deleuze, in Marks, SoF, p63. My italics.
126Marks, SoF, p63.
127Deleuze, The Movement Image (1985: Athlone Press, 1989) p70.
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Joanna's filmmaking practices (Stan Brakhage is another obvious example, as is 
Marie Menken, or Nathaniel Dorsky) but her manner of handling it and expressing 
its  contents  within these  formal  restrictions  (as  I  have  outlined  earlier;  silence, 
fragmented assemblage, personal subject matter,  non-narrative) is unique to her. 
For  Deleuze  one  of  the  key  differences  between  movement-images  and  time-
images is the gap between habitual and attentive-recognition (images which need 
no thought to understand and those that must be thought through). In Joanna's films 
I find a kind of attentive movement-image (in which I am made aware of the limits 
of movement with respect to time).
* * * *
Either: Sometimes when I watch Joanna's films I see through a “perceptive 
eye,”  and  find  the  poetry  of  vision  flowing  through  the  images,  linking  the 
fragments together (as I have indicated above). This is the first register of Deleuze's 
movement-image.
Or: Other times when I watch Joanna's films I don't see “perceptions” as 
such.  Instead,  I  see  concrete  assemblages,  pure  fragments,  affection-images 
merging  together  in  what  Deleuze  calls  an  “any-space-whatever”  (the  second 
register of the movement-image). While perception-images designate a relationship 
between the frame and that which is framed, the  affection-image is designated by 
close-ups and in particular the close-up of the face (or objects which 'face' us).
Both/And: As I watch Joanna's films more and more I get used to thinking 
with both of these concepts in my head at the same time. This allows me to make 
further connections between images. Perception comes into contact with affection, 
and affection with perception. An action-image, the third register of the movement-
image, then occurs between them. Though it may seem unusual for a filmmaker to 
foreground three different modes of viewing, in poetic texts (and particularly the 
haiku poem, as we shall see) this is common practice. It is important to realise that 
this is not a randomness of meaning, or non-meaning (non-sense). Joanna's films 
shatter  meaning  (the  time-image)  and  in  its  wake  produce  works  which  have 
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genuine multiplicities of readings, creating new and vibrant connections between 
self-aware  cinematic  thought  (attentive  movement-images,  rather  than  habitual, 
clichéd movement-images).
Something Rosalind Krauss wrote about the abstract painter Piet Mondrian 
feels applicable to Joanna's work here, considering her grounding in 'modernism'; 
“Given  the  visual,  or  formal,  consistency  of  Mondrian's  mature  style  and  the 
passion of his theoretical pronouncements, we would think that work of this sort 
would have to hold one position or the other [either/or]; and because the chosen 
position contains a definition about the very nature of the goals of art, one would 
think that an artist would certainly not want to confuse the issue by seeming to 
imply both [and]. Yet this is exactly what Mondrian does.”128
* * * *
Either: On the one hand, the time-image, “powerless to draw upon resources 
of common sense [the spectator] question[s]... everything about how this particular 
image got to be constructed from a given perception [or perception-image].”129 The 
“perception-image” is the first register of the movement-image and refers (initially) 
to  the  image's  possibility  of  belonging  to  one  of  three  categories  of  “textual 
practice” as I have discussed in the previous section: 'histoire' (what Deleuze calls 
an  “objective”  perception-image),  'discourse'  (a  “subjective”  perception-image, 
which includes “point-of-view” shots from a character's, or camera's, perspective), 
and  what  Deleuze,  after  Jean  Mitry,  calls  a  'semi-subjective'  perception-image 
(which I will talk about in detail later). Crudely, the perception-image details the 
relationship between, 1) A character, or object (who also 'sees') and 2) The frame 
which  sees  everything  (in  the film) and positions  the  characters  and objects  in 
relation to the camera-eye (and spectator). Deleuze suggests that there are two ways 
of treating the perception-image, regardless of its status as objective, subjective or 
semi-subjective: either to suppress the “perceiver” (privileging the perceived, what 
is represented on screen), or to make us aware of the perceiver/camera in relation 
128Rosalind E. Krauss, The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths (The MIT Press, 1985) p19.
129Marks, SoF, p42.
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to the perceived/character (thus drawing my attention out of the frame, to the body 
doing this perceiving). Deleuze calls this, after Pier Paolo Pasolini, 'free-indirect-
discourse',  or  the  “poetry  of  cinema.”130 In  Joanna's  films  there  are  constant 
reminders that the 'eye' of the camera is in the act of seeing, regardless of the mode 
of  discourse  (subjective,  objective  or  semi-subjective).  Some  of  Joanna's  films 
foreground  objective  perception-images,  while  some  foreground  subjective 
perception-images.  Others  foreground  semi-subjective  perception-images. 
However, regardless of the initial 'state' of the image, all of her films also produce a 
sense  of  'free-indirect-discourse'  (an  eventual  breakdown  of  objectivity  and 
subjectivity).
Self-conscious 'free-indirect-discourse' is what Deleuze and Guattari might 
call a 'rhizome' structure (rather than the 'tree' structure of classical 'narrative').131 A 
'rhizome'  has  two  (or  more)  layers  which  interact,  rather  than  one  linear  plot 
(whether you are talking plots of movies, or plotting a graph). In cinematic 'free-
indirect-discourse'  there  are  (at  least)  two layers  (the frame and what  is  in  the 
frame),  each  able  to  establish  multiple points  of  connection  between them.  In 
Joanna's film Task, for instance, the “objective” status of the frame is foregrounded, 
while simultaneously the character performing the task (ironing the washing) is 
foregrounded  as  a  “subject”  (subject  to  the  codes  of  'histoire').  In  Bosshard's  
House,  a  film which  highlights  its  “subjective”  frame,  I  am shown a  series  of 
“objects” one after the other. In all cases subjects are layered over objects, and 
objects over subjects. This 'rhizome' structure allows for a constant  play between 
the nature of subjectivity and objectivity to occur in Joanna's films.
Later in Bosshard's House I see a 'subject', a woman who I come to think of 
as the 'mother' of the Bosshard children (though I cannot be sure). As a 'subject' she 
is not 'subjected' to the view of the camera and takes power in looking directly at  
the camera. In this moment the image shifts from a perception-image to a classical 
“affection-image” (a close-up of the face), the second register of the movement-
image.  The  woman's  action  of  looking  directly  at  the  camera  changes  the 
relationship  of  the  subjective  and  objective  perceptions,  “shifting”  them.  She 
130Deleuze, MI, p74.
131D&G, TP, p3-28.
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becomes the 'subject' and the camera's status as an 'object' is revealed in the reversal 
of glances. Hence, there is now a subject/object on both sides of the relationship 
between the perceiver (the 'eye' of the camera) and the perceived (on screen). In 
this instance subjectivity and objectivity have been set in 'process' and shatter the 
usually fixed categories of “objects” and “subjects” to produce a “reversal.” As 
Kristeva writes, in the poetic subjectivity (and objectivity) are placed “in process, 
making the moment of reading one in which meanings are  set in play rather than 
consolidated or fixed.”132
As the perception-image is replaced by an affection-image (which Deleuze 
significantly links to “expression” and the “face”) and the subjective and objective 
change places I am reminded that the 'eye' of the film is not just thinking the images 
in  a  certain  way  (histoire,  discourse,  semi-subjective,  free-indirect)  but  is  also 
existentially present  to  the  seen/scene.  Joanna's  films  foreground  the  embodied 
existence of the camera, regardless of the modes of perception. In this moment of 
reversal I experience another kind of “time-image.” This time-image renders the 
perception as “a stranded eyeball,”133 as an “empowered eye.”134 Deleuze writes that 
certain time-images may indicate the “genesis of an unknown body”135 and that the 
affection-image  is  a  mode  of  “becoming”  which  has  transformative  powers.136 
Hence, I argue that the “eye” of the film is a “genesis of an unknown body” which 
“becomes” the woman who looks at it. In this moment I (the spectator) become the 
woman also,  and find myself  looking at  the house from her perspective,  seeing 
things as a mother might, thinking (as much as is possible) her thoughts. In terms of 
Mulvey's  critique  of  the  dominant  cinema's  “male  centred  perspective”  my 
“becoming female” through the 'eye' of the camera is politically (and personally) 
significant. Joanna's films 'change' me, rather than 'fix' me. I am opened, rather than 
closed.
Here I would like to draw on Vivian Sobchack's work, as Marks does, to 
thicken  Deleuze's  concepts.  Sobchack,  referring  to  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty, 
132Kuhn, p12. Kuhn cites Helene Cixous (1980) and Julia Kristeva (1975). My italics.
133Deleuze, in Marks, SoF, p42.
134Marks, SoF, p19.
135Deleuze, The Time-Image, in Marks, SoF, p127.
136Marks, SoT, p196-7.
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describes a movement between subjectivity and objectivity (a “reversal”) which 
allows  them  to  change  places  and  interact  with  each  other,  much  as  I  have 
described  above.  Classically,  our  perception  is  thought  of  as  “subjective,”  as 
partial, and therefore limiting. Going back to Rene Descartes' philosophy the notion 
of subjectivity (in the West) has been perceived as cutting us off from “objective” 
world (because I experience everything through the senses, which are subjective by 
their  very  nature,  I  cannot  know  the  outer  world  as  objective).  However,  in 
Merleau-Ponty's analysis when someone looks us in the eye there is an exchange of 
“subject” and “object.” In seeing someone see us, we finally SEE that we are both 
subject and object, rather than a “unified subject.”137 When I see someone looking 
at me I realise that, for them, I am part of the objective world, and hence I have 
genuine knowledge of this object, for I am the objective. This is what Merleau-
Ponty  calls  “intersubjectivity.”138 Intersubjectivity  involves  at  least  “two 
subjectivities properly speaking, two subjects each of which has its own first person 
existence,”139 in which subjectivity and objectivity are superimposed, and entangled 
“one in the other,”140 forming  “a single system”141 of intersubjectivity.
One form of “intersubjectivity” is foregrounded in Joanna's films through 
the  “signed”  relations  of  looking  and  the  use  of  'free-indirect-discourse'.  This 
intersubjectivity  is  not  Sobchack's  concern  however.  For  Sobchack  it  is  the 
intersubjectivity  of  the  film  and  the  spectator  which  grounds  an  existential 
phenomenology of cinema. For Sobchack, one may choose to experience all films 
as  a  perpetual  “time-image,”  in  which  the  perception  continually  expresses  a 
stranded eyeball. Every film perceives, regardless of how it chooses to “think” this 
perception.  For  Deleuze  the  screen  is  a  “brain”  which  “thinks”  images.142 For 
Sobchack the screen is an “eye” which “lives” images, and  expresses a  “body” 
which we, as spectators, “wear” intersubjectively. Very crudely, if the film is a big 
137The 'universal subject' “symbolically and politically represent[s] the interests and ideals of a highly privileged and 
determinate community of (usually) men.” (Moscovici, p3)
138Gary Brent Madison, The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (Ohio University Press, 1981) p37-45.
139Madison, p41.
140Merleau-Ponty, in Madison, p40.
141Madison, p40.
142As Deleuze writes, “The brain is the screen... Cinema isn't theatre, rather it makes bodies out of the grains.” Deleuze, 
“The Brain is the Screen: An Interview with Gilles Deleuze,” in Gregory Flaxman (ed.), The Brain is the Screen 
(University of Minnesota Press, 2000) p366. These “bodies out of grains” are significant in terms of the “unknown 
bodies” I analyse in the first chapter and the “grains” I analyse in the second.
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'eye'  (visibly  perceived  through)  then  it  also  implicates  a  big  'body'  (invisibly 
expressed)  which  we,  as  the  audience,  experience  with  our  bodies 
(intersubjectively).  As  Sobchack  writes,  “Thus,  Merleau-Ponty's  primacy  of 
perception  is  always  also  a  primacy  of  expression,  the  latter  articulated  as  the 
visible gesture of the former,” and therefore “every lived body [here, a film's body] 
is both the subject of perception and expression and an object for perception and 
expression in a simultaneous subjective and objective modality.”143 
However, Sobchack argues that a film cannot intentionally express its own 
existential  presence,  and maintains  that  this  is  a  freedom which belongs to  the 
spectator alone. I would argue that “intercultural cinema” constantly expresses its 
own  bodily  presence,  forming  an  “intersubjective  machine”  foregrounding 
“perception” as an ongoing  process, which never completely closes, or fixes the 
relationship  between  subjectivity  and  objectivity  for  the  spectator.  Perception, 
intersubjectivity, and the “film's body” are the subjects of the first chapter of this 
thesis,  which  seeks  to  explore  the  way  in  which  Deleuze's  “film brain”  might 
“think” its own intersubjective “body.”
Gene  Youngblood  gives  another  interesting  take  on  this  same  problem, 
applied directly to experimental cinema. What could be interpreted as a cinematic 
example  of  Merleau-Ponty's  'intersubjectivity'  is  described  by  Youngblood  as 
“Synaesthetic Cinema” in which there is the “simultaneous perception of harmonic 
opposites.”144 This amounts to the perception of space and time as a “space-time 
continuum.  It  is  neither  subjective,  [or]  objective...  but  rather  all  these 
combined.”145 Synaesthetic cinema does not use traditional dualisms, such as 'he 
and she' or 'I and you', operating instead on a new logic of “both/and, which in 
physics is called triadic logic,”146 breaking down traditional notions of succession, 
observing  the  superimposition of  particles  in  space  and  the  entanglement of 
particles in time, in which “the subjective and objective are one.”147 Drawing on 
Buddhism,  quantum  physics  and  Michael  Snow's  Wavelength,  Youngblood 
143Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye [AoE] (Princeton University Press, 1992) p41.
144Youngblood, p81.
145Youngblood, p81.
146Youngblood, p81-2.
147Youngblood, p46.
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describes “Synaesthetic Cinema” as a process of perceiving without “'meaning' in 
the conventional sense. Its meaning is the relationship between film and viewer. 
We are interested in what it does, rather than what it  is... The confrontation of art 
and spectator, and the spectator's resultant self-perception, is an experience rather 
than  a  meaning...  [which]  replaces  object-consciousness  with  metaphysical 
relation-consciousness... romance is born in the space between events.”148
I would argue then, that Joanna's films have not only a 'body', a “point of 
view upon the world,”149 but also have (through being self-conscious of its viewing 
position  as  an  'I/eye'  and  'body')  a  'mind'  which  itself  thinks  about  the  act  of 
perceiving images in general.  This argument is put forward by Bruce Kawin in 
Mindscreen, who writes that “it is possible to encode the image in such a way that 
it gives the impression of being perceived by a consciousness.”150 He goes on to 
write,  “Self-consciousness  most  often  expresses  itself  through  mindscreen, 
characterising the aural and visual fields as those of  its own mentation.”151 Thus, 
through seeing itself as a film, Joanna's films  think about themselves, or have a 
mind.  And as I am given the silence to contemplate this consciousness as it 'thinks' 
about its own manner of perceiving the world (perception-images), I am entwined 
in  the  'flesh'  of  the  film's  thought  (affection-images).  Perception  reverses  into 
expression.  I  think  with Joanna's  films,  perhaps  even  as them,  questioning  my 
previous assumptions about the manner in which I have come to act toward cinema. 
As Merleau-Ponty writes, “this new reversibility and the emergence of the flesh as 
expression are the point of insertion of... thinking in the world of silence.”152
Or: On the one hand Joanna's films foreground the process of “perception,” 
the first register of Deleuze's “movement-images,” and Sobchack's intersubjective 
“film  body.”  On  the  other  hand  Joanna's  films  also  foreground  each  image's 
fragmented nature as “affection-images” and belong equally to what Deleuze calls 
the “any-space-whatever” (a special case of the affection-image). An “any-space-
whatever” is firstly a space which foregrounds the essentially fragmented nature of 
148Youngblood, p126-7.
149Sobchack, AoE, p39.
150Kawin, pxi.
151Kawin, p19.
152Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (Northwestern University Press, 1968) p144-5. My italics.
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film and, in its most extreme forms, rejects linear narrative altogether. An any-
space-whatever not only foregrounds fragmentation, but also the “emptiness” of 
spatial organisation.153 Once emptied this “space” then fills with shadows, lights, 
greys (and then colours). Affection-images (or “affects,” as Deleuze affectionately 
refers to them) designate the realm of the close-up and in particular the close-up of 
the “face” (though it can equally refer to objects). The cliché affection-image is 
constructed so that we do not notice the transition from perception to affection, 
from the longer-shot to the close-up. The poetic affection-image foregrounds the 
(essentially)  fragmented  nature  of  film,  and  draws  the  eye  away  from 
'representation',  delving  into  the  'abstract'  recesses  of  the  “film's  mind”  and 
“thought” (philosophy).
The  second  chapter  of  this  thesis  looks  at  Joanna's  films  from  the 
perspective of the “any-space-whatever” and the foregrounding of “fragmentation,” 
“emptiness,” and “shadows.” This, I will argue, when interwoven with Sobchack's 
notion  of  the  “film  body,”  produces  what  Deleuze  and  Guattari  call  a  “Body 
without Organs” (a “BwO”), or in this case, a “film's BwO.” Bodies have two ways 
of being “organised” according to Deleuze and Guattari. Firstly we are organised 
according to our “desires,” which are prepared by capitalism. When I go to the shop 
and buy food this food was prepared for me, and I am pre-organised to consume it. 
Everything I consume is prepared for me, and “subjects” me to the processes of 
mass-consumption. The organised body is a “consumer,” a body organised to desire 
commodity.
The BwO refers to bodies which organise themselves differently from those 
modes  of  organisation  which  help  the  “state”  (of  capitalism)  to  “function” 
successfully  in  terms  of  “meaning.”  The  BwO  is  opposed  to  all  state  (static) 
“organisation”154 and all fixed philosophical systems.155 The BwO is an assemblage 
(of fragments) rather than a narrative.156 It is a “rhizome” of “becomings” populated 
by “multiplicities” (rather than a “narrative” of “beings” populated by “unities”). 
There are a vast number of tendencies and terms which lead to the construction of a 
153Or of the film-body's “organs.”
154D&G, TP, p175.
155One does not produce systems, but free-floating, useful concepts (a toolbox).
156D&G, TP, p179.
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“full body without organs,” some of which I will discuss in the body of this essay 
(and some which I will not). The BwO, like the any-space-whatever, is “emptied” 
and then “filled” with intensities (lights/shadows). In one sense the BwO refers to 
those bodies which the state defines as “mad” or “insane” and in other senses it 
refers  to  any  bodily  experiences  which  are  not  limited  to  pre-organised  mass-
consumption.  Meditation,  creating  art,  flower  arranging,  rock-climbing, 
philosophy,  poetry  –  all  these  (and  many  other  practices)  may  bring  the 
consciousness and body of a person closer to their BwO, to an experience of the 
body  as  pure  “intensities.”  The  BwO is  that  which  interweaves  “free-indirect-
discourse”  (an  “act  of  perception”)  and  an  “any-space-whatever”  together, 
occurring in the “gap” (or “chiasm”) between them.157
Both/And:  Firstly,  in  clichéd  movement-image  cinema  the  “perception-
image”  is  dominantly  'histoire'  and  avoids  poetics.  Secondly,  close-ups,  or 
“affection-images,”  are  not  used  to  accentuate  fragmentation,  but  to  convey 
character's  thoughts  through  a  facial  expression.  Drawing  on  C.S.  Peirce's 
taxonomy of  signs,  Deleuze  indicates  that  these  images  work  in  cycles  within 
narrative. In a scene, for example, we pass from the character perceiving (objective 
perception-image), to the  object/subject they see (subjective perception-image), to 
a  close-up  of  the  “face,”  which  suggests  the  characters  internal  feelings  and 
thoughts  toward  what  they  have  seen  (affection-image).  Then  they  perform an 
“action” (the action-image).
In cliché movement-images this same structure is also repeated at the level 
of the story structure: the hero sees a problem (in a disaster movie: the hero sees the 
impending disaster)  and then  thinks of  a  way to  solve  the problem (the  affect-
image: how can I save myself, and as many people as possible in the face of such a 
disaster?).  These  two  images,  “perception”  and  “affection,”  are  then  sutured 
together with an expected, cliché, predictable, and hegemonic “action-image” (the 
hero saves the day). In the cliché “action movie” don't we all already know the hero 
will succeed? In the cliché “romance film” don't we already know the lead couple 
will wind up together at the end? Isn't everything already known from the opening 
157There is an “actuality of perception, a “zeroity” in the order of the deduction of signs and images... It signals a kind of 
body without organs.” Peter Canning, “The Imagination of Immanence,” in Flaxman (ed.), p339-40.
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shots which establish our hero, and “his” goal? These are “action-images,” images 
which affirm expectations of the “narrative.” Art-cinema, experimental-cinema and 
the avant-garde do not produce cohesive narratives. They cease the development of 
clichéd  “action-images”  in  order  to  return  to  seeing  anew (to  finally  SEE).  As 
action is suspended the spectator enters the “any-space-whatever.”
Joanna's “action-images” do not come at the end of watching her films, but 
in watching them again. In re-watching them I find my mind emptied of all the 
things I had experienced thinking “through” Joanna's 'visual philosophy' in terms of 
perceptions and affections. Exhausted, I let the images wash over me and I begin to 
fill with brief, but very real “haptic-images” or “cinesthetics.”158 As Marks writes of 
intercultural  cinema,  “though  it  only  directly  engages  two  senses,  [it  may] 
activate... a memory that necessarily involves all the senses.”159 This might involve 
the eyes transmitting a “sense that functions like the sense of touch”160 to the body. 
Similarly we might smell, taste and (in the case of silent films, such as Joanna's) 
hear the films. Joanna's images inspired my eyes and body to create the un-smelled, 
the un-tasted, the un-touched, the un-heard in my body as an experience of smell, 
taste  and  touch.  Haptic-images,  I  argue,  constitute  the  “poetic  register”  of  the 
action-image, just as free-indirect-discourse and any-space-whatevers are the poetic 
registers of, respectively, perception and affection-images. The third chapter of this 
thesis will discuss these “haptic-action-images.”
* * * *
The  three  chapters  which  make  up  the  body  of  the  thesis,  as  I  have 
indicated, are organised around the “Perception,” “Affection” and “Action” of the 
“film's  body”  on  my  “body”  as  a  spectator  and  the  “bodies”  on  screen.  This 
“poetics of bodies” is particularly relevant to Joanna's feminist practices, forming 
an intercultural weave between her status as a woman in the 1970s and the body of 
the  “male-centric”  state  in  which  she  lived.  Her  films,  poems,  paintings,  and 
writings, all draw on Buddhist, Taoist, and more generally, Chinese and Japanese 
158My body-without-organs is emptied and then filled.
159Marks, SoF, p22.
160Marks, SoF, p22.
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aesthetic  and  religious  regimes  of  knowledge,  which  I  find  illuminating  in 
discussions surrounding intersubjectivity, becoming, fragmentation, emptiness and 
action. These are concepts which have been central to Buddhist and Taoist thought 
for  many  centuries  (though  many  of  them  are  relatively  new  in  Western 
philosophical systems). Joanna's work, as a Catholic New Zealander, draws on her 
understanding  of  Japanese  and  Chinese  art,  without  seeking  to  represent (and 
potentially  mis-represent)  these  cultures  as images.  Rather,  Joanna's  collected 
works echo the “structures” and “aesthetics” of Chinese and Japanese poetry and 
painting.
As Anne Kirker writes of Joanna's painting and poetry, “Common to both 
idioms  is  a  haiku-like  sense  of  the  power  of  a  single  moment  or  thought 
quintessentially  stated.”161 The  haiku  poem  has  many  points  of  comparison  to 
experimental art and intercultural cinema in the West. The haiku is often comprised 
of fragmented words, and relies on the spectator to complete the poem.162 More 
significant to this study is that Joanna's films seem to mimic the structure of the 
haiku almost exactly (which Deleuze and Guattari align with “rhizomes” and the 
“BwO”).  Furthermore,  to become a BwO in 'writing'  is  to begin to cross wires 
everywhere:  to find structural  connections between different  cultural  regimes of 
knowledge and to offer ways out of the text at every point. Hence, although it may 
seem  strange  to  draw  on  a  literary  device  when  looking  at  the  practice  of 
experimental film, I feel that by describing how to write “haiku” within this essay, I 
become an “author as producer” myself, encouraging you, the spectator, to gain the 
necessary knowledge to write your own haiku, to exit this text and begin your own 
intercultural creative journeys.
In light of this, in the first chapter I will draw extensively on the “haiku” 
poetic structure to 'open' my Deleuzian reading of perception-images in Joanna's 
films. In the second chapter I will draw on the Dali Lama's concept of “emptiness 
as a field of compassion” and the yin-yang to accompany Deleuze's “any-space-
whatever.” In the third chapter I will draw briefly on the notion of action-through-
inaction,  central  to  Buddhist  and  Taoist  understandings  of  the  “body”  (with 
161Kirker, p200.
162Harold Henderson, An Introduction to Haiku (Doubleday Anchor, 1958) p3.
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similarities to the “body-without-organs”). At the end of the third chapter there is 
one final development. Once the images have produced “synaesthetic,” or “haptic 
images” in my process of viewing, I leave the films. After “time” images begin to 
return to me, but not as visual images. Words begin returning to me (loosely) in the 
form of haiku poems. I become a poet. These words, which have previously been 
fixed to the striated space of organised lines smooth into rounds, curves and water 
falls –
As with Deleuze's toolbox method these terms are meant to provide leaping 
off points from the text, moments of intertextuality which may remain unresolved, 
like loose threads. These threads are not “unfinished” but are intended to create a 
fine tapestry which can be woven not only in the words that I have chosen to say, 
but also in the vast amount of ideas I have had to discard. I attempt to use terms not 
as end-points, but like Deleuze, “as effects that traverse their analyses, generating 
ever new effects, as points of reference indeed, but also as points of intensity and 
signs pointing a way out:  points-signs that offer a multiplicity of solutions and a 
variety of directions for a new style of politics.”163 And, hopefully, a new style of 
“poetics.”
In returning me to poetic “movement-images,” to the “site” of cinema, from 
the perspective of “time-images,” Joanna's films take me on a journey through the 
anatomy of a “film body,” building the film body part by part. First I build the 'eye' 
of the body, and begin to  perceive. This perception then expresses its embodied 
nature,  suggesting there  is  a  fully  functional  “film body” which lives the  eye's 
perceptions (this is the subject of chapter one,  “Perceptions”).  This body is  not 
“organised,”  but  deconnected and fragmented in  the any-space-whatever,  which 
produces a space for the “spirit” of cinema to arise (this is the subject of chapter 
two, “Affections”). Finally this body, my body, as the spectator, begins to produce 
experience from within,  in the form of “sensations” and “words” (which is  the 
subject  of  chapter  three,  “Actions”).  “Perceptions”  and  “Affections”  take  the 
'language' of film to its limits, to the edges of what can be said with words. Joanna's 
films, after all, are moving images, not words. As I attempt to get closer and close 
to Joanna's films with my words (this essay) I find language itself is exhausted, that 
163Seem, Anti-Oedipus, pxxi.
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it  is  missing  expressions  and  lacks  terms  for  describing  certain  kinds  of 
experiences; especially those which relate to minority regimes of knowledge not 
easily categorised within dominant culture.164 As Adrienne Rich writes, “Whatever 
is unnamed, undepicted in images, whatever is omitted from biography, censored in 
collections of letters, whatever is misnamed as something else, made difficult-to-
come-by, whatever is buried in the memory by the collapse of meaning under an 
inadequate  or  lying  language  –  this  will  become  not  merely  unspoken,  but 
unspeakable.”165
This  thesis  is,  finally,  not  an  archaeology,  or  a  phenomenology,  strictly 
speaking, but a “nomadology,” or a “noology” (another of Deleuze and Guattari's 
terms used to describe the process of becoming a BwO). Each stage in this process 
they  call  a  “plateau”  and each  plateau  introduces  a  plethora of  new terms and 
concepts which populate it (what they call  packs, or  bands). As with Benjamin's 
“author  as  producer”  nomad-art  is  “irreducible  to  the  State  apparatus”  and  is 
therefore  “outside  its  sovereignty.”166 Nomadic  art  does  not  produce  a  'unified 
subject' (either in terms of characters in the work, or spectators of the work) but a 
“pure and immeasurable multiplicity,” just as Joanna's works produce thousands of 
tiny  fragments,  which refuse  to  merge into a  'preformed'  meaning.  Rather  than 
producing a  uniform 'bond'  and then “implementing [fixed]  binary distributions 
between states,” nomadic art unties the bond and “sees all things in relations of 
becoming...  [particularly]  a  becoming-woman.”167 Just  as  Mulvey  argues  that 
'mainstream' cinema addresses us as 'males',  Deleuze and Guattari  suggest (like 
Foucault)  that  society  in  general  positions  us  as  'white,  male,  heterosexual 
consumers' (majority rules).
This is why there is no “becoming-man,”168 for we have all already become 
“men”  by  growing  up  in  the  modern  capitalist  state,  subjected  to  a  'position' 
predetermined by our current  “state  philosophy.” Feminist  thinkers have further 
linked 'masculine'  thought  to  'unity'  and  Aristotelian  'ontology'  (a  theory  of  an 
164“Intercultural cinema appeals to the limits of naming... and this is where it is most transformative.” Marks, SoF, p21.
165B. Ruby Rich, “In the Name of Feminist Film Criticism” (1978) in Patricia Erens (ed.), Issues in Feminist Film 
Criticism (Indiana University Press, 1990) p268.
166D&G, TP, p388.
167D&G, TP, p388.
168D&G, TP, p320.
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'absolute unity' among all things 'being'). As Kuhn writes, “[Luce] Irigaray... argues 
on  behalf  of  a  feminine  language  which  operates  outside  the  bounds  of  an 
'Aristotelian type of logic' which she sees as informing masculine logic.”169
Deleuze, after Henri Bergson, develops a philosophy of 'becoming' (rather 
than being). Nothing is ever 'being', for 'being' implies a  fixed state. Being, as a 
theory, “functions” but it does not produce anything new. Deleuze suggests we look 
at the world in its endless becoming – without stopping. As Deleuze and Guattari 
write, “man is majoritarian par excellence, whereas becomings are minoritarian... 
women, children, but also animals, plants and molecules, are minoritarian.”170 In 
Joanna's  films  these  are  the  multiplicities  that  populate  the  images:  women, 
children, but also plants, and animals, and shots which abstract the visual world and 
produce particles which look like molecules,  and cells,  and atoms. I  argue that 
Joanna's films are sites/sights for a series of different “becomings” from mothers 
doing laundry,  to  children  drawing pictures,  to  Joanna's  friends  playing  on  the 
swings, to dogs, and bees, to shadows, lights, atoms, waves, intensities – to the film 
itself.
As  Vivian  Sobchack  writes,  “I  want  to  begin  again.  That  is,  I  want  to 
mistrust  what has become a certain ground, the premises,  of contemporary film 
theory”171 and to “restore... to reflection about cinema the existential experience of 
the medium's openness and the spectator's freedom.”172 Though Sobchack does this 
largely through the classical  cinema, in which the phenomenological experience 
must be done 'after the fact' Joanna's films (and intercultural cinema) invite us to do 
this  here  and  now,  displaying  directly  cinema's  'openness'  and  my  'freedom'. 
Sobchack calls for the freedom of the audience member, which I support whole-
heartedly. I am simply asking if there are times when the author exerts this same 
freedom as a social, political and textual choice.
169Kuhn, p11.
170D&G, TP, p321.
171Sobchack, AoE, pxvi.
172Sobchack, AoE, pxviii. My italics.
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Chapter 0
Perceptions
(of an unknown body)
Fig. 2. Swings [film still]
(dir. Joanna Paul, super8mm, 1972)
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0. The Poetry of   Movement  
“The subjectivity of my poetry... resists the eye of the camera... I dislike the 
objectivity of the camera”173
 
“I also enjoy the abstraction possible with the camera, movie or still & the gter 
resistance to the purely subjective offered thru that lens.”174
“By a continual interchange invest the I (eye) with isolation.”175
“By  constantly  changing  one's  lens,  one  sharpens  awareness  of  the  given 
medium; medium becomes subject.”176
“A vision of space might be, indeed, a vision of vision, as seeing as Other.”177
0)  In  this  chapter  I  intend  to  unfold  the  various  “attentive  perception-
images”  within  Joanna's  films.  I  have  suggested  that  Joanna's  films  initially 
foreground a  kind  of  “time-image”  in  which  I  find  my “attentive  recognition” 
directed toward  perception itself and the various modes in which cinema 'thinks' 
through perception, in terms of Deleuze's analysis of “movement-images.” What 
does this mean practically? Deleuze writes that, in the first place  “perception [is] 
double, or rather ha[s] a double reference. It can be objective or subjective. But the 
difficulty  lies  in  knowing  how an  objective  perception-image  and  a  subjective 
perception-image  are  presented  in  the  cinema.  What  distinguishes  them?”178 
Crudely, an objective perception-image can be defined as an image which “remains 
173Paul, in O'Brien, p69. My italics.
174Paul, in Evans, Lonie & Lloyd (ed.), p97. My italics.
175Paul, NPL, p2. My italics.
176Paul, “Shibusha,” p10.
177Alexander Greenhough, Hereness and Thereness: On the Structures of Cinematic Space (MA Thesis, Emory University, 
2005) p97.
178Deleuze, MI, p71.
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external to [the] set,” in the third-person. A subjective-image is an optical 'point-of-
view' in which we see the diegetic world from the perspective of a character “who 
forms part of that set.”179 As I have said, classically, these demarcate the distinction 
between  histoire (objective) and  discours (subjective) as discursive practices and 
form the beginning of a cinematic “archaeology” (an investigation into the subject-
positions assigned to me in the act of spectating).
1) A third of Joanna's films are, after my initial watching, “subjective,” in 
the sense that the view forms a part  of the set  of things seen. For a film to be 
subjective the perception must be acknowledged as present to the set it is filming, 
indicated firstly by the movement of the “camera eye” and secondly, by characters 
in the film looking directly at the “camera eye.” Joanna's subjective films not only 
'think' from a subjective position, but also foreground these “rules,” providing me a 
site in which to dig up subjective traces, foregrounding the mindscreen.
2) Three of Joanna's films are, initially, shot in the “objective” style and 
construct the perceiver as “absent” to the “set.” As with subjectivity, this “mode”180 
of perception is  accentuated in Joanna's objective films through reference to the 
rules and codes of “histoire” (the camera is still and foregrounded as invisible to the 
characters, for instance).
3) Deleuze adds a third mode of perception, as I have said, called 'semi-
subjectivity', to which half of Joanna's films belong. In order for a film to 'think' in 
terms of subjectivity, or objectivity, there must be people within the frame. Without 
a person/character in the frame (who may potentially look at the camera) I cannot 
decide if the perception is definitively “within the set” (discours) or “outside the 
set” (histoire). It is both semi-subjective and semi-objective simultaneously. It is 
'open' to interpretation.
4) Central to all three modes of perception in Joanna's films is the visibility 
of the “frame” in relation to what it frames; of the viewing-view's (real) limits, in 
relation to the viewed-views potential to “become visible.” Each film foregrounds 
one of the three dominant cinematic subject-positions, as if Joanna had made these 
films to illustrate the film's thoughts on perception itself, as well as that which the 
179Deleuze, MI, p71.
180We will remember that these kinds of “rules” (the available subject-positions from which to construct meaning) belong 
to the fourth category of Foucault's author function, my “modes of being” toward the text.
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perception  sees.  As  Ian  Wedde  writes  of  Joanna's  works,  “their  detail,  scale, 
relationship, sequence, and duration might disclose ways of  thinking rather than 
merely  ways  of  representing a  result,  an  out-there.”181 These  thoughts  are,  in 
Joanna's films, “archaeological” (concerned with the visibility of subject-positions). 
As  Marks  notes,  many  intercultural  films  are  visual  forms  of  “archaeology,” 
dedicated to digging through the previously buried layers of private histories (often 
conflicting with official histories).182 Over the course of watching Joanna's films I 
felt I couldn't help but become very “attentive” to her systematic use of cinematic 
“subject positions,” as if the “set” of films were a kind of silent, poetic,  visual-
philosophy: a filmic research site in which to dig up cinematic discursive practices.
Deleuze, however, describes these first “words” of cinema (the perception-
image, analogous to the linguistic “noun,” to a basic “naming” function) as “purely 
nominal,  negative,  and  provisional.”183 The  cinema  is  really  a  perception  (the 
“camera eye”) framing another perception (a character in the frame). As I have said 
this is what Deleuze describes as “free-indirect-discourse,” a term borrowed from 
Pier  Paolo  Pasolini.184 Deleuze  argues  that  free-indirect-discourse  is  the 
combination of “what is seen” (within the frame) and the “way in which it is seen” 
(the framing, as a thought of the screen/brain) which together creates a “look” of 
things, a “style,” a “poetics” of the moving image. As Catherine J. Bisley writes, 
seeming to echo Deleuze's thoughts, Joanna “repeatedly iterates the importance of 
the  frame...  [Tony]  Bellette  comments  that  “The  relationship  between  Joanna 
Paul’s  poems  and  paintings  is  best  seen  in  this  process  of  transference  and 
reorganisation of objects, or words”... the frame creates meaning by showing these 
relationships.”185
I have suggested that there are two kinds of films: those that do not make us 
aware  of  free-indirect-discourse  (classical  movement-images)  and  those  that  do 
(poetry of cinema).186 As Deleuze writes, “we can see images in the cinema which 
claim to be objective or subjective – but here something else is at stake: it is a case 
181Ian Wedde, “Rain on the Hills,” in Budgen, Donson & O'Brien (ed.), p17.
182Marks, SoF, p28.
183Deleuze, MI, p71.
184Deleuze, MI, p72.
185Catherine J. Bisley, The Poetry of Joanna Margaret Paul (Research Essay, Victoria University, 2006) p3-4.
186Deleuze, MI, p74.
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of going beyond the subjective and the objective toward a pure Form which sets 
itself up as an autonomous vision of the content.”187 Joanna's films make me aware 
of this “autonomous vision” which both lives its vision existentially and 'thinks' in 
terms of subjectivity and objectivity. I perceive not only the “objects” (or “nouns”) 
in the  frame,  but  also  the  “frame”  itself  (not  unlike  a  “pro-noun,”  or  “before 
noun”).188 For example, in Jillian Dressing, one of Joanna's “objective” films, I am 
not only aware of Jillian dressing, but the fact that the camera addresses her as 
“she”  (in  the  third-person).  In  Bosshard's  House the  camera  does  not  address 
people  in  the  third-person,  but  as  friends,  as  “subjective,”  and  personally 
meaningful “yous.”189 By isolating each mode of perception I am made aware not 
only of what I see, but importantly, how this given perception got to be here. The 
“frame of the screen” becomes, in Deleuze's terms, the “brain of the screen,” no 
longer simply a window to look through, but a mind which “thinks” objects (as 
objective, subjective or 'open') before us.
As Deleuze writes, “A [thing/person] is on the screen, and is assumed to see 
[or  be  in]  the  world  in  a  certain  way.  But  simultaneously  the  camera  sees 
[it/them]...  from another point of view which  thinks,  reflects and transforms the 
viewpoint of the character.”190 As Bisley writes, often the “object is coloured by 
Paul’s  subjective  aesthetic.”191 Equally  I  find  that  “subjects”  are  coloured  by 
Joanna's  “objective”  aesthetic  (in  those  films with objective  “frames”)  and that 
semi-objects/semi-subjects are coloured by her semi-subjective/objective aesthetic 
(in those films which are 'free' from the perception of others).
In this way Joanna's films return me to the most primal “sign” of cinema: 
perception. I return to the cinema's very first words: I perceive (eye see).192 In this I 
187Deleuze, MI, p74.
188Deleuze, MI, p59. Deleuze compares the perception-image to a “noun” in terms of its function in the filmic statement (in 
that it names/sees an “object”). I would argue that a film which foregrounds the act of perceiving the noun (a self-
conscious free-indirect-discourse) constitutes a “pronoun.”
189Significantly, the term “you's” is considered grammatically incorrect in English. However, without a plural to “you” 
there is no way to speak of the camera's multiplicitous subjective address (in that it looks at everyone equally in a frame, 
addressing “you's”). In order to describe Joanna's films with words it is often necessary to distort grammatically 
“correct” language.
190Deleuze, MI, p74.
191Bisley, p4.
192As Tom Gunning writes of early (pre-1906) cinema, the “primal scene” of the film's eye: “Its unique power was a 
'matter of making images seen',” rather than preparing the “scene” for narrative.  Gunning, “The Cinema of Attractions: 
Early Film, Its Spectator and the Avant-Garde,” in Thomas Elsaesser (ed.) Early Cinema (Routledge, 1990) p56.
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find “poetry,” as Pasolini says. But what kind of poetry? In words there are many 
ways to  make  a  poem,  and to  “frame” the  poetic  image.  I  would  suggest  that 
Joanna's  films  are  structured  like  a  Japanese  “haiku”  poem.  There  are  many 
similarities  between the  haiku  and Joanna's  films,  as  I  began to  discuss  in  the 
introduction.  Haiku  are  usually  about  simple,  everyday  subject-matter  (trees, 
gardens,  animals...)  just  as  Joanna's  films  are.  They  are  also  comprised  of  a 
minimum vocabulary, reducing the image to its bare necessities, to nothing but a 
“trace.”  Like  intercultural  cinema,  and  the  'poetic  image'  (as  Bachelard,  and 
Kristeva define it) in general, the haiku uses the “power of suggestion“193 to reach 
beyond what is written on the page (the  representational meaning of words). As 
Harold Henderson writes, “only the outlines... are drawn, and the rest the readers 
must fill in for themselves.”194
By making the haiku extremely simply it is able to be “read” by anyone, 
without  any  specialist  knowledge.  It  is  not  a  “time-image”  but  a  “movement-
image.” However, after multiple readings you may begin to notice the poem can be 
read in an entirely different way, or perhaps even three or four different ways. It is 
for  this  reason that  haiku reading itself  is  an art,  a  “knowledge” transmitted in 
repeated readings of the poem.195 The haiku has no fixed meaning. It suggests a 
number  of  entry  points  into  producing  meaning  for  yourself.  Within  these 
unfoldings  of  meanings,  I  find  another  kind  of  time-image,  arising  out  of  the 
foregrounded  movement-image,  a  kind  of  time-image  which  addresses  the 
spectator's “perception” directly. This is achieved through the use of a number of 
special  terms,  such  as  “cut-words,”  “pillow-words,”  and,  particularly,  “pivot-
words.”196
Deleuze  and  Guattari  call  these  complexes  “floating  lines.”197 A  “pivot-
word” (or line) is a word that can be read in many different contexts within the 
193Henderson, p2.
194Henderson, p3.
195Much as the folds of “origami” leave a “map” of how the object was made.
196Kireji is Japanese for “cut-word.” A cutting-word “has its function dividing the two component elements of a haikai 
[haiku] verse.” Donald Keene, World Within Walls (Grove Press, 1976) p575. “[L]ike kana, which usually marks the 
end of a haiku, and ya, which divides a haiku into two parts that are to be equated or compared.” (Henderson, p8)
197D&G, TP, p288. Arthur Cooper writes that “This technique... belongs... to all the best poetry in the world.” He adds, 
however, that the Chinese language (and following on from this logic, the Japanese, whose language has many Chinese 
influences) is “particularly well suited to it.” Cooper, Li Po and Tu Fu (Penguin, 1973) p30.
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frame of the poem, foregrounding the multiple meanings of various words and the 
ways in which words produce meaning. In the Japanese language very few words 
have a single meaning and their “order of thought is almost the direct opposite from 
ours.”198 Every term in Japanese potentially allows for the meaning of the word 
(and the poem) to literally “pivot.” The way in which you stress the words in the 
series, significantly “shifts” the meanings  you produce (in accordance with their 
'open' structure). In this sense, the haiku poem “folds” into itself, not happening in a 
“line of action” (from point A to B to C) but as an incomplete list, which (may) 
awaken my “attentive perception.”199 In this moment I actively superimpose the 
“terms” in order to produce meaning for myself, having to draw on my own bodily 
frame  to  complete  the  image.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  argue  that  these  kinds  of 
words/lines/shots constitute lines of “becoming.” Take the following “open” haiku 
poem;
light
leaves
grass
At first glance it is a list: light, then leaves, then grass. To read the poem 
this way I am myself, a person, looking at words. Each word has a single meaning: 
the word “light” indicates light from the sun, the word leaves “leaves” from a tree, 
and the word “grass” grass on the ground. I picture it: there is light, and there are 
leaves, and there is grass. The poem is really just three words. But when I frame it 
in with “body,” bringing the images together in my “mental landscape,” it becomes 
something. The light becomes perception (light enables perception), the tree leaves 
an affection fragmenting the light and the grass the completion of the action of the 
image (the light hits the ground).
Something is missing: a shadow on the grass (of the light coming through 
198Henderson, p179.
199“Joanna was a keeper of journals and inventories. (What is her book Unwrapping the Body but a bound, annotated, and 
illustrated 'list'?). However, there is an important distinction to be made between the impulse to itemise the world and 
the impulse to commodify it – Joanna's art being an ardent instance of the former and a negation of the later.” Gregory 
O'Brien, “Always quartettish thoughts,” in Bugden, Donson, and O'Brien, p29.
64.
the leaves). This is the “any-space-whatever.”200 Then there is a reversal: the grass 
becomes the  affect/face covered  in  shadow,  and the leaves  a  perception of  the 
light's  action. The shadow is entirely a “mental-image” I receive in my mind, not 
contained  on  the  page.  This  is  me completing  the  image,  not  only  finding  a 
meaning, but learning something of haiku structure as I read. In completing the 
image I had to interject a number of “frames” to organise the three things. Then 
they  “moved,”  and  “came  to  life.”  I  had  to  add  this  movement  and 
invent/create/produce shadows cast by enlightened leaves on the grass.
But this is only one way of reading the poem. Perhaps I do not read light as 
“light” from the sun. What if I read it as “light” weight? Then the leaves are “light” 
on the air, falling from the tree to the grass below. I imagine falling through the air 
and the soft touch of the grass. There is a certain sensation of “becoming leaf,” 
while in the last reading I was “me” standing nearby perceiving the scene. In this 
reading the “leaves” also “leave” the tree, before floating to the grass (pivots of 
poetry always keep folding, unlike “turns” in a plot).201 But what if I read it as the 
grass,  covered  in  leaves,  heating  in  the  mid-day  sun.  Do  I  not  become grass 
suddenly, with so many light leaves piled on top of me? Then I imagine me again 
picking up the leaves: they are a hot pile, the grass steaming underneath. This kind 
of poetics (irrespective of their medium; film, literature, painting), as Deleuze and 
Guattari write, create for the spectator a “floating” time of “becoming.”202
These are just a few of the meanings which can come from the pivot-words 
“light” and “leaves” and serves to illustrate the ways in which multiple meanings 
can be made from the one text. In Joanna's films I find exactly the same structure as 
the haiku. We begin with very simple “perceptions,” which are what Deleuze calls 
“solid”  (in  the  sense  that  they  resemble  objective,  subjective  and  “open” 
perceptions  solidly).203 I am placed in this “solid perception” for most of the film 
and then, usually in the second half, there is a single-shot which has the effect of a 
200This is expanded on in the next chapter.
201As Bisley notes, “Paul’s “process of vision” is continuous, reflecting Charles Olson’s comment that “one perception 
must immediately and directly lead to another” (273).” (Bisley, p5)
202D&G, TP, p290.
203For Deleuze “solid” perception-images relate to distinctions between subjectivity, objectivity and semi-subjectivity. (MI, 
p71-76) When one of these forms is distinct, there is a solid perception-image: “This is the status of solid, geometric and 
physical perception.” (MI, p217)
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“pivot-word” in the haiku, reversing and “shifting” the meaning of early images in 
the  series.  In  all  three  modes  of  film  the  “pivot-shot”  acts  as  a  moment  of 
intersubjectivity. In the subjective and objective films this intersubjective moment 
comes when a character looks directly at the “camera's eye,” or the “camera's eye” 
is  addressed  indirectly.  In  this  moment  the  object/noun  and  the  brain/eye  are 
brought  into  direct  contact  and  I  experience  a  new  “time-image,”  inside  a 
“movement-image,” inside a “time-image.” I become the body/mind of that which 
looks at (and affects) me. These kinds of time-images, as Deleuze writes, open onto 
the “genesis of an unknown body.”204
In the subjective and objective films this is not a “film body,” as Sobchack 
describes  it,  but  some body  in  the  film,  a  “real,”  present  body  housing  the 
perception (a body house). These time-images awaken me to the realisation (real-
eye-sensation) that this “view” is really there, no matter what codes, or signs it is 
“thinking”  the  image  with.  As  Sobchack  argues,  the  perception  expresses the 
presence of a body which perceives. I would argue that this body (through being 
perceived itself) expresses “somebody” which the perception is  becoming. In this 
moment  the objective and subjective change place and perception  reverses  into 
expression. I go back to the images I have seen before and re-read them from the 
perspective of this “body.” These images transform the flow of thought into what 
Deleuze calls “liquid perception.”205 Liquids flow under the frame and reconnects 
the disparate parts. Like the any-space-whatever of the affection-image, I would 
describe this as an “any-perception-whatever”206 which “opens” the perception onto 
a “body” in the film. This body I “become” and my perceptions (images/thoughts) 
take on qualities of that body.
In the “semi-subjective” films I find something slightly different. I find that 
204Deleuze, The Time-Image, in Marks, SoF, p127.
205For Deleuze “liquid” perception-images refer to the “existential” nature of the “eye”and the potential for a reversal of 
the subjective and objective poles. As Deleuze writes, liquid perception enables the “possibility of passing from the 
subjective to the objective pole... the more the privileged centre [the eye] is put into movement.” (MI, p76) “The 
perception of that which crosses the frame or flows out. The liquid status of perception itself.” (MI, p217)
206The any-space-whatever is made of “fragments” (affection-images) of space, it foregrounds cinema's essentially 
fragmented nature. For Deleuze the affection-image and the any-space-whatever are where movement becomes time-
image cinema. In the second chapter I will examine Joanna's films as affections and fragments. Here I am suggesting 
that we begin in perception, in a self-awareness of free-indirect-discourse which “fragments” the layers of the “eye” 
(what is seen, what sees, how it sees it) into an “any-perception-whatever” (opening perception onto an “unknown 
body”). There, I begin with affection and fragment the film horizontally (rather than vertically).
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the  “film's  body,”  as  Sobchack  describes  it,  is  foregrounded.  As  I  have  said, 
Sobchack argues that the film's body cannot self-consciously see its own framing, 
its own “mind.” Sobchack writes, “The frame is invisible to the seeing [and hence, 
in Deleuze's term, the  thinking] that is the film.”207 The frame is a limit. Joanna's 
films take me to this limit, continuously drawing my eyes to the “frame” as visible 
to me (the spectator). In the “open” films I find that the film itself sees its own 
frames, both in terms of the “frame” around the images and the “frames” in the 
projector. 1) In Joanna's films shots are constantly overexposed, underexposed, and 
significantly,  change exposure mid-shot. When light interferes with the vision of 
the “film's eye” the eye sees the “frame” expressed as a “limit” of vision (in light). 
Joanna's films produce “light-images” continuously, framing the seen/scene in such 
a way that I become aware of the choices the “eye” makes in seeing. Frequently the 
exposure changes mid-shot and light becomes visually palpable. 2) When the eye 
moves fast, there is a different affect. I start to see the projected “frames” of the 
film and feel the choices which the “mind” of the film makes in projecting the 
images back to its self. A camera which is thrown violently this way and that (such 
as my vision in the “open” films) produces images which are hard for a projector to 
project. In this moment my attention is shifted from the unity of a frame which 
perceives, to the multiplicity of frames expressed. This is not a “representation” of 
the film-strip (as in many avant-garde films) nor a “representation” of a camera.208 
Joanna's films, through fast movement and use of light create an experience for me 
(the  spectator)  which  includes  the  “limits”  of  the  projector  and  the  camera 
intersubjectively foregrounded. These constitute brief moments in which the “reel” 
film's body is existentially engaged by the film's intentionality.
In  all  cases  the  introduction  of  an  “intersubjective”  image  (from faces, 
facings and “unknown bodies,” to the light and movement-images of the “film's 
body”)  is  a  kind  of  “affection-image”  (a  firstness/body  which  arises  from the 
zero/ground of perception). As the film makes me aware of its “existential vision” 
through an affection-image, I  become the body of the film's perception: either an 
“unknown (virtual)  body” or  the “film's  (reel)  body.”  Affection is  the realm of 
207Sobchack, AoE, p131.
208Sobchack discusses the potential for self-reflexivity when the camera sees itself, but never the self-consciousness of a 
“film's eye” interrogating the limits of cinematic vision.
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“becoming” and forges  a  pathway between the  movement-image and the  time-
image. As Marks writes, “Deleuze translates Peirce's category of Firstness as the 
affection-image, an image of barely contained feeling or affect.  “It is quality or 
power, it is potentiality considered for itself as expressed.” In the affection-image a 
becoming-other occurs; for as soon as we have sensation or feeling, we change. 
Thus, in the affection-image there is an enfolding of perceiving self into perceived 
world.”209 In the haiku poem I quoted above, the difference in meanings is then a 
multiplicity of “bodies” and “becomings.” In one reading I am me watching the 
leaf, and the grass. In the next image I “become leaf,” falling from the tree, and in 
the next I “become grass,” leaves piled on top of me. I am folded into the grass and 
the light. When I become leaf I am folded into the air. In Joanna's films I find a 
similar experience, each film a series of “becomings,” each becoming initiated by a 
single shot, like the pivot-word of the haiku. This “shot” is “intersubjective,” and 
for me “intercultural.” It is a fold of my body and the film's body into one, in which 
I eventually “become film” itself, becoming “machine.”210
“Pivot-shots”  (or  floating-lines)  are  one  example  of  the  “challenging 
relationship...  in which the act of reading, meanings are grasped as  shifting and 
constantly in process.”211 This is achieved through the use of “intrusions from the 
'real  world'”212 and  intersubjective  “pivots”  or  “shifts”  (firstly  in  the  form  of 
direct/indirect  address  to  the  camera  and  secondly  through  the  breakdown  in 
perception  of  movement  and  light).  “Pivots”  of  the  first  kind  open  on  to  an 
“unknown body” in the film, some (real) body. “Pivots” of the second kind refer to 
the film's (reel) body, an existential film body (as Sobchack describes). The first 
two sections of this chapter deal with the shift  from solid subjectivity to liquid 
subjectivity/objectivity,  and  the  reverse  effect  in  the  objective  films.  The  third 
section deals with the “shift” to the “film's body” as existentially intentional in its 
209Marks, SoT, p196-7.
210As Vivian Sobchack writes, “the film's material body always engages its possibilities as a non-human body... as a 
cyborg.” (AoE, p163) Sobchack is drawing on Donna J. Haraway's notion of the “cyborg” which, as Sean Redmond 
writes, “heralds its potential to transform identity from one being predicated on essentialised gender roles [particularly 
the male/female binary] to one that swims in its own liminality.” Redmond, Liquid Metal: The Science Fiction Reader 
(Wallflower Press, 2004) p157. See Haraway, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism 
in the 1980s,” in Redmond, p158-81.
211Kuhn, p12.
212Kuhn, p170.
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own right, as an eye/I (a  seer).213 The following chapter is therefore broken into 
three  sections:  subjective,  objective,  and  'semi-subjective'  (open,  or  free) 
perception-images,  each detailing the constant  process  of  “building a  body.”  In 
conclusion  I  will  discuss  the  “body-without-organs,”  in  relation  to  the  “film's 
body,” arguing that Joanna's films constitute a “film-body-without-organs,” which 
empties itself  of  representation and approaches the  invisible, populated only by 
shadows, whites and greys. In this chapter I approach the visible, the “perception-
image,” as seeing and being seen (viewing and viewed). In the next chapter I shift 
my  viewing  to  the  invisible  and  imperceptible.  As  Marks  writes,  intercultural 
cinema often happens in the space “between discourse and the visible, on the one 
hand, and what is unsayable and unseeable, on the other.”214 This chapter is about 
discourse and the visible, while the next is about the unseeable and the unsayable 
(any-spaces-whatever).
As I have said, there are two ways to read Joanna's films: as “perception-
images,” grounded in “movement,” or as “affection-images,” grounded in the “any-
space-whatever.”  Here,  I  begin  with  “movement-images  of perception,”  not 
“affection-images in any-spaces-whatever” (where they also belong). Joanna's films 
return me to “perception” it is true, but another audience member may find a return 
to “affection,” no less interesting or vital. This chapter, as I have said, will deal 
with perception-images and subsequent action and affection-images (as they are 
grounded in  perception215)  which  offer  me a  selection  of  “unknown bodies”  to 
“become.”  These  bodies  are  the  bodies  specifically  of  women:  I  find  myself 
“becoming woman.” This, as I have said, Kuhn calls a “poetic (open) cinema,” a 
form of “feminine” perception, a relationship between spectator, film and author, in 
which multiple subjectivities and objectivities (and gradients between them) are put 
into process, rather than left standing still.
213Deleuze refers to characters within “any-spaces-whatever” and “time-image” cinema as “seers,” in that they become 
existential wanderers, people simply “on the move” (the plot begins to thin, rather than thicken). In Joanna's films the 
film's existential body/eye as perceiver (and expresser) is the character who becomes a seer, who enters a philosophical 
“refrain.” Refrains are central to the nervous system of a “body-without-organs” and “rhizome” structures (see D&G, 
TP, p342-86). “So just what is a refrain?  Glass harmonica: the refrain is a prism, a crystal of space-time. It acts upon 
that which surrounds it, sound or light, extracting from it various vibrations, or decompositions, projections, or 
transformations.” (TP, p384)
214Marks, SoT, p200.
215Rather than any-spaces-whatever (ungrounded affection-images).
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1. Subjects &   Affections  
I am watching Bosshard's House. It opens with shot of a road. Across the 
road is a house which I look toward. A car goes past, and then “I” cut to the other 
side of the road. The camera “walks” up the path, and “looks” around. It angles up 
to see the top of the house and then moves in close to something on the porch. 
Another cut – “I” am inside the house,  looking around empty, shadowy rooms. 
Each shot feels within the set it films, the viewer making up one of the possible 
objects in the visible world. These are undoubtedly “subjective” perception-images 
(this I have processed almost without thinking). But what kind of subjectivity and 
what  kind  of  perception?  Philosophy  is  riddled  with  conflicting  theories  of 
knowledge,  subjectivity  and  perception.  This  is  what  Deleuze  has  called  a 
philosophical “crisis.” Faced with this “crisis” each philosopher works out their 
own way of conceiving of knowledge, subjectivity, and perception. The crisis is 
this:  if  we  are  limited  to  perceptions  of things,  we  cannot  know  things-in-
themselves. We are cut off from “objective” knowledge. But, if we ourselves are 
“objects” (to others), couldn't we approach the outside (objectivity) from the inside 
(subjectivity)? This is where Deleuze,  Foucault,  Sobchack, and Merleau-Ponty's 
thoughts converge: on the inside, which is really the outside (an interiority which 
positions us exteriorly). Can we not know the outer “objective” world in-ourselves, 
as  our  bodies  interior  exterior?  The  question  then  becomes:  how  do  Joanna's 
(subjective) films  think their own subjectivity as objectivity? How do they shift 
from  subjectivity  into  objectivity  and  thus  displace  the  “metaphysical  heritage 
where “subjectivity” is conceptualised as disembodied, unchanging, masculine and 
univocal.”216
Although  relatively  simple,  the  opening  shots  from  Bosshard's  House 
contain a large amount of information. Firstly: the perception is on one side of the 
road, and it  waits. A car goes past. What does this indicate? That the perception 
216Moscovici, p26.
70.
obeys the “rules” of the society it films. This also indicates that there are “objects” 
within this perception, “real” objects with “real” effects. The perception waits for 
the  car  because  the  car  is  dangerous to  the  perception,  it  is  a  moving  object. 
Deleuze writes that perception is firstly perception  of movement in the frame, of 
objects,  or  “nouns.”  Here  I  perceive  a  “noun” in  the  foreground (the  “house”) 
which suddenly becomes the background, as the car becomes the foreground. After 
the  car  has  passed  there  is  an  empty  space  where  the  car  was,  an  emptied 
foreground.  This foreground seems to vibrate,  but before the house has time to 
reassert its position, I  cut across the road. This foregrounds the perception of the 
camera, of an “inhuman” perception (which can cut). In a single shot (and a cut) I 
have learned not only that the film is “subjective,” but that it seems to be from a 
camera's  perception,  and  that  it  is  a  real  “object”  which  must  wait  for  other 
“objects.”  Rather  than  simply  perceiving  objects,  or  subjects,  I  am aware  of  a 
“subjective”  mindscreen  layered over  “objects”  (within  this  perception). 
Subjectivity  is  foregrounded  and  becomes  'free-indirect-discourse',  a  camera-
consciousness which transforms the seen into a “subjective perception” seeing an 
“object.” As Deleuze writes, 'free-indirect-discourse' often involves a kind of mise-
en-scene  which  “makes  the  camera  await  the  entry  of  a  character  [or  moving 
object]  into  the  frame...  The  perception-image  finds  its  status,  as  free-indirect-
subjective, from the moment that it reflects its content in a camera-consciousness 
which has become autonomous ('cinema of poetry').”217
Then the camera “walks up the path.” What does this mean, “walks” up the 
path? It means I “see” the footsteps of (someone) in the way the frame moves and 
that this is accentuated by the shooting style. I feel the presence of somebody, but 
not an “unknown body,” or the “film's body.” Combined with the “reality” of the 
super8 camera and the “realness” of the feet as they step up the path, I begin to read 
these  films  as  personal,  home-movies,  as  totally  “subjective”  films,  in  which 
Joanna  herself  is  walking  around  with  a  camera.  As  Jean  Mitry  writes,  in 
perceptions “called subjective... The camera advances down the street, I advance 
with it; it climbs the stairs, I climb with it. I therefore experience, in the moment, 
217Deleuze, MI, p74.
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the  walking and  the  climbing or,  at  least,  everything  happens  as  if  I  did.”218 
Sobchack,  citing  Don  Ihde,  describes  these  effects  as  “instrument-mediated 
perception,” in which the “perception” (I watch) is “mediated” by an “instrument” 
(the camera).219 Thus, I do not see the world (perception) as the world, but through 
a  “machine,”  which  changes  my  “experience”  of  the  world.  The  machine  in 
Bosshard's House not only perceives, but expresses (through movements) the body 
which holds the camera and sees with it. But these movements do not feel imitated 
(as if it  is trying to be a body, like a classical “point-of-view” shot) but clearly 
“mediated.”220
In Joanna's “subjective” films she “sees” the world with a camera attached 
to her body and I “see” the world through the camera, which expresses both the 
camera's perception and the bodily movements of Joanna, in the frame. Though this 
relation is the same for all camera movements, in  Bosshard's House  (and poetic 
cinema in general) the bodily movements of the camera-operator (who is also the 
director/producer) are foregrounded. As I move through the world I am constantly 
aware of the “real” body which holds the camera. I see in the image that a person is 
walking the camera up the path (it does not walk alone, always in pairs). As it is 
walked up the path the camera swings from side to side in a “looking” motion. In 
the swinging of the camera from side to side, looking this way and that (common to 
all  Joanna's  “subjective”  films)  the  frame  “mediates”  Joanna's  body  with  my 
experience of the perception as a moving-image. Furthermore, in “seeing” footsteps 
(expressed) there is a second object which comes into contact with this body, the 
pavement, which is transmitted through the body as mediator, to the camera (and 
then to my perception). The “expressed” (Joanna) becomes the “mediator,” and the 
“mediator” (the camera) becomes an “expression” of the pavement's surface. On 
the one hand I think of the image as things in the frame (the car, the house) and on 
the other I think of the frame itself,  drawn to its subjective, bodily movements, 
sensing a whole world off-screen which is  altering the world I see on screen. In 
terms of Deleuze's free-indirect-discourse we might add a layer. There is an object 
218Mitry, in Sobchack, AoE, p235.
219Sobchack, AoE, p186-187.
220Sobchack gives a long analysis of Lady of the Lake in reference to subjective perception (images) which “imitate” a 
body (“false” or “borrowed” bodies) from the first-person perspective (see AoE, p230-48).
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(seen), and a subjective (seer) or “I” (which thinks what is being seen) as Deleuze 
indicates,  but  there  is  also  something  suggested  between  them,  a  relationship 
between the camera and the body which intertwines them in a “single system” (the 
intersubjective “eye”).
In the subjective film Swings I become aware of this instrument-mediation 
even more powerfully.  The perception-image is “of” friends at a swing and the 
camera makes it obvious that it is “there.” It stands amongst the friends and takes a 
turn on the swing. People look at the camera. The camera is not outside the scene 
(objective) nor “semi-subjective” (a being-with, without being there) but is one of 
the characters, participating in the event subjectively.221 As the “eye/I” swings on 
the swings  the  frame  transmits  the  movements  (the  bumps and knocks)  of  the 
swing, through Joanna's body, to the camera, to me as perception. But this is not a 
perception simply of objects, but the objects mediated by a “swinging eye,” which 
abstracts the images. As the shot swings I am taken from one extreme to the other. 
In the middle the shot blurs and I see an abstract shot (a time-image) but there is no 
“time”  to  “contemplate”  it.  The  “time-image”  comes  to  a  stop  and  directly 
transmits the limits of the swing to to me, gathering energy as it slows down. Then 
the camera plunges back into an abstract time-image. All this in just mere micro-
moments of the film.
As  I  am  placed  in  a  subjective  “state  of  mind,”  I  turn  my  “attentive 
perception” to the objects which are framed by this subjective mindscreen. I return 
to Bosshard's House. I cut inside the house and see a child's painting, an “object.” 
This painting is not important to me (the viewer) and neither is it in relation to an 
action which a subject/character is doing (as objects will be in Joanna's “objective” 
films). This is simply an object (a noun) and a subjective pronoun (the “eye/I”) 
looking at the object. Then I cut to an empty dining room: I see a table flanked by 
empty chairs. I cut around the chairs. Then a clock. Then a series of paintings. The 
first is not by a child (it depicts religious imagery) and the second (of a peacock) I 
am not sure. The third is completely abstract making it impossible to tell whose 
painting I am looking at. Finally, I am shown a painted paper-maché mask.
221A semi-subjective camera is not “one” of the characters, but is with the world (both there and not there). A kind of 
anonymous view which moves among things. I will discuss semi-subjectivity in reference to “open” perception (see 
Deleuze, MI, p72).
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Are these artworks by children or adults? Suddenly I am uncertain and feel 
that I would not like to comment either way. I think of the first painting: that might  
not be a child's painting either. It may be an artist imitating a child's painting.222 
Why did I feel the need to make the distinction within my description? What did it 
make you feel about the painting? I want to go back and look at them again. What 
were simple things have become “time-images,”  images which confuse me and 
make me want to reinvestigate the grounds of my perception (an optical-image). I 
had perceived the first painting as a child's painting (a noun, plus a description, an 
adjective, analogous to the affection-image: childish). Now I am not so sure. On a 
second watch I find I cannot be certain if an adult or child did it. I find that I have 
to take off all descriptions of the “noun” and return to the “paintings” as purely 
nominal perceptions.223
As  I  watch  the  images  I  have  seen  again  I  fall  into  reverie,  into  a 
“subjective” time-image, lost in my own thoughts. I notice that each “thing” in the 
“list” of objects represents Joanna's main aesthetic interests: the “minor” arts (the 
paintings), emptiness (the house) and time (the clock). Although the shots appear 
disconnected,  I  slowly  become aware  of  more  subtle  connections,  in  a  kind of 
backward  narrative,  plotting  my movements  in  reverse,  rather  than  anticipating 
what  is  coming ahead of  time (the  cliché).224 I  notice,  for  instance,  one of  the 
paintings in the background of the shot of the clock. This signals a shift (the clock-
face, an affect). In Joanna's “objective” films I (think I) see what is coming ahead 
of time: the completion of a task. In her subjective films I have no idea. I have 
approached a house and then come inside to look about. The family doesn't seem to 
be around (at first).
Then  I  think  of  the  paintings:  1)   Religious  iconography,  2)  A 
representational painting, and 3) An abstract painting.  In the first the artist uses 
religious  “symbols,”  while  in  the  second the artist  uses  “icons” to  produce the 
likeness of a  peacock. In the third painting there is neither a “symbol,” nor an 
222Or even “becoming child.”
223As I have said, Deleuze aligns perception-images with the linguistic “noun.” The “perception of” is a “pro-noun.”
224Bisley notes this in Joanna's poetry as well: “In her series each object gathers meanings that colour what is to come, as 
well as referring back to what has come before: this creates an internally coherent world.” (Bisley, p27) One might call a 
narrative something which is externally coherent (I know the external relations of shots in space and time) while the 
“poetic” refers to the internal relations of a “film-body” (becoming sensible, rather than being sensible from the outset).
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“icon.” The “abstract” seems to mediate the “symbolic” and the “iconographic,” 
forming a “liquid” space between them, through which the symbol becomes an icon 
(and icons become symbols).  The abstract  is  indexical,  signifying an existential 
connection to the painter's hand.225 The mask is strange however. It both represents 
both an “icon” for the shape of a head, and is a “symbol” of tribal life. Finally, it is 
coloured “abstractly” (the index). At the same time it is a real headdress, a covering 
for the face. The mask is a kind of “zero” which gathers together the other three, 
just as Deleuze describes “perception” (or “zeroness”). I think of putting the mask 
on and perceiving through its eyes.
Then there is a shot which breaks me out of these time-images and places 
me solidly back in the “movement-image.” I see a person  doing something. This 
person is hunched over a board in the kitchen cutting bread with a knife. I see them 
not as “subject” to my perception but as an “object” looked at. Their face is at the 
edge of the frame and I do not find myself looking at it. Instead I look at at the 
“action” which the body performs in the frame. This is an action-image:  cutting 
bread. Watching the person cut bread I mentally hear someone calling out “Come 
to the table, it's  ready” as a pure reflex.226 In suddenly introducing “life” to the 
image, everything has come to life. I hear the unheard. The action-image produces 
an action in my mind: a voice, a sound.227 Then, the other images suddenly connect, 
weaving a tapestry. The empty-room is the dining-room where they will eat the 
bread. The clock shows the time (I check: three o'clock, time for afternoon-tea). 
The paintings show who will be at the table (both the children  and the adults). I 
realise that so far the house has been empty. Where have the children and adults 
been? I remember the sunny day outside (which feels so long ago). They must have 
225My distinction concerns the difference between symbols and icons (using C.S. Peirce's terms), or relation-images and 
affection-images (to use Deleuze's terms). The “icon,” properly speaking, is a sign which refers to its object by 
“resemblance,” while a symbol does so by social “convention” or “law.” Icons and symbols are, in Peirce's terms, 
examples of firstness and thirdness. Between them is the “index” (secondness) which refers to its object existentially 
(action-image). By way of example: classical realist paintings use iconic-signs, while symbolist paintings use symbolic-
signs (not forgetting that a painting may be both). Peirce gives the example of smoke as an indexical-sign for fire (as the 
smoke is existentially connected to the fire). I would argue that many abstract paintings, which heighten the materiality 
of the brush stroke, are indexes (as they existentially index the brush stroke). See Thomas Gouge, The Thought of C.S.  
Peirce (Dover, 1950).
226This would not have happened if the film had sound.
227This is a point I will return to in the third chapter. When vision produces the other senses (recalling touch, sound, taste 
and smell) it is called “synaesthesia,” or, in Laura Marks words, “haptic” vision (referring primarily to touch). For now I 
will leave this thread open, a mere outline.
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been in the backyard.228
This kind of “action-image” is very different from cliché movement-images, 
which suggest an action to be accomplished at the outset and then completes this 
action  in  the  final  stages  of  the  film.  As  I  have  said,  this  structure  (arguably) 
constitutes a large portion of classical cinema: an initial “situation” is disrupted, 
which suggests an “action,” which eventually restores the “situation.”229 Task, one 
of  Joanna's  objective films,  on a superficial  level,  illustrates this  well.  There is 
washing  (the  disrupted  situation),  which  leads  to  the  washing  being  done  (the 
action  I  see)  which  restores  the  state  to  balance  (the  washing  is  done).  In 
Bosshard's House, however, the classical “action-image” works in reverse. There is 
not a situation which prepares a predictable action, but an unexpected action which 
causes the images to make sense backwards. As Joanna writes, “And I should like – 
it's a Maori proverb, to walk backwards into the future.”230
While in a time-image (which caused me to think of Joanna's interest in art) 
I  was  disrupted by a  movement-image (the person cutting bread)  which folded 
outward and unexpectedly connected the images (in a moving-time-image). In this I 
find  a  memory-image  which  is  not  caused  by  me  needing  to  “figure  out”  the 
images. Instead it  is a memory which occurs  once the figuring out is done.  As 
Laura  Marks  writes,  intercultural  cinema  provides  us  the  space  to  call  up 
“associations  that  are  probably  somewhat  different  from  the  artists'  and  other 
viewers' associations with them.”231 Here, I am strongly reminded of staying at my 
Nana and Poppa's. We used to go there every holidays. I haven't thought about that 
in years.
I watch the family eat. This is a “situation” following the “action” of cutting 
the bread. When they finish eating the “situation” becomes its own “action” (the 
“action” of eating) which opens onto another “situation” (after lunch: what will we 
do?). Layers of actions and situations interlock, each image in the chain becoming 
the middle of one action-complex, the end of another and the beginning of their 
228Later, re-watching the opening shots I find a human is just visible beyond the house.
229This is what Deleuze calls the “large form” action-image. (MI, p142) As Kuhn writes, “the structure of classical 
narratives works in such a way that stories are opened by a disruption of some equilibrium... and works towards a 
resolution of the initial disruption.” (Kuhn, p17)
230Paul and Eagle, p97. My comma.
231Marks, SoF, p146.
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own,  depending  on  where  I  start  reading  the  sequence.232 Again  I  enter  a 
“recollection-image,”  a  memory,  a  “time-image.”  The  only  place  I  ever  ate 
afternoon-tea was at my Nana and Poppa's house. At their house, no matter what 
your age, everyone knew the day stopped at 3pm (remember the clock) when it 
was, as Winnie the Pooh would say, “time for a little smackeral  something.”233
I remember other images. My Nana would often paint watercolours, their 
house was full of them, the walls covered in paintings (the paintings!). And their 
large wooden chairs and tables: how big they seemed when I was younger (I think 
back to the close-ups of the emptied chairs). Because we were usually on holiday, 
after eating we would sit around in the garden, or on the deck. The adults would 
drink coffee and the kids would play. As I am thinking this, Joanna's film shows me 
these images. This feels like a traditional action-image all of a sudden: an expected 
action unfolds. I see the Bosshard family on the grass, relaxing in the sun. I stop 
watching the film and look out the window. I don't know why. I feel slowed down, 
like I used to at my Nana and Poppa's. Relaxed in a way my adult life does not 
allow for. I feel attuned to looking at things differently, everything slightly calmer. 
Trees on the other side of the valley quiver in slow motion.
I look back to the film. At this point the images become more random, like 
the list I  first perceived: there are shots of the family outside, the garden, more 
images  from  inside  the  house,  shots  of  the  street  outside  the  house  and  a 
workbench.  I  am  thrown  into  a  kind  of  “time-image”  again,  in  which  I  am 
struggling  to  comprehend the  connections.  A memory comes:  my Poppa had a 
wood workshop, and my Nana had a vast garden. I think of these in connection to 
the range of art works I have seen. The workshop is a place of turning wood into 
art, and the garden is another kind of art (where the wood grows). Paintings are 
done on paper (also made of wood) with colours from within the earth's dirt belly.
But there is another shot which shifts my perception again, this time to an 
intersubjective position. This is the “pivot-shot” of the film, causing a moment not 
232This is what D&G call a “rhizome” structure: “Any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be. 
This is very different from the tree or root [classical narrative] which plots a point, fixes an order.” (TP, p7) Rhizomes 
produce multiplicities, rather than unities. (TP, p8)
233A. A. Milne, “In Which a House is Built at Pooh Corner for Eeyore,” in The House at Pooh Corner (1928: Methuen, 
1973) p3. A time-image from my childhood.
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of memory, but of “becoming.” So far these perceptions have collapsed into time 
and I have been delving into my memories, remembering my own life (mediated by 
Joanna's memories). Now, I am in the kitchen with “mother Bosshard” (I assume). 
While cleaning up she suddenly looks  directly at  the camera.  In this moment I 
perceive a full-blown “affection-image” (a face). As she looks at the camera the 
“subjective” perception of “objects” (instrument-mediated free-indirect-discourse) 
reverses. The camera suddenly becomes an “object” looked at in the world, and the 
“object” which I look at, the woman, becomes the  subjectivity of the film.234 The 
eye perceives itself perceived and in this moment expresses a body which does this 
perceiving, which is looked at. As Marks says, “In the affection-image a becoming-
other occurs.” I become the mother of the family, “becoming woman” (as Deleuze 
would say). So far I have been thinking of these objects as “things.” When I look at 
the house like a mother I find I have a different perspective. However, as I am not a 
woman, I imagine this is another kind of “time-image” for me. I  cannot become 
woman, can I?
I return to the images: I see empty rooms, this time the children's rooms. 
The camera looks at  toys scattered on the ground.  Quite by surprise  I  think to 
myself:  mess! This is not a normal “me” thought. Then I see a child on their bed 
reading. The camera pans to the floor showing the toys lying dormant. I think of 
my mother: “Pick up that mess Richard!” she would say. Repeatedly I pan from the 
children to the floor. I become angry at the children, seeing them laying about when 
there is work to be done. Where is mother? Cleaning up the lunch dishes in the 
kitchen.  I  always  thought  that  my  mother  was  annoying,  but  now  that  I  have 
become “other” (to myself) I start to feel differently. In the process of “becoming 
mother” I took on her “body” metaphysically. This is not the “instrument-mediated 
perception” of subjective perceptions, but a “mentally-mediated perception.” As I 
“become mother” and begin to look around the house I realise that, to the mother, 
the house is an extension of her body. She sees the house as related to how she is 
“seen” as an object. When it is untidy it reflects on her.
234Although a look from a person to the camera is common in films (especially in documentaries, self-reflexive fiction and 
early cinema) the specific effect of foregrounding firstly, objects in the frame as “objects” and secondly, the camera as 
“subjective,” is rare.  It is specifically the foregrounding of 'free-indirect-discourse' as objects seen by subjects (and 
subjects seen by objects) which produces the necessary conditions for the image to become “intersubjective.”
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I think of Joanna coming to visit for afternoon tea. Then I think of the/my 
mother looking at the house before Joanna (and I) arrived. My mum would always 
have to clean a little before people came over. I never understood it, but now I 
kinda get it. To my mum the house is an extension of her body (like Joanna's film 
“body  house”)  and  this  body  is  looked at  by  others  (what  Mulvey  calls 
scopophilia).235 Before people arrive what does my mother feel? As if the objects of  
the house look at her. Deleuze describes two kinds of affection-images: the face, 
and the object which becomes like a face.236 Everything in the film turns into a face, 
thousands of eyes perceiving me (every speck of dust an eye). Everything is facing 
me. When Joanna first came into the house what did she do? She looked around. 
She  may  have  been  looking  subjectively,  but  to  the  mother  she  perceives 
objectively (the  mess).  A  mother's  perspective  of  the  house,  I  realise,  is  both 
“objective” and “subjective” (it is intersubjective). As Marks comments, this has 
the  power  to  “shift...  the  hierarchical  relationship  between  subject  and  object, 
indeed dissolves the dichotomy between the two, such that erstwhile subjects take 
on the physical, material qualities of objects, while objects take on the perceptive 
and knowledgeable qualities of subjects.”237 In Joanna's films the subject (here, the 
mother)  takes on the physical  qualities  of  the  house,  while  objects  take on the 
power to  “subject”  her to certain  feelings of  inadequacy or lack in the eyes of 
(m)others.
But  I  also think of all  the paintings by children I  have seen.  There is  a 
particular shot after I have “become mother” of a wall filled with children's art. The 
effect  of  seeing  so  many pictures  suddenly  gathered  together  in  the  one  space 
(where  before  I  saw each  art  work  separated  from the  rest)  suddenly  fills  me 
(becoming wall) with the “meaning” of those first shots. The paintings become her  
children: as her children grow up and leave the nest their paintings will remain. 
They will forever “become” an indication of a mother's (and/or father's) pride in 
their children's existenz. The mother does not wrap her second body in “major,” or 
235Reading this paragraph to my wife, she said, “When people commented on the way I kept house, it was like a physical 
blow to my body.”
236“The affection image is the close-up, and the close-up is the face,” (Deleuze, MI, p87) but also “[t]here are affects of 
things.” (MI, p97) More significantly, the face becomes a “partial object,” and the partial object becomes like a face, or a 
“faceified object” which is able to “express.” (MI, p97)
237Marks, SoF, p141.
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“official art,” but with the “minor arts.” Looking at the wall of paintings I suddenly 
capture glimpses of “becoming.” Each picture is like an eye looking out on to other 
worlds,  other  times,  piled  one-a-top-the-other.  I  notice  changes  between  the 
paintings, each representing a stage in her children's lives. I think about the way I 
stopped drawing things when I was a kid. It was when I realised that my drawings 
didn't really look like the things they were meant to be. I remember thinking that 
this meant I wasn't 'good' at drawing. I wonder what I thought before that? Before I 
knew the difference between (socially determined) good and bad art? A child, I 
realise/remember does not think, or see, in terms like “children's art” or “minor 
arts.” They do not even see “art” really. To a child, I would argue, a painting is an 
act (not an art) of doing something (pure creation without judgement). A child does 
not think in terms of “success.” Much like the experimental film-maker, they are 
freed from the constraints of the “business of art” (in which 'good' and 'bad'  is 
determined by financial return).
A  child  does  “art”  for  the  pure  pleasure  of  doing  it,  much  like  the 
experimental film-maker. As Foucault notes, the category of “author” subjects the 
majority of people to the status of “non-author.”  There is a moment, as a child, 
when I felt this distinction, in which the difference between “art” and “not art,” 
between “author” and “non-author” is determined (for you: I am subjected). For 
some (myself included) this can be an alienating experience, mentally distancing 
one from the “means of producing” art. This happens as the child realises that their 
drawing is not the same as others, that it cannot produce art which others respond 
to. That's when I stopped drawing, when I realised I could not reproduce the effects 
of  others  (for  others).  I  am moved to  start  drawing again,  but  this  time I  will 
produce my own marks (for me) taking pleasure in the doing (rather than expecting 
anything). I take a crayon and start to draw, becoming child, beginning again –
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Universe-S
(Dick Whyte, crayon on paper, 2006)
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2.   Activities   &   Objectives 
What is an objective perception-image? A movement-image that is called 
“objective” is analogous to the third-person-address of “histoire,” rather than the 
first-person  “discours”  of  the  subjective  perception-image.  Histoire  is  most 
commonly associated with 'classical  realist  text'  found in  mainstream cinematic 
practices. Three of Joanna's films (Task, Jillian Dressing and Bag) all use a style of 
perception  which  is  very  similar,  on  the  surface,  to  the  “classical”  objective 
perception-image. The frame is “still” in every film (rather than the “instrument 
mediated perception” of the subjective films) and the characters in the films give no 
signs of being aware of the camera's presence. Although there are just three films 
which use what is classically called an 'objective' (perception) image, they are each 
so different from the rest of Joanna's work, I feel they constitute a category all of 
their own, with its own complex processes. Note: if there is a way of putting our 
“subjectivity into process,”238 as Kuhn writes, then perhaps there is also a way of 
putting “objectivity into process.”
As well as using “objective” perception-images, these three films also focus 
on a single “action” for the duration of the film (rather than the collage, or scrap-
book feel of the subjective films, indicating a memory-perception). The “action-
image”  is  also  central  to  the  construction  of  classical-cinema's  “structure” 
(Deleuze's “action” film). In Jillian Dressing I watch a woman perform the action 
of  getting  dressed  and  putting  on  make  up  (in  silhouette).  In  Task I  watch  a 
woman's hands as she performs the action of ironing and folding washing. In Bag I 
watch hands as they perform the action of unpacking a bag and then packing it 
again. In all three films I watch “her” do the action for three minutes, never taking 
my eyes off the action. These are objective action-images. However, they are not 
the “actions” of the classical  film, but those which are dominantly  absent from 
classical  cinema.  As Marks  writes,  intercultural  cinema “read[s]  significance  in 
238Kuhn, p12, citing Helene Cixous (1980) and Julia Kristeva (1975).
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what  official  history  overlooks”239 (dressing,  washing,  ironing).  Joanna's  films 
feature women in private action (rather than males engaged in public actions). They 
picture women doing “work” which is  seldom seen in  mainstream movies,  and 
seldom seen at all with such attention to detail: women ironing washing, dressing, 
putting  on  make  up,  unpacking  a  bag.  As  Laura  Marks  writes,  “intercultural 
artists... interrogate the historical archive, both Western and traditional, in order to 
read their own histories in the gaps.”240 Here the “gaps” of the mainstream film 
archive are  both illuminated and filled  by Joanna's  films.  However,  as  well  as 
watching the performed “objective” (the “action” she is subject to), the objective 
perception-image (the  fact  that  the  camera  is  not  there)  is  foregrounded.  This 
creates a sense of “free-indirect-objectivity.”241
Classical cinema editing is often referred to as 'invisible editing', meaning 
that it does not impinge on the viewer's consciousness as they watch the film. The 
camera is completely invisible to the characters, and largely to the spectator. Even 
though we know it was there, in the act of watching, we suspend this knowledge in 
order  to  comprehend  the  story.  This  is  the  nexus  of  'histoire'  as  a  discursive 
practice. In Joanna's “objective” films the camera is invisible to the characters (the 
women  who  iron,  who  dress,  and  who  pack)  but  this  is  made  visible  to  me, 
revealing for the spectator the “codes” and “conventions” of objective discourse. 
These three films foreground objectivity firstly through the constant stillness of the 
frame (unlike the constant movement of the subjective perception). A “still” frame 
suppresses  the  spectator's  experience  of  the  camera's  presence  and  produces  a 
“silent” discourse which is said by no-one (from no-where). In Joanna's three films 
the camera is  still,  but it  is  not  still  like a classical  film. Having no tripod the 
camera is  trying to be still (and not always succeeding).  In these moments the 
camera  is  foregrounded as  a  'free-indirect-objective'  perception-image,  a  seeing 
which thinks itself unseen.
239Marks, SoF, p28.
240Marks, SoF, p5.
241Pasolini and Deleuze refer to 'free-indirect-discourse' specifically in terms of subjectivity, in rough camera movements 
which have a habit of obsessively “making the camera felt” as a moving, living consciousness. (MI, p74) This Deleuze 
also refers to as 'free-indirect-subjective'. Given this, I have merely extrapolated that the camera's “objectivity” may be 
equally “felt” in the film (through the 'obsessive' lack of movement) and that this might be called existential, or self-
conscious “free-indirect-objectivity.”
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Secondly, an “objective” perception-image watches from “outside” the set 
of actions it films (and cannot be seen by the characters). Joanna's films accentuate 
this by ensuring that the characters  cannot look at the camera: two of the women 
are off-screen (bar their hands and arms) and Jillian is silhouetted (which hides her 
eyes). Each woman is made invisible. Read by themselves, these films might seem 
insignificant, but coupled with the subjective films, they create a polar opposite. In 
this sense, I find a “free-indirect-objective” perception, which looks at a “subject” 
(an  actress)  perform  an  “objective”  (action-image).  Like  the  “histoirical” 
perception  of  classical  cinema,  these  three films “subject”  their  characters  to  a 
“uniform objective” (but  unlike classical  cinema they make this  visible).  In  the 
previous section Joanna foregrounded a subjective mind looking at objects. Now I 
find  an  objective  mind,  subjecting  that  which  it  looks  at  to  performing  tasks. 
Joanna's films, read in series, are reversals of each other. At this point I constructed 
a  table  of  differences  between  the  objective  “action-image”  and  the  subjective 
“perception-image”  (outlined  in  the  previous  section)  as  illustrated  by  Joanna's 
films;
Subjective                                         Objective                                
Moving Still
Can & does look at camera Cannot look at camera
Many Shots One Angle/One Shot
Multiple Perceptions One Action
Many People One Character/Actor
Camera Eye/I/There No-One/Nowhere
Bosshard's/My Friends Jillian/She/Her
Discourse Histoire
Joanna's  films,  when looked at  in series,  produce a  complex “binary” in 
which  every  feature  of  the  subjective  film  is  mirrored  in  the  objective  films, 
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foregrounding their different codes and conventions. As Marks says of intercultural 
cinema, they can do the job of “archaeology,”242 forming a part of the “archive” 
which  makes  visible  (and  deconstructs)  the  official  “rules”  and  “codes”  of 
discursive  practices.243 As  Marks  writes,  “The  acts  of  excavation  performed  in 
these works is primarily deconstructive, for it is necessary to dismantle the colonial 
histories that frame minority stories before those stories can be told in their own 
terms.”244
For Deleuze the “action-image,” as I have said, belongs to the register of 
“secondness.” As Marks writes, “Struggle enters the sign in Secondness, for here 
everything  exists through  opposition:  this  and  not  that,  action-reaction,  and  so 
on.”245 As I enter into the free-indirect-objective mindscreen of the film, looking at 
a “subject” perform an “objective,” I begin to think this way, my mind in a very 
different state from that which I found myself in when framed subjectively (which 
opposed nothing, and suggested a visible camera “facing” the world, in a constant 
state of “firstness,” or affection for the world). I become aware that the “objective” 
frame causes me to “judge” and to create oppositions (while in the subjective films 
I was caused to “remember”). As Deleuze writes, “There is no subject which acts 
without another which watches it act, and grasps it as acted, itself assuming the 
freedom of which it deprives the former.”246 Placed in an objective-mindscreen, in a 
head full of “secondness,” I see opposition everywhere between the action-images 
of classical cinema and the action-images of Joanna's films.
* * * *
242Marks, SoF, p8 & 25.
243This binary model extends much further than film and literature. Classical physics, for instance, believes there is “one” 
way of knowing the universe and that the “rules” worked out on Earth (for space, time, motion, and so on) would hold 
anywhere in the universe (indicating that the universe is 'homogeneous'). Like 'histoire' and cliché movement-images, 
classical physics has “one” meaning, “one” conclusion (or answer) and is designed for “one” kind of experience. 
Modern physics, on the other hand, like the time-image, shatters the expected actions of the movement-image and 
recognises that the universe is a complex machine made up of a multiplicity of different kinds of “experiences” (of 
which the Earth is only one example) each with their own heterogeneous “rules” and “codes” in terms of space, time, 
motion (and so on).
244Marks, SoF, p25. My italics.
245Marks, SoT, p197.
246Deleuze, MI, p74. My italics.
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The classical action-image works with affection-images (the close-up of the 
face). Without the close-up of the face there is nothing for me to identify with.247 In 
Joanna's three objective films there are no affection-images, no faces: I cannot look 
at the women. This is significant in terms of Laura Mulvey's critique of classical 
cinema.  Mulvey,  as  I  have  said,  argues  that  classical  cinema addresses  a  male 
subject,  representing women as “objects” for masculine pleasure.  Here I  cannot 
look at the women (as objects: their bodies occur off-screen or in the dark) and am 
instead made aware of their status as subject (to the objective view).
Furthermore,  in  classical-cinema  the  “action”  is  completed:  the  hero 
(usually a male) always succeeds in their task. In this moment we, as the spectator, 
are also completed and closed. As I have said, the “action-movie” begins with a 
“situation” (a threat to the world), which prompts a predictable “action” (the hero 
attempting  to  save  the  day),  which  restores  the  initial  “situation”  (the  threat  is 
availed). In Joanna's “objective” films the “situations” either side of the “action” 
are never shown and the action itself is never completed (though I had imagined it 
would  be  at  the  beginning  of  the  film).  As  an  audience  member,  I  am  never 
“satisfied” by the task and there is  no “closure.”  As Kuhn writes,  “One of  the 
arguments  on  behalf  of  a  feminine  language  is  that  it  works  against  that  very 
closure which, it  is suggested, is a feature of dominant 'masculine' language.”248 
Rather than having my (arguably, masculine) “desire” to see a task completed, I am 
left in the never ending cycle of the 'feminine' task. Citing Roland Barthes, Kuhn 
“makes  a  distinction  between  the  pleasure  to  be  obtained  from  the  closure  or 
resolution of the classical narrative, and the bliss (jouissance) of the text which 
challenges  such closure...  which goes  beyond,  or  is  outside  the  pleasure of  the 
fixation of the subject-reader of the classical narrative.”249
0) In Bag I see the hands of someone unpack a bag and then pack the bag up 
247As Kuhn argues, “In the classical realist text, action typically pivots on central characters... [who] tend to become 
objects of identification for readers... [and that] a series of close-ups and medium close-ups... immediately signals the 
centrality of the... character to the narrative.” (Kuhn, p31)
248Kuhn, p17.
249Kuhn, p17. Though I am not a psychoanalyst, and nor is this paper in any way psychoanalytical, I have embedded a 
crude “beginning point” for a possible psychoanalytical “fold” in my use of the terms desire, drive, jouissance and 
body-without-organs. In this text I have largely referenced the BwO in terms of art theory (as Deleuze and Guattari 
discuss in A Thousand Plateaus) but it is an equally powerful psychoanalytical intervention (see D&G, Anti-Oedipus).
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again, all from the same 'objective' perception. When they finish the task however, 
I do not sense any completion. In the second half, the bag is packed again, but as 
the clothes are replaced, it stores up the energy of the action. When it is completely 
packed, I know that it must unpack itself again at another time. The packing of a 
bag in-itself is not an action which stops, but which only lead to further situations: 
Where are you going with the bag? Where have you come from with the bag? The 
bag is line a spring, coiling up as it is filled, gathering the potential of an emptying 
to come. A bag implies a journey, and when the bag is completely emptied (for just 
a moment in middle of the film) the wide open spaces of the open road unfolds 
from within the bag's vacant shadows.250
1) In Jillian Dressing the unfinished quality of the action is more direct: the 
film simply ends before Jillian has finished getting ready. The real act of dressing 
takes  much  longer  than  the  three  minutes  we  watch  and  Joanna's  editing 
accentuates this. For me, a person who gets dressed in a matter of minutes usually 
(a classical “male”) this experience is jarring and somewhat unusual. It takes so 
long for “her” to choose her clothes, to select the things she wishes to wear that day 
(from  my  perspective,  to  another  audience  member  it  might  seem  “normal”). 
Further accentuating this is the fact that Jillian is always in silhouette meaning that 
I never really “see” the clothes she puts on.251 There is nothing complete in this 
image. Instead everything is incomplete, like a thread slowly coming apart. Rather 
than sewing me into the image (as in suture) I become aware of my distance from 
the image.252
2) In Task I do see the task completed, but I do not feel completed by it. As 
she finishes the ironing I sense not that the task is completed, but that it has only  
just begun. I imagine her having to pack away the clothes, and then the clothes 
being worn, and then her here again at the ironing board doing the same task. I 
imagine clothes on the line outside and in the washing basket waiting to be done. 
Returning to the films I see the three of them as a mini-narrative, each folded over 
250A mini “any-space-whatever,” a “bag-without-organs.” See next chapter.
251Interestingly enough the one piece of clothing I catch a glimpse of has the design of an American flag on it, the key 
producers of the “action-film.”
252My wife, while proof-reading this text, wrote in the margins, “When I had anorexia I always felt incomplete, as if I were 
unfinished. The only time I feel that way now is sometimes when I am putting on make-up, looking at myself in the 
mirror.”
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the other. First the clothes are worn (in Jillian Dressing). Then Jillian's clothes are 
washed and ironed (in  Task). In  Bag they are packed away, and unpacked. Then 
they are worn again. Then washed and ironed again (and so on). Rather than a 
narrative which ends, this narrative loops infinitely.
Deleuze  writes  that  the  “action-image”  mediates  two  “situations”  (the 
disrupted  world  at  the  beginning,  and  the  restoration  of  peace  at  the  end,  for 
instance). In Joanna's objective films I see only an “action,” the two “situations” on 
either side unknown. These are filled by the other two films in the series, the chain 
forming  a  kind  of  “repeating-machine.”  This  causes  me  to  shift  from a  “solid 
perception,”  to  a  “liquid  perception.”  Unlike  the  liquid  subjective  perceptions 
(which flowed from shot to shot) this “liquid perception” flows out the beginnings 
and endings of the films themselves, causing me to connect the three films to each 
other,  creating, as I have said,  a kind of rhizome/machine. A narrative-machine 
goes from A to B to C, with each part following the other in a necessary linear 
order.  In  a  “rhizome”  the  parts  are  interchangeable:  in  any  order  a  rhizome 
becomes red. No part of this “rhizome” is the definitive beginning, middle or end 
(in the story of “washing”). They all play this function, shifting from position to 
position, folding over one another. Any one of the films can be read as  both the 
situation  and the action, each superimposed over one another.  Task is an action, 
which  prepares  the  situation  of  Bag.  Task is  simultaneously  a  situation  which 
follows the action of  Jillian Dressing. The same can be said for each film in this 
series.253
Finally the awareness I have of the “objective perception” (cinema poetry) 
in Joanna's  three objective films foregrounds the way in  which the women are 
“subjects,” rather than “objects.” The “objective” perception in these three short 
films  openly  “subjects”  the  women  to  its  gaze,  and  cuts  them into  fragments, 
making them invisible. They are not “objects” to be watched but foregrounded as 
“subject” to a view which “thinks” them this way. The objective frame/gaze also 
foregrounds the women as “subject” to their objective – to iron, to dress, to pack 
253This function is similar to that which I found in the subjective films, with one important difference: in the “subjective” 
films the action-sequence unfolded “inside” the frame (just as subjectivity designates perception inside the set) while the 
action-sequence of the objective films unfolds “outside” the frame (just as objectivity designates perception which is 
outside the set).
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and unpack – destined never to complete their task.
Through  being  put  in  an  objective  frame  of  mind,  I  have  slipped  into 
objective  thought,  opposing  the  “illusion”  of  classical-cinema  with  the  “real” 
effects of objectivity on subjects both in the film, and in the audience. Deleuze, as I 
have said, aligns the “action image” with C.S. Peirce's secondness (judgements and 
contrasts between  binaries).  While  watching  these  action-images  I  have  found 
myself  deconstructing  classical  action-images,  contrasting  and  judging  them 
against Joanna's. However, in the second half of all three films there is a single 
moment (a “pivot-image”) which shifts my experience, which causes a change in 
my perception, opening onto memory and intersubjective becoming.
3) In  Task, at the very end of the film, the woman finishes her task and 
arranges the iron on the ironing board facing the camera. She almost presents the 
iron, arranging it almost as if for my perception. Still, I do not see her face. It is in 
the deliberateness of her action that  she is revealed as an actor. Her body turns 
slightly and it feels as if she is addressing the camera. She seems hesitant, as if 
Joanna  had  not  told  her  what  to  do  when she  was  finished.  The  status  of  the 
perception-image  shifts  from  objective  to  subjective  (the  camera  is  suddenly 
present to the set). The camera becomes the “subject” and the woman becomes the 
“objective-perceiver.”  This  is  a  time-image,  a  genesis  of  an  unknown  body. 
Perception  and  expression  reverse  and  I  “become”  the  woman  in  the  film  (a 
moment of “intersubjectivity”). I suddenly see something I hadn't noticed before: I  
think differently. The way she placed the iron and blanket on the ironing board had 
a feeling of “pride” in it, as if she was displaying them to me because she felt proud 
of her work.
I go back and watch the film again. This time the I see the washing as the 
“subject” and “object” of her vision. I am not the real “her” but a second “her” 
looking down at the image: looking over her work. It is as if the “her” I see is the 
“subjective-woman” (whose hands perform the task) and the “objective-perception” 
is “her” mind, checking over the work she is doing, making sure it is well done 
(just as I had found in the “subjective” films – all lines lead to Egypt). As Deleuze 
writes, free-indirect-discourse provides “an oscillation of the person between two 
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points  of  view on  [themselves],  a  hither  and  thither.”254 This  is  a  time-image, 
drawing on my memory-image: I am reminded.
I  think  back  to  my  mum  when  I  was  a  kid  and  her  ironing  (the  only 
experiences I really have of ironing clothes). I remember that mum would groan 
when I wore un-ironed clothes. I could never figure out why it was important to 
her. I never understood my mother, I guess. Now I realise that her children (and the 
way  they  look)  are  like  the  “house”  of  Bosshard's  House.  My  body  was  an 
extension of my mother's and the clothes I wore, the way I looked (when I was a 
child)  affects the way she perceives herself (objectively). Searching through my 
memory I find that I do not have many memories of  seeing her do the ironing. 
Maybe it was because I never made her feel good about it. I always persisted in 
wearing my clothes un-ironed no matter what she said. Perhaps she began to iron  
invisibly. It is not that I never saw my mother ironing, but only that I know for what 
I  saw,  there were thousands of  hours  I  never saw,  years  of  effort  put  into my 
appearance,  with no thanks from me. I never had a conversation once with my 
mother about how much ironing there was. I could always finish my homework: 
my tasks were completable.
Mum's housework I “real-eyes” was  actually never done. I wonder what 
kind of pride she felt in a job which was never finished? I know that a “job well 
done” is so much more satisfying when someone compliments you on it  after its 
completion. No-one is there to compliment the woman who does the ironing, day in 
and day out, but herself. I suddenly felt a warmth for my mother, something deep 
and powerful. The kind of satisfaction she received for ironing would have to be 
located outside the realm of being seen (hence, the objective perception-image). 
Unlike the satisfaction received from others, the satisfaction of house-work is self-
provided: unpaid, and often unnoticed.255 I certainly never made her feel like it was 
worth anything to me! This moved me, literally.
After watching the films I got up and performed an action  with my body 
(much like the action of drawing I took up at the end of the previous section). I 
called my mother and told her about this experience, and I thanked her for doing 
254Deleuze, MI, p74.
255Moscovici (p25) notes that Irigaray “argues that in the exchanges and “division of labour” between men and women, 
women's exchanges have all too often taken the form of unreciprocated giving, a gift of the “self” with no return.”
91.
that, all those years ago. I felt like I had understood something profound about my 
mother's life and the things she did. Once again, as with the subjective films, I 
found the “genesis of an unknown body” in the film, which again turned out to be 
the vision of a “mother.” Using a self-conscious and poetic free-indirect-discourse 
Joanna's films foreground subjectivity (which leads to objectivity) in one mode of 
film, and then objectivity (which leads to subjectivity) in others. As Deleuze writes, 
“is it not the cinema's perpetual destiny to make us move from one of its poles to 
the other, that is, from an objective perception to a subjective perception, and vice 
versa?”256 In Joanna's films this perpetual destiny is foregrounded and heightened 
for my experience as a viewer, giving me the chance to deconstruct cinema as a 
model of perception.
The films Jillian Dressing and Bag, like Task, also have similar pivot-shots 
within  their  objective  mindscreen,  creating  spaces  for  interjection,  and 
intersubjective exchanges. At the end of Bag, for instance, the bag is presented to 
the camera, the camera suddenly moves like a “subjective” perception and the film 
becomes  “subjective.”  Similarly,  in  Jillian  Dressing there  is  a  shot  in  which 
Jillian's arm passes through the frame, causing an “intersubjective shift.” But I will 
leave “you” to discover these unknown bodies for “yourself.”
3. Open Frames &   Free Thoughts  
Joanna's  “open,”  or  “free,”  films  borrow  from  both  the  subjective  and 
objective modes. The camera is “semi-subjective” (in the sense that it  moves) and 
“semi-objective” (in the sense that no-one looks at the camera). Semi-Subjectivity: 
In Joanna's “open” films, such as  Napkins,  Roses,  Port Chalmers Cycle,  Round 
Picton, or Body House, the movement is not like that of a person holding a camera, 
nor of a “real” body in contact with the world (as in the “subjective” films). The 
movements are wild and unrestrained. In Roses the camera launches into the roses, 
and in Port Chalmers Cycle it turns round and round, in a dizzying “pirouette” (like 
256Deleuze, MI, p71-2.
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a “pivot”).257 Here I find a movement which is “alien” to me, a kind of seeing that is 
“inhuman.”  Semi-Objectivity:  In Joanna's  “free” films there are  no humans,  and 
therefore nothing to definitively mark the perception as objective or subjective. In 
Gravestones I simply see image after image of gravestones. In Roses I see image 
after image of a rose bush. In Body House I see images of a dilapidated house, and 
in  Remnants  of  a  Demolished  Wharf I  see  images  of  a  demolished  wharf.  No 
people. Only things.
This  is  what  Deleuze,  citing  Jean  Mitry,  calls  a  “semi-subjective” 
perception.  A semi-subjective perception is a  “being  with” the world,  a curious 
expression which Deleuze characterises as a  perception which “moves amongst” 
the things in the film, “no longer mingl[ing] with the character[s]” (as subjective) 
and yet not on the “outside” either (the objective). Instead, the “eye of the camera” 
takes the form of an “anonymous viewpoint of someone unidentified”258 among the 
things of the film-world. However Joanna's films are not only “semi-subjective,” 
but also “semi-objective” (an equal intermixture).
This has the effect of presenting me with a series of “nouns” completely 
ungrounded, and open to interpretation. There are no faces, or events to reconnect 
these images with. In Gravestones I feel the film saying “gravestone! gravestone! 
gravestone!” instead of “I saw the gravestone” (subjective), or “The gravestone” 
(objective). In Roses I hear “roses! roses! roses!” In Body House I hear “wall! wall! 
wall! window! wood! dirt! ground!” Watching from the perspective of perception I 
find  that  the  films  list objects,  in  “series,”  without  a  pronouns  (subjective)  or 
articles (objective). Like the poem I quoted in the introduction to this chapter there 
is nothing before the noun (no histoire, no discours).
light
leaves
grass
In reading this poem I “became leaf” and I “became grass.” Deleuze and 
257“I hold on/ to the face/ of a rose.” Paul, in Bisley, p16.
258Deleuze, MI, p72.
93.
Guattari also talk of the potential to “become animal.” An animal, arguably, sees 
neither subjectivity, or objectivity as these are human constructs.259 In Gravestones 
I see images which are “open,” without distinctive markers, freed from the play of 
glances which code subjectivity and objectivity. Near the end I see an affection-
image of dog ferreting in the ground. In seeing the dog close-up (an affection-
image) I “become dog.” Watching  Gravestones again I realise how many of the 
grave-images have writing foreign to me on them, distancing me from using my 
language (which dictates subjective, and objective distinctions) making me like a 
dog who looks, unable to see anything but marks in grey stone. But does a dog even 
see “grey stone”? What is it to become dog? The way in which the camera looks 
around and  moves  freely  reminds  me  most  of  a  dog,  particularly  the  way  the 
camera shakes and peers at the ground from a low perspective.
In  Roses I  “move  amongst”  the  roses  erratically,  the  images  becoming 
abstracted, filled with a pure redness. In the middle of the film there is a shot where 
the camera actually moves into a single rose and the screen goes black. In this 
moment  I  am  suddenly  placed  in  a  “time-image,”  left  to  think:  what  have  I 
become? I am in the flower.  I realise,  I am a  bee flying around the rose bush, 
weaving back and forward!
Joanna's films all contain such readings, various “unknown bodies” arising 
from within the films, each built from the ground up (the perception/eye as zero). 
Each  film  foregrounds  its  own perception,  leaving  the  space  for  an  “unknown 
body” to arise between the enacted “expression” latent in the “perception-image.” I 
find myself thinking things I had never thought about before, understanding things 
I  hadn't  thought  of in years.  Before watching Joanna's  films,  and attempting to 
translate my experiences of them into language, I had never thought that language 
might  structure  my  perception,  or  that  subjectivity  and  objectivity  might  be 
“illusions.” I never thought of perception as 'thought'. But then again, I don't think I 
had ever really thought closely about what an “animal” sees, or that it might be 
different from what I see. I had never thought that a woman would see the world 
259As Sobchack writes, “A cat cannot look at a king for the same reason it cannot see a film.” (AoE, p53) A “film,” like an 
“author,” is a “function” of social discourse, requiring “prior reflexive knowledge” (AoE, p53) of the function of the 
“king” and “film” in relation to “subjects”and “objects.” The “cat,” however, is not “subject” to the “film” in the way a 
person is and has no interest in it as an “object” of consumption.
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differently, simply because of the way she was positioned to think of herself (if I 
am being honest). I knew we had different experiences, but I had never thought of 
the structure of experience as being different. In Joanna's films there seems to be a 
“series” of structures which systematically provide the perfect “site” for unpacking 
the “eye” of cinema, and its various capacities for becoming. As well as a site of 
intervention, I find a “sight” of invention, in which new and unthought experiences 
of becoming-woman, becoming-child and becoming-animal occur.
These “becoming-animals” liquefy the solid perception, as I have written of 
the subjective and objective perceptions of bodies, and flow through the images in 
time (both backwards and forwards: they are a liquid). But there are two kinds of 
images  in  Joanna's  open films  which  cause  another  kind  of  “intersubjectivity,” 
which does not open onto unknown (virtual) bodies,  but onto the “film's body” (as 
Sobchack calls it).  The first  of  these images is  the “movement-image,” and the 
second is the “light-image.” These two images begin Deleuze's books on cinema. 
They are the birth of cinema for him. Light at very high speeds cools, until we see 
it as concrete movement, and this is the cinema. This movement-light is perceived, 
and  the  perception-image  becomes  the  first  register  of  the  movement-image. 
Deleuze  spends  very  little  time  discussing  movement  or  light-images  in-
themselves, and seems to imply that a pure-movement image does not exist without 
one of the three “registers” added to it (movement and light are imperceptible). In 
Joanna's “open” films movement and light are taken to their limits: pulsing, curved 
and quick. The film is both an “eye,” and a “body,” endowed with an existential 
power to become  movement through the  light of the world (what Merleau-Ponty 
might call a kind of “flesh”).260
Body House opens with an image of a wall, a “brick wall.” It says, as I have 
said, “wall,” and nothing more. I am close to it – too close. Added to the wall is a 
quick movement of the camera to the right. The movement is so fast that the wall 
abstracts. In this moment of abstraction there is an “action-image” which arises 
within  the  “open  perception.”  The  swift  movements  break  down  the 
perception/camera/eye and as the wall “becomes abstract,” I see the real frames of 
260As Sobchack notes, “flesh” is a concept Merleau-Ponty used to designate the “shared material nature of the lived body 
and the objective world.” (AoE, p56, n3)
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the film. There is a  stutter in the mechanism. I  see the projector struggling.  In 
Roses the eye moves so fast everything turns to a fiery liquid. The movements test 
the projector, and camera, placing them in tension with each other. The roses “face” 
me  and I am nothing but the wind, thrown this way and that. In  Port Chalmers 
Cycle there  is  a  shot  which  jolts  up  and  down  a  road,  looking  down  at  the 
pavement. It  is like no human perception I know. In each of the jolts there is a 
sudden  breakdown and  I  see  the  “frames”  stuttering,  becoming  briefly  visible. 
These kinds of movements are prevalent in Joanna's “open” films (especially shots 
in which the camera turns, and spins).
Here, the “perception” of the film “sees” its own projection, spreading itself 
across time and space. The projection of the film, for Sobchack, represents one of 
its film's “organs.”261 The camera is the “organ of perception” (like an eye) and the 
projector is the “organ of expression” (a projection of light). In Joanna's open films 
the “organ of perception” is taken to the “limit” of the frame (as Sobchack says, the 
perception/frame is a “limit”). At the “limit” the film becomes conscious of its own 
“organ of expression.” This is similar to the way in which my own vision breaks 
down when I move my head quickly around without centring my perception on 
anything. My perception  of things breaks down and I sense a “gap” between my 
physical “eye” and my intentional “I.” My mind (my intentional “I”) is performing 
an action which my “eye” cannot successfully translate into solid vision. I sense a 
disparity  between  the  “world”  and  “myself.”  As  the  projector  sees  its  own 
expressive function, the “film's body” catches a glimpse of its own “reel” body, and 
enters into an intersubjective relation with its second self (the projector). The film 
becomes aware of itself existing in three places, splayed across time and space, 
self-consciously seeing,  recording,  and projecting (perceiving,  remembering and 
acting).
Joanna's movement-images break down the perception-image on one side, 
revealing to me the projector in its “reel” relationship with/as the “film's eye.” On 
the other side Joanna continually uses images of “light” which take me in the other 
direction. When I see an image of “light” I become aware of the intersubjective 
fold between the “eye” and the “real” world it films. In Gravestones, for example, 
261Sobchack, AoE, p222.
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the gravestones are set against black silhouetted mountains. The light of the sky 
cannot be contained by the “eye” and streaks run from the edges of the mountains 
to the gravestone. The gravestone and the mountain suddenly become “thick” with 
space and light shoots from the sky to the ground. These beams of light rush from 
the “there” where the “camera/eye” is through time and space to the “here” where 
the projector is, remembering the light. Like my own process of vision the light of 
the world rushes into my eyes, passes through the memory (where certain parts are 
retained while others are lost) and then projected as an “image” for my conscious 
mind to relate to. I do not see through my eye. Instead I see an image constructed 
some time after the eye has done its seeing. In this moment the film sees its own 
“real” body, made of nothing but light. In Deleuze's terms the film's brain 'thinks' 
this, becoming 'self-conscious' of both it's own “reel” body and its own “real” body. 
On the one hand the film is made of light (just as the person's body is nothing but 
atoms and energy). On the other it is made of physical substance (the projector: reel 
movement). Another gap opens between these extremes, and there is a vast space 
produced, filled with moving-light: this is the “film's body.”
The unity of the “eye,” as it reflects on itself in relation to reel movement-
images and real light-images, breaks down in Joanna's “open” films, and yet it is no 
longer  a  “breaking-down.”  The  “eye”  in  these  films  intentionally goes  through 
these things time and time again, as if intent on interrogating the limits of its own 
perception (frame) in relation to its own capacity to express an existential presence. 
This is achieved primarily through heightening the 'distance' between the subjective 
intentions of the “I” and the  objective existence of the “eye.” This distance, this 
gap: ever widening, filled with light. The light is blinding. I feel my eye straining to 
see.  I  am  brought  into  contact  with  my  own  existential  eye and  become 
intersubjectively  entwined  in  the  film.  As  this  happens,  I  feel,  as  I  have 
foregrounded in the introduction, my own eye and body get bigger, matching the 
size of the film. We might say the “affection-image” is an “enlargement,” and in 
this final perception-expression relation I feel both an embodied enlargement and a 
shift  from  the  “perception-images”  of  the  “film's  eye,”  to  the  “any-spaces-
whatever” of the “film's mind.” I feel my skin begin to stretch, my eye mingling 
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with the light of the film body, becoming light. I blink many times. I become film 
and in becoming film I become nothing but light. I am the light.
4.   Time   to Conclude 
What of all these “becomings” then? Where to from here? For Deleuze a 
series of becomings eventually leads to “becoming imperceptible.”262 In Joanna's 
films this happens through “becoming light.” This piece of light is not in any one 
place or time. It is everywhere at once. But this is only from my perspective. The 
purpose of a series of “becomings” is to alter the  speeds and movements of the 
body,  to  take them to  their  limit,  and  in  this  limit  to  become  everything.  Like 
Kuhn's notion of “feminine discourse” my subjectivity (and objectivity) are put into 
process, and I am made “open” to so many new modes of experience, in particular 
a “feminine perception.” I have “become woman,” unable to retain my position as a 
male desiring completion and closure.
In this  way Joanna's films do the work of “archaeology” on themselves, 
each time taking perception to its limit. At the “limit” language ceases to work: 
subjectivity and objectivity switch places and I become somebody.263 I move from 
archaeology, to the process of “building an (unknown) body.” As Marks writes, 
“this  process  describes  the  movement  from  excavation  to  fabulation,  or  from 
deconstructing dominant histories to creating new conditions for new stories.”264 
But  where  does  this  lead  us?  In  this  chapter  I  have  collapsed  the  series  into 
perceptions and “unknown bodies.” Once I have discovered the “film's body” in the 
“open” films, I go back and watch the subjective and objective films. I notice that 
they all have the same attention to “light-images” (beams of light visible on the 
white clothes in  Task, beams of light visible at the edges of Jillian's silhouette in 
Jillian Dressing, and so on). These images make it impossible for me not to see the 
existential presence of the eye. All Joanna's films foreground a “film body” which 
262D&G, TP, p309. All becomings begin with “becoming woman.”
263Rather than “I coulda been a contender.” (On the Waterfront, dir. Elia Kazan, 1954)
264Marks, SoF, p5.
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'I can' read if I want to. In going back, with this new “mindscreen” in place, I find 
that “perceptions” become “imperceptible.” Though I am seeing perceptions, they 
are no longer perceptions. Pure expression. Pure affection. I notice that all the shots 
have a thick layer of grain over them, which I ignored when I 'thought' the images 
through perception. I also notice the constant abstraction of perception.
In this chapter I read for perceptions and in each film I found a number of 
perception-images which opened onto becomings. But now I have trouble retaining 
a sense of perception and all the images seem to be “affections,” corresponding to 
what Deleuze calls an “any-space-whatever.” In this chapter I have read the films 
as if they are “connected” by their silence, by a “time-image” which gathers them 
together and prepares them for movement-images to arise.  In this way Joanna's 
films,  as  Deleuze  and Guattari  write  of  Eastern  poetry,  allow the spectator  “to 
produce extremely complex dynamic relations on the basis of intrinsically simple 
formal relations.”265 Let us say that the perceptions discussed here are the 'simple 
formal  relations',  while  the  “affect”  designates  a  series  of  'complex  dynamic 
relations' (becomings). These 'simple formal relations of becoming' were completed 
in the perceptive and expressive “foregrounding” of the “film's body,”266 becoming 
visible in broken walls, abstract movements and fissures of light. In movement and 
light-images I find a path by which I can “build a body” in the cinema. But what 
kind  of  body  is  this  “film-body”?  Sobchack's  film  body  is  predicated  on  the 
“frame” (the limit)  of the film being  invisible to the perception of  the film. In 
Joanna's films this organisation, also central to classical-cinema, is challenged, and 
the “frame” is made constantly  visible  to the perception that is the film. Joanna's 
“film body” thinks of itself, unpacking itself piece by piece, fragment by fragment. 
This is a concept not alien to Joanna: “I put together Unpacking the Body 1977 as 
assemblage of texts & objects.”267
Hence,  I  am  arguing  that  Joanna's  “film  body”  is  now  an  “any-space-
whatever,” a “body without organs,” an “assemblage” of pure “affection.” In this 
265D&G, TP, p288-9.
266It is worth noting that in fore-grounding the body there were “four” kinds of bodies produced (four “grounds” immanent 
to the “film's body.” 1) A movement from subjective to objective (becoming house/mother); 2) A movement from 
objective to subjective (becoming woman); 3) A movement from subjective/objective to objective/subjective (becoming 
animal), and 4) A movement in the opposite direction (becoming film/light/imperceptible).
267Paul and Eagle, p81. My italics.
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chapter are bodies which have not been “built,” but which existed ready-made in 
my memory. The any-space-whatever exists between “movement” and “memory,” 
drawing on the ineffable quality of the images to be the “essence” of something 
between the shots, not contained in the perceptions, or representations.
As I have said, Joanna's art oscillates between the visible and invisible. Here 
I have spoken of “visible” bodies. Now I move to the invisible. The “body-without-
organs” begins as a series of “becomings,” and yet it is more. First it is the building 
of  a  body.  Then  it  is  the  “emptying”  of  the  body  and  a  de-connecting  of  the 
“expected” organisation of the body (rather than a clear connection between the 
parts). The any-space-whatever is the realm of the “assemblage,” of fragmentation 
and  emptiness.  No  longer  do  I  look  for  “representations”  or  “perceptions” 
(narratives) but for the “imperceptible” and the “abstract” (poetry). In this chapter I 
have concentrated on those images which I can make some sense of, but in each of 
Joanna's films there are as many images which float away, which I cannot “see,” 
which are covered in shadows and light, blacking or whiting out the “seeing” that is 
the film. In the “any-space-whatever” I find more and more time-images, more and 
more becomings of more and more strange things. In the emptied film-body “the 
story suspends in order to contemplate this emptiness.”268 Here, I have been finding 
stories, working back to the “figure” through a “figuring out.” Now I release these 
figures, and return to the films as affection, as “concrete” abstraction.
Hence  I  move  from perception  to  affection,  to  a  new “zero”  point,  the 
previous perceptions extinguished.269 I begin from a new ground of “expression.” 
Deleuze  places  perception  at  “0”  and  affection/expression  at  “1.”  Sobchack 
grounds  cinema  not  only  in  perception,  but  in  expression  as  a  reversible  “0.” 
Joanna's films offer me both views, simultaneously superimposed over one another. 
And between these views there will be many other points of contact. Rather than 
one modality Joanna's films layer the perceptive and affective faculties (detailed in 
this chapter and the next) over top of one another (the subject of the third chapter, a 
268Marks, SoF, p5.
269When grounded in perception-images affection-images are a firstness to perceptions zero. When viewed as an any-
space-whatever affection-images become their own “zero,” grounding the uprising of “time-images” in reverse (a 
“minus one” or “negative firstness”). As D&G write, rhizomes constitute “multiplicities with n dimensions having 
neither subject nor object... and from which the One is always subtracted (n – 1).” This is the state of the “any-space-
whatever,” a multiplicity of fragments which have no subject or object, from which the One is constantly subtracted.
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return to  action). To have (at least) two lines and many various points of contact 
between them, rather than a 'unified' structure, is what Deleuze and Guattari call a 
“rhizome,” integral to “becoming” a “body-without-organs.” Haiku, as I have said, 
are  also  “rhizomatic”  in  structure,  as  are  “becoming  woman,”  and  “becoming-
animal.” Music (the refrain) is also central to the structure of the “body-without-
organs,” to “becomings,” and “rhizomes.” Music is pure “becoming.” Music does 
not  “represent”  anything,  but  is  an  abstract  mosaic  of  waves  and  shallows,  of 
intensities and depths. Interestingly, Joanna's films originally were “worked out on 
music paper.”270
The  rhythmic  fragments  of  the  any-space-whatever  move  beyond 
representation, into the realms of the film's “spirit.” The “refrain” is a particular 
mode of musicality central to the plane-of-immanence which one passes through in 
constructing a  BwO. The “eye”  enters  into  its  own refrain,  perceiving only  an 
assemblage of rhythms, and intensities. As Deleuze and Guattari write, the refrain 
“does not operate in a homogeneous space-time, but by heterogeneous blocks. It 
changes  direction...  Rhythm  is  never  on  the  same  plane  as  that  which  has 
rhythm,”271 just  as  the  any-space-whatever  is  comprised  of  fragments  which 
foreground  their  heterogeneity.  It  is  “refrains”  which  assemble  spaces,  and 
territories,  which  may  be  converted  into  “any-spaces-whatever.”  As  Gregory 
O'Brien writes, “Joanna finds music an important presence underlying her work. 
'While there isn't a literal connection,' she explains, 'sometimes music can open up 
clues as to where a painting should go or how a particular work can develop. I once 
put a grid over a still life to get a similar effect.”272
Finally,  not every revolution of the film's perception has been discussed 
here: you may find other transformations, other “becomings.” I have not tried to 
comprehensively look at all of Joanna's films, but chosen a few that best illustrate 
the kind of structure (the haiku) which I feel that Joanna has used in her films. As I 
have said, as well as being an “essay” (tree) about Joanna's films, I hope that this 
270Paul, “Shibusha,” p10.
271D&G, TP, p346. The “refrain” designates the “expressive” element of the BwO (just as the affection-image designates 
the expressive elements of the movement-image).  In the refrain and “expressive qualities or matters of expression enter  
into shifting relations with one another that “express”... [and] there is an autonomy of expression.” (TP, p349-50)
272Paul, in O'Brien, p77. Alexander Greenhough has written on the similarity between “grids” in modernist art and “any-
spaces-whatever” (which he calls “equivalent spaces”). See Greenhough, p68-90.
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text might also act as a “tool box” (rhizome) for thinking through Joanna's films. A 
“tool  box” cultivates concepts which will  hopefully be useful  anywhere,  in any 
situation, though they may have a specific design (or purpose) initially. Joanna's 
films all  “de-sign” a  particular  series of  perceptions (de-signing them, breaking 
them down) and then “design” (through their  arrangement into three “kinds” of 
perception) a sort of “map” of cinema.273 Maps, rather than tracings, are essential to 
the BwO. I become a ”cartographer” of film, making a map of its territories, of its 
various becomings in the hope that some one else may find their way back. Now I 
switch my way of thinking. These are not perception-images: they are affection-
images, any-spaces-whatever, assemblages of thought in the film's mind, and tactile 
experiences for the film's (reel/real) body. To the end of time we proceed, forever 
an eternal beginning, areturninground –
273“All of tree logic is a logic of tracing and reproduction... its goal is to describe a de facto state, to maintain balance in 
intersubjective relations... The rhizome is altogether different, a map and not a tracing... It fosters connections between 
fields, the removal of blockages on the body without organs... It is itself a part of the rhizome.” (D&G, TP, p13)
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Chapter 1
Affections
(of an unknown consciousness)
Fig. 4. Gravestones 1 [film still]
(dir. Joanna Paul, B&W, 16mm, c. 1975)
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1. The Space of the Body: Assemblages and Any-Spaces-Whatever
“Desired  to  pass  from confusion  of  darkness  voice  things  in  a  room full 
presence of darkness to the simple, Passed through a white square to air to 
0.”274
“One may know the world without going out of doors. One may see the Way 
of Heaven without looking out the windows.”275
“My interest is in a poetic language; or more precisely the non-literal levels on 
which words operate and which allow the possibility of poetry.”276
“I'm reading a book of critical writing by Margaret Atwood, who believes that 
poetry is the heart of language, the activity through which language is renewed 
& kept alive (that fiction writing is the guardian of the moral & ethical sense 
of the community).”277
In  the  last  chapter  the  film  foregrounded  its  own  “existential  eye”  and 
“body” and these became the main “characters” of the film for  me. Integral  to 
Foucault's  analysis  of  authored  discursive  practices  is  Roman  Jakobson's 
conception of “shifters.” In the final stages of his analysis Foucault  argues that 
neither 'histoire' or 'discourse' use real 'shifters'. Shifters refer to signs which are 
linked  to  their  speaker  (or,  in  this  case,  seer)  existentially.278 A  'shifter'  in 
conversation refers to terms like “I” or “me” (for instance) which is existentially 
linked  to  the  “speaker”  (unlike  the  term  'couch',  for  instance,  which  does  not 
274Paul, “Written at St Omar,” in Jack Ross (ed.), Brief #32 (May 2005) p49.
275Tao Te Ching, in St. Elmo Nauman Jr., Dictionary of Asian Philosophies (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979) p331.
276Paul, NPL, p1.
277Paul and Eagle, p96.
278Roman Jakobson, “Shifters, Verbal Categories and the Russian Verb” (1957) in Selected Writings II: Word and 
Language (Mouton, 1971) p132.
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depend on an existential link to the speaker's body). In Joanna's films there is, as 
Sobchack writes, an “address of the eye,” which points to its own bodily presence 
on the seen/screen (both in movement-images and light-images) as existential. The 
“eye” is existentially foregrounded through continuous images of light, reminding 
me that the “eye” is not separated from the world, but entwined with it, both then 
and now. The eye of Joanna's  films therefore constitutes  a  “visual  shifter”  (the 
film's visible body) which moves itself (rather than a “non-shifter,” most commonly 
used in 'histoire', which would not draw attention to the “address of the eye”). The 
space between the “eye” and the things it “sees” (the perceived and the perceiver, 
the viewed-view and viewing-view) is accentuated and then filled with light. The 
“film's body-space” moves or shifts into this light-space, and through intentionally 
pushing movement and light to their limits, thinks of itself  as perceived light, as 
movement  expressed.  Sobchack  writes,  “Because  a  film  behaves  and  acts,  its 
present movement adds dimension to the flat space... Abstract space is dynamised 
as habitable, as “lived in,” as described in the depth of movement... Thus, space in 
the film becomes the situation of existence.”279 For Sobchack, this is an experience 
possible when watching any film. Joanna's films accentuate this effect, making the 
'existential' situation visible to the spectator within the chain of signification (rather 
than before the chain of signification, as Sobchack argues).
How does one build a “space” then, and therefore the “body” of the film 
with  it?  Deleuze  offers  two ways;  1)  We may plot  a  narrative  space  in  which 
events, and characters experience space and time in a linear fashion, perceived in 
such a way as to be clearly visible,  audible and sensible to the audience. Space is 
constructed as 'unified' and disguises the heterogeneity of film as homogeneity. In 
terms of the “film's body” this kind of space is sensibly organised and “closed.” 2) 
The  second  kind  of  space  begins  in  emptiness,  often  emptied  of  humans  and 
representation, as Joanna's films are, and then proceeds to build a space “fragment 
by fragment.”280 Each fragment corresponds to a sliver of space, a singularity, an 
affection-image (the close-up of the face, or that which 'faces' us). An affection-
image here is a close-up which  “retains the same power to tear the image away 
279Sobchack, AoE, p61-2.
280Deleuze, MI, p108.
106.
from  spatio-temporal  co-ordinates,”281 to  abstract  it  from  classical  (Euclidean) 
spatial  organisation.  Deleuze  calls  this  kind  of  space  an  “any-space-whatever.” 
Any-spaces-whatever  are  firstly  fragmented and  then  they  are  emptied of 
representation. When images become invisible (I see only shadows, whites, lights, 
and greys) space is “emptied.” When an image becomes abstracted and I cannot tell 
what it is (often by getting too close to it) the image is also “emptied” (of readable 
content).  Film  Noir,  German  Expressionism  and  what  Deleuze  calls  Lyrical 
Abstraction (a kind of filmic “impressionism”) all “empty” space in this way (the 
shadow) and in it, for Deleuze, there are produced “affections” of the spirit in the 
form of emptied and deconnected images.282
He  writes,  “There  are  therefore  two  states  of  the  any-space-whatever... 
deconnected  or  emptied  spaces.”283 In  each  of  these  spaces  there  is  a  pure 
“potentiality” released from the fragments in which the spectator may approach the 
realm of the “spirit.” As Deleuze writes,  “Space is no longer determined, it has  
become the any-space-whatever which is identical to the power of the spirit.”284 
Crudely: because there is nothing to hold the fragments together (usually provided 
by a narrative unity) they give way to an ineffable sense of the “spirit” of things 
which  exists  between  the  fragments,  which  does  not  reside  in  our  everyday, 
material perceptions of the world (it is poetical and metaphysical). The “any-space-
whatever” has the power, for Deleuze, to restore a metaphysics to physics, and a 
physics to metaphysics, to restore the spirit of film to itself. Deleuze writes, “This is 
what Bresson suggested in his theory of 'fragmentation': we pass from a closed set 
that is fragmented to an open spiritual whole [the essence/spirit] that is created or 
recreated.”285 Bresson's films, and his short book of cinematic philosophy, Notes on 
Cinematography,  were very important to Joanna, and one can see his 'theory of 
fragmentation'  expressed throughout  all  of  her  films,  regardless of  their  distinct 
perceptions (discussed in the last chapter). As Bridie Lonie writes, Joanna's works 
were  “fragments  of  sensory  experience,  connections  drawn  between  ideas  and 
281Deleuze, MI, p96.
282Deleuze, MI, p112.
283Deleuze, MI, p120.
284Deleuze, MI, p117.
285Deleuze, MI, p117.
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things.”286
Deleuze argues that an any-space-whatever also has the power to render the 
various  fragments  “equivalent,”  each image philosophically  “indifferent”  to  one 
another  (rather  than  “different”).  Alexander  Greenhough  developed  a  similar 
conception of fragmented space (in reference to Bresson's films) which he calls 
“equivalent-space.”287 In Bresson's work, like Joanna's, each shot corresponds to an 
“affection-image”  (a  close-up)  which  tears  the  image  from time  and  space.  In 
classical-cinema the close-up is used to pick out the central character, or to indicate 
some object  of  importance.  When a  film is  entirely  comprised of  close-ups,  of 
affection-images,  every fragment  has the  same importance (equivalence).  In the 
previous chapter I picked out shots which signalled shifts, which were important. 
These created narratives. Now every image seems to blur into the last, every shot 
woven into a sprawling mosaic of shadows and light. Every shot is picked out: no 
shot is picked out.  As Greenhough, quoting Bazin, writes that in an equivalent-
space “everything that  is  happening...  is  of like importance,” in which no shot, 
sequence  or  scene  “can  be  said  to  be  more  important  than  another,  for  their 
ontological equality destroys drama at its very basis.”288
By limiting the film to close-ups, the “any-space-whatever” foregrounds the 
essential “fragmentation” of cinema and its power to cut up bodies (and objects) 
into thousands of tiny pieces.  All  films are made of affects,  of  fragments,  of  a 
“complex” (as Deleuze calls it). It is complex because “it is made up of all sorts of 
singularities that it sometimes connects and into which it sometimes divides.”289 A 
classical  (Euclidean)  film-space  'unifies'  its  filmic  fragments,  thinking 
'homogeneously'.  The  any-space-whatever  returns  film  to  its  real/reel  status  as 
“divided,”  to  its  actual  existenz  as  an “assemblage,”  foregrounding multiplicity 
over unity and spatial 'heterogeneity' (over 'homogeneity').
Deleuze also describes a series of “affects” in which shadows obscure a 
character's facial “expression,” signifying struggle of spirit. One only need think of 
the characters in Film Noir (and the shadowy worlds they inhabit) to see understand 
286Bridie Lonie, “Joanna Paul, a view from here,” in Budgen, Donson & O'Brien (ed.), p26.
287See Greenhough, p68-90.
288André Bazin, in Greenhough, p70.
289Deleuze, MI, p105.
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what he means. Other characters are bathed in light, opening themselves to the 
alternation of the spirit. Thirdly, characters may alternate between the shadows and 
the light, caught in moments of indecision. In these moments of indecision between 
the light and the dark we find the “grey” of indifference. For Deleuze, it is from this 
“in(ter)difference” that philosophy is born.
Joanna's “affection-images” are the  expressed  face  of the film, rather than 
perceived faces in the film. The “eye” is a “character” which experiences “so many 
concrete modes of existence”290 made up of shadows, whites and greys. We do not 
see  characters  struggling  with  thought,  but  rather  “become”  the  character  who 
thinks: the screen becomes a projection of the “film's mind.” Furthermore, the any-
spaces-whatever are no longer exterior spaces in which characters lose themselves. 
Rather,  they  are  an  “interior”  assemblage  of  the  film's  body.  In  Joanna's  films 
shadows do not “represent” struggles with moral or ethical issues (as Deleuze sees 
them in fictional, narrative cinema) but rather “present” a “film-mind” struggling to 
comprehend perception (in) itself.
Joanna's film-mind begins again, from nothing, my eye alternating between 
representation  and  the  shadow (no-representation).  Like  the  characters  Deleuze 
writes of, I have to make a choice (becoming existential). In the last chapter I chose 
perception. Now I let shadows dominate (the space is emptied). Not only shadows, 
but also the brightness. Between them there is a philosophy of spirit (in the gaps of 
vision). Furthermore: from within the shadow I discover specks of white gathering 
energy. Equally: within brightness I find shadows. As Deleuze writes, “As soon as 
this light is reached it restores everything to us. It restores the white to us, but a 
white that no longer confines the light. It finally restores a black to us, the black 
which is no longer the cessation of light.”291
In Joanna's films it is the “film's body” and “mind” which are “emptied” and 
“deconnected,” producing a series of fragments, an assemblage.292 Joanna's film-
body, in terms of Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of “bodies” and “power,” is a 
“body-without-organs,”  a  body  which  “empties”  itself  in  order  to  feel  only 
290Deleuze, MI, p114.
291Deleuze, MI, p117.
292D&G use the term “assemblage” to refer to the “fragmentation” and “dismantling” of the “BwO” before it is “emptied” 
and “filled” with intensities. (see TP, p165-84).
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intensities and waves of becoming.293 The body-without-organs de-organises (and 
de-connects) the various parts of the body and crosses their wires, not content to 
proceed in a linear, or cliché fashion (as with the any-space-whatever).294 Just as 
there are two kinds of space, there are two kinds of “film-body.” 1) The first body 
is organised to make sense, to produce a striated space which prepares the linkages 
of each movement-image. 2) The second breaks with these connections, and de-
organises  itself,  producing a  smooth Reimannian space and with it  a  BwO. As 
Deleuze and Guattari write, “Reimann space... cannot locate [its] spaces in relation 
to each other without a new convention. Each vicinity is therefore like a shred of 
Euclidean space,  but the linkage between one vicinity and the next is not defined  
and can be effected in any number of ways,”295 thus calling on the spectator's active 
production of meaning through thinking (film thought).
Throughout this process I imagine that the “film's face” becomes one of 
Deleuze's characters who is placed in a pure struggle of affection, in a metaphysical 
philosophy of  shadow, white and the spirit. Covered in shadow the cinema-space 
(the “film's mind,” seated behind the screen/eye) becomes like Plato's cave, a return 
to  the  genesis of  Western  thought.  As  Daniel  Frampton  writes,  “Film-thinking 
resembles no one single kind of human thought, but perhaps the functional spine of  
human thinking.”296 This  functional  spine is  theory of  “being,”  a  philosophy of 
spirit, enacted in images. As Anne Kirker writes, Joanna “takes recognisable motifs 
to suggest a state of being that transcends the physical.”297 This is not only the 
“brain of the screen,” but the brain of the film-body. Furthermore, it is not only a 
“mindscreen,”  but  a  mind-space,  a  moonscape:  filled  with  crater-shadows,  flat-
light, moon-grey and the white sound of night.298 In Joanna's films “space” itself is 
foregrounded. As Joanna writes, “Since leaving home... I have tried to pay attention 
293D&G: “A BwO is made in such a way that it can be occupied, populated only by intensities. Only intensities pass and 
circulate.” (TP, p169)
294D&G: “The BwO... is opposed to that organisation of the organs called the organism.” (TP, p175, my italics) The 
“organisation” I am referring to is narrative organisation of organs (shots) into a linear, orderly progressions. As Joanna 
writes, “Fiction action anecdote or contrivance of any kind is rejected.”
295D&G, TP, p535.
296Daniel Frampton, “Introduction” to Filmosophy. Internet WWW page, at URL: <http://www.filmosophy. org/articles> 
(version current at 1/1/2008).
297Kirker, p200.
298Both Deleuze and Marks mention the connection between lunar-spaces,, moonscapes and any-spaces-whatever. See 
Deleuze, MI, p121.
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to the effects of light, the way light explicates the world; the complimentary burr 
produced  by  adjacent  colours...  the  sense  in  which  this  linear  (interface)  of 
object/area can be used to define spaces w. the same or greater clarity than objects 
– the possibility here for a visual poetry.”299
In this chapter I intend to unfold the philosophical wanderings of the film's 
mind emptied of representation, emptied of images. It is shadows, whites, lights 
and greys which fill this “film mind,” which pass across the “film's body without 
organs,”  corresponding  to  the  “existential  any-space-whatever”  of  the  “film's 
spirit.”
299Paul and Eagle, p92.
111.
2. A Place for Shadows: The Emptiness of the Orient
“I cd see the light/
 shadows in the white.”300
I think of shadows which fall over. Darkness covers the s(cr)een. Shadows 
on the porch, cutting the frame in half. Shadows creeping over the grass, sinking 
into every object.  Shadows flatten the  grey pavement.  In  between the  green of 
every leaf. Shadows of fences: striated spaces spilling over the lawn. Shadows in 
the foreground, making a dark frame around a now brightened image. Shadows in 
the evening, in the morning and in the high noon sun. Shadows in houses, in rooms, 
in  the  forest,  and  city.  Shadows  on  dirt  grounds.  Jillian  becomes  a  shadow. 
Shadows fall inward and outward, over things and under things. Everything either 
receding into shadow, or framed by it. Joanna Margaret Paul's films are a place for  
shadows: as she herself writes, “it's true that I too inhabit that shadow world.”301 
Coupled  with  Deleuze:  “a  space  full  of  shadows,  or  covered  with  shadows, 
becomes an any-space-whatever.”302 What  effect  do these shadows have on my 
experience of vision?
The shadow is  the  opposite of  vision  and  contrasted  with  the  visible  it 
provides a difference by which vision can be defined: I see it, but I do not see it. In 
Port Chalmers Cycle,  Bosshard's House and  Napkins (or any number of Joanna's 
films in which I am plunged into total darkness) I see only the absence of other 
things and in this, I see the shadow. Only by knowing the limitlessness of shadows 
do I encounter the difference between “vision” and vision sans vision. In this sense, 
while the “light-image” opened Joanna's films onto the visible, the shadow frees the 
film from “seeing” and “being seen.” Vision is replaced with “visions,” and images 
300Paul and Eagle, p92.
301Paul, in O'Brien, p77.
302Deleuze, MI, p111.
112.
become “imaginations.” In Joanna's “any-spaces-whatever” time-images draw on 
the mind,  rather  than the memory.  Bachelard argues that  the poetic  image is  a 
“new”  kind  of  image.  Deleuze  writes  of  “noo-images,”  and  “optical-images,” 
arguing that they break with the expectations of “vision,” having the potential to 
awaken  the  spirit of  the  spectator  (which  leads  to  philosophy).  When I  am in 
darkness  I  have  no  body  with  me,  and  I  can  only  “imagine”  where  I  am.  As 
Bachelard  writes,  “In  order  to  clarify  the  problem  of  the  poetic  image 
philosophically, we shall have recourse to a phenomenology of the imagination.”303 
In Joanna's films I find that this becomes a phenomenology of shadows.
The shadows are so numerous in Joanna's films that I could just watch them 
(ignoring  what  the  image  represents,  its  “perceptions”)  and  see  a  completely 
different  film.  Here  I  find  films  made  not  of  “perception-images,”  but  of 
“imperception-images.” In Port Chalmers Cycle, for instance, there is a shot with a 
shadow in the foreground, filling up the space, dwarfing everything else. In the 
background I see a house and a white “thing” hanging on a clothes-line (an article 
of clothing which I cannot recognise). The shadow has the effect of flattening the 
screen. The objects which occur in this flatness seem disembodied, cut off from 
everything in the world. I flick between the two perceptions unable to reconcile 
them. On one hand, the house and the clothes-line exist in the world of perception 
(of real things). On the other, the shadow opens on to an “any-space-whatever” and 
an “optical image” (an image which I cannot re-cognise). This optical-image, if I 
continue to look at it, shatters the perception-image. I  stare into it, trying to see 
what it is. No amount of looking gives me a noun to name the image with, apart 
from the general conceptual term “abstract.” Something Ian Wedde wrote about a 
series of Joanna's drawings is equally applicable to her film-making here; “Inside 
are three small ink drawings: of details, but details of what, exactly? They could 
derive from peering even more deeply into the detail of the cover, a microscopic, 
almost forensic view.”304 As Marks writes, “The optical image defamiliarises the 
cliché  by  severing  it  from its  context.  The  resulting  image  looks  rarefied  and 
abstract compared to the thickness of clichéd images.”305 If I read the perception-
303Bachelard, pxiii.
304Wedde, p16.
305Marks, SoF, p46.
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image  as  the  cliché,  then  the  shadow is  that  which  severs  the  cliché  from its 
context. In Joanna's films “I can” read them either way. In the last chapter I read for 
perception, which deconstructed the cliché in order to produce unknown bodies. 
Here I read the optical-image occurring in an any-space-whatever, which makes up 
a corresponding “body-without-organs.”
However,  as  Marks  points  out,  it  is  really  the  cliché  (perception-image) 
which is abstract, and the optical-image which “thickens.” At the end of the last 
chapter I found that images were nothing but light. This abstracts my notion of the 
“object.” The house in this shot is not a house then, not an object (or a subject): it is 
beams of light (the same goes for the washing line). Representation becomes “thin” 
and without a unified “organisation” of perception. The space which is covered in 
shadow  becomes “thick” and “full,”  seeming to  fold back into the  image and 
expand. The house and the washing line suddenly flick into the foreground, and the 
shadows become the background.306 As Deleuze writes,  shadows accentuate  the 
flatness  of the screen,  “by 'an inversion of the values of light  and dark',  by an 
inversion  of  perspective,”  shifting  “depth  to  the  forefront.”307 As  I  continue  to 
watch Joanna's films I begin to realise that almost every shot is drenched in some 
kind of “shadow.” All perception and representation floats into the background (the 
floating-world)  and  I  see  nothing  but  shades  of  grey.  I  watch  Body House,  or 
Auckland 1971, but I no longer see the films as “individual,” they merge into one 
another. All of Joanna's films become, in a sense, “equivalent,” each a chapter of 
some flickering shadow-theatre.
I continue watching Port Chalmers Cycle. More and more shots steeped in 
shadow.  A  shot  of  leaves  and  a  wooden  pole  leaning  against  a  flat  black 
background.  The  blackness  “shifts”  into  the  foreground,  while  the  leaves  and 
wooden pole seem to get smaller. Then a faint white grid projected on a shadow-
graph  (window frame).  The  grid  looks  fragile  and  disembodied  like  that.  The 
flatness of the shadow starts to falter and gives way to a new depth. This depth 
seems infinite: a thickness of shadow which is endlessly expansive (a white cross in 
a shadow-space has no depth and yet it is only depth). These spaces, constantly 
306“The ground constantly changes direction.” (D&G, TP, 545)
307Deleuze, MI, p112.
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comprised  of  close-ups,  enlarge  the  film's  “eye”  and the  space  of  its  body.  In 
Joanna's  films  this  enlargement  is  pushed  to  its  limit,  shadows  constantly 
expanding  and  thickening the  spaces  which  they  flatten  (and  then  extend).  As 
Deleuze writes, “the shadow extends to infinity.”308 I stare into the shot lost in the 
“emptied space” of the shadow. I feel as if the “film-body” is being “emptied” of its 
representations, turned into a vast cavernous shadow, becoming a giant cinematic 
“body-without-organs.”  Then  another  shot  of  the  same  window  and  something 
reflected in the glass. Or perhaps something behind the glass: a curtain? I can't tell. 
It reflects the window inside it, and floats in the emptiness of a black space. The 
empty space expands around the thing and the “thing” seems to get smaller in the 
frame.  Representation  is  shrunken,  and  shadows expand,  “giving  space  a  great 
depth.”309
Then a shot of a garden: leaves of green and white 'glinting' shadow-spaces. 
The whole left half of the screen is completely black, opening onto a vast space. 
The plants are no longer plants to me: they have become the edges of the shadow. 
Then a shot of a window close up, the top of it completely black. The black seems 
to expand into the screen. There is a tiny curved orange “light” in the centre of the 
screen.  The light seems to rush away from me in the depth. Then: a shot in which 
there is only the tiniest shred of representation left, indifferently grey and far off in 
the background.  Infinite space. Then there is a change in exposure and the grey 
becomes  a  blinding  white  suddenly,  light  firing  from  the  blackness  to  the 
“existential eye,” awakening a sense of becoming in me (the light-image triggering 
a return to “affection” in its pure state). Connected to the “existential eye” I feel 
myself shrinking as the blackness expands. A pool of darkness into which I sink. I 
am reduced to the size of the small light in the previous shadow, with nothing but 
emptiness around me. I imagine that I am a single “light receiver” of the “film's 
eye”  and  that  the  “empty  spaces”  are  gaps  between  me  and  the  next  “light 
receiver.” I am becoming the place where the eye and world meet, and “mingle.” 
For Merleau-Ponty this is one way in which my body is “folded” into the world. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that we are not separate from the world, but actually folded 
308Deleuze, MI, p111.
309Deleuze, MI, p111.
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into it, our flesh in constant exchange with the flesh of the world (light, waves, 
intensities).310 In this sense we are neither subject, nor object, but an “interject,” 
spliced into the machine assemblage of the universe. To my usual mode of thinking 
an eye is just an eye. To a “light receiver” in the eye, the eye is an entire universe in 
which it lives intersubjectively with other “light receivers,” each with their own 
consciousnesses and situated existence. My eyes thin(g)king.
More and more shadows follow. Then there is a shot which plunges me 
completely into shadow with nothing to see. I do not become a speck of light, but 
am suddenly myself, alone in the cool, dark depths. I am imperceptible and I am 
blind. The shadow flattens and then extends to infinity creating an infinite “film-
body”  in  which  I  am  suddenly  lost.  I  am  shrunken.  There  is  no  sound  and 
everything around me seems quieter than before. The room in which I am in has 
gone completely black as well. In the next shot I cut to an image of two elderly 
people slowly walking along the road. They are dwarfed by the frame, drifting into 
the  distance.  I  feel  that  I  have  become them in  the  previous  image;  my  body 
shrinking, my hearing and vision slowly fading from view (viewed or viewing). I 
am becoming “elderly.” In this moment I  see again, re-grounding the affection-
image  in  a  perception-image,  shattering  the  any-space-whatever.311 Unlike  the 
previous  chapter  which  passed  from movement  to  time,  these  films enable  the 
passage from time back to movement.
I find these “becomings” arise everywhere in Joanna's films: images taking 
on the qualities of bodily transformations, as I have described in the last chapter. 
But what happens when there is no representational image to link the “becoming” 
too? What happens when I become  nothing, but still become. Perhaps I become 
becoming itself? Or is this what Deleuze calls “becoming imperceptible.”
0) In a later section of  Port Chalmers Cycle the eye “jolts” down a road. 
The frame moves erratically up and down. In this moment, as I have said, the film's 
310“In Merleau-Ponty's account, time and space are thick, almost viscous with experience. “Memory is built out of the 
progressive and continuous passing of one instant into the other, and the interlocking of each one, with its whole 
horizon, into the thickness of its successor.” Our perceptions fold us into this thick world at the same time as they 
demarcate us from it.” (Marks, SoF, p148) As Deleuze writes, “His task is one of interpreting the Heideggerian fold as a 
“chiasm or interlace” between the visible [visible] and the seeing [voyant].” Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the 
Baroque (University of Minnesota Press, 1993) p146.
311These kinds of readings will become the central “machine” of the third chapter.
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“existential eye” and “body” is foregrounded. The body moves like none I know, 
jaggedly making its way up the street. 1) In the first shot the wall to the left casts a 
shadow, but it does not flatten the screen. It is a veil. 2) In the second shot of the 
sequence, the eye directs us to the ground itself, and follows the line of the shadow, 
contrasting it with the pavement, covered in little black specks. The pavement is 
bright  and  framed  next  to  the  shadow  looses  its  representational  qualities  and 
becomes like an “abstract” painting of black paint flicked at a canvas. The shadow 
in this shot is thicker and begins to flatten.
3) In the third shot of the pavement, the image starts out overexposed and 
then shifts quickly to underexposed, contrasted against a thick black shadow (which 
slowly fills the frame). The eye heads for the shadow, the shadow getting bigger 
and bigger. 4) In the fourth shot the eye plunges into the shadow and I become 
infinitely small against the infinitely large canvas of the black screen. I am thrown 
into the “emptied space” like a speck of paint, becoming smaller and smaller. This 
emptied  space  is  not  becoming  anything  else,  not  grounded  in  a  perception  to 
follow. I am thrown into the film's body, emptied of all its “organisations.”312 Every 
representation is complemented by a shadow in Joanna's films and these shadows 
connect  all the  films  together,  organising  the  films  according  to  a  a  kind  of 
“essence.” This essence is what Deleuze calls the “qualisign” of the any-space-
whatever.313 Shadows become openings in the frame, extending from one film to 
another  (spilling  out,  falling  over).  Although  Joanna's  films  all  offer  different 
becomings  at  the  level  of  perception,  in  the  any-space-whatever  I  find  “pure 
becoming.” The films are “one” in a sense, but within this “one” there are a number 
of different speeds and intensities. It is both the one and multiple simultaneously.
Perhaps  I  could  say  this  shadow  is  the  “spirit”  of  Joanna's  films?  As 
Deleuze writes, “the any-space whatever... is identical to the power of the spirit.”314 
312D&G: “The BwO is not opposed to the organs,” such as the organ of the eye, “rather, the BwO and its “true organs,” 
which must be composed and positioned, are opposed to the organism, the organic organisation of the organs.” (TP, 
p176, my italics)
313A “qualisign” is something we appreciate for the sheer existence of its qualities, in its ineffable “realness.” The shadows 
are not “shadows-of,” but “shadows in-themselves,” or “shadow-singularities.” As Deleuze writes, one example of a 
qualisign, borrowed from C.S. Pierce, might be “a field of corn which becomes boundless, 'dazzling yellow immensity'.” 
(MI, p108) There is always an immensity, an exaggerated enlargement, of the 'qualisign': it is bigger than you. 
Incorporating Sobchack's notion of the spectator's existential, embodied experience of cinema, as the 'qualisign' gets 
bigger, I get smaller.
314Deleuze, MI, p117.
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In reducing my perceptions to “nothing,” to the blank screen (an optical-image, a 
time-image) I am reminded that cinema begins as nothing but black celluloid. Next 
to  “movement”  and  “light-images”  those  images  which  deny representation,  or 
“non-images,” are the “essence” of cinematic perception. Light, which is moving 
hits black celluloid. From this the “film's life” is born and grows (the author its 
parents, so to speak). The darkness of the shadow produces a particular kind of 
film-body  which  “empties”  itself  in  preparation  for  being  filled  with  new 
“intensities” (a BwO). As Marks writes, “Deleuze [suggests] that the absence of 
images, such as with a black or white screen, underdeveloped or snowy image, has 
the 'genetic power' to restore our belief in the world... to bring something new out 
of the ruins of the image.”315
From the deconnected spaces of all Joanna's films I find “something new” 
arising, a sense of spirit, of wholeness to the parts. But this wholeness is not like 
that of narrative. It does not connect the parts in any order. I am left to arrange 
them as I please, the shadows providing linkages in any direction, to any shot. I 
think of my own body. When I walk around outside and the sunlight hits me, all of 
this sunlight is reflected off me. I take in light as heat and I take it in directly 
through the “eyes.” Other than my eye, there is no “light” in my body, so to speak, 
only a vast “shadow.” Light awakens me to that which is outside my organised 
body,  but  it  is  shadows which flow  through the body,  which “empty” it.  I  am 
nothing more than a grain of sand, a single atom, or something smaller, a “quark” 
perhaps, lost in the deep, thick caverns of the film's body-without-organs.
As Deleuze writes, “If we want to grasp an event we must not show it... we 
must not pass along the event,  but plunge into it,  go through all  the geological 
layers that are its internal history (and not simply a more or less distant past).”316 
The event of the “spirit” is just such an event. The only way to express spirit is to 
not express it and to perceive “nothing.” The only way to examine the nature of this 
spirit is to pull it apart, to separate the layers (or strata) of perception and affection 
“in order to,” as Marks writes, “resist the order that would be imposed by working 
on one stratum alone.”317 This is a kind of textual “archaeology.”
315Marks, SoF, p42.
316Deleuze, in Marks, SoF, p29.
317Marks, SoF, p29.
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Between all these nothings (fragments of non-images) there is the “film's 
spirit.”  In  the  sequence  from  Port  Chalmers  Cycle I  described  above  I  see  a 
continual renewal of the shadow and its many geological layers. Eye pass from the 
struggle between the material (flat) screen and the representational screen, to the 
struggle  between  the  material  (physical)  screen  (the  brain)  and  the  mind 
(metaphysical) screen (thought).  Along the way  I experiences a whole series of 
imperceivable events: becoming light, becoming atom, smaller and smaller, as the 
shadowspace  gets  larger  and  larger.  Finally  I  become  the  shadow-spirit  of  the 
“film” itself and, as Deleuze notes on the power of certain shadows, I pass “on the 
spot from one space to the other, from physical space to spiritual space.”318 As if 
echoing my experiences Joanna writes, “I have pursued the beauty of suggestion 
and things concealed.”319
But it is not only in the struggle of darkness that I find the film's spirit, but 
also the “white space.” As Deleuze writes, “Darkness and the struggle of the spirit, 
white and the alternative of the spirit are the first two procedures by which space 
becomes  any-space-whatever.”320 White  space  is  not  just  the  “light”  but  the 
“whiteness” of walls, of roofs, of wooden hand-rails and of the sky covered in a 
veil of cloud. It reflects the light, just as the shadow deflects the light. The shadows 
are not a “completion” of this  process of making “spirit,” but only one way to 
“empty” the film's body, to de-connect space and form a “new dependence” of its 
parts. If there are shadows everywhere in Joanna's films (and there are) then equally 
there are white “luminous” spaces everywhere.  Port Chalmers Cycle opens with 
shots half filled with the city, half filled with a brilliant cloud-white-sky. It is the 
white I watch. It flattens the screen and makes everything else in the frame seem so 
much darker. I cut to a close-up tracking along white wooden hand-rails forming a 
network  of  criss-crosses,  blinding  and  “flat.”  Here  shadows  fill  in  the  spaces 
between the rails  and the background.  The white  becomes a  lattice  weaving of 
“matter” in the “spirit” of the shadow. I am reminded of all the window frames I 
have  seen,  all  their  “crosses”  hanging  in  the  shadows.  The  white  space  is 
318Deleuze, MI, p117.
319Paul, “Shibusha,” p11.
320Deleuze, MI, p117.
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“luminous,”321 and  the  shadow,  in  its  spirit,  is  “numinous,”  an  expanse  of 
nothing.322 As Rosalind Krauss writes, “If the window is this matrix of ambi- or 
multivalence, and the bars of the window – the grid – are what help us to see, to 
focus on, this matrix,” then “the work of art can allude, and even reconstitute, the 
forms of being.”323
For Deleuze the luminous is a semi-religious, spiritual space and in  Port  
Chalmers Cycle I feel the “religion,” or “spirituality,” of the white light. Following 
the shot of the hand-railing, there is a series of shots of a white, luminous sky. In 
these shots there are also buildings, and in particular a church. The church is grey 
and the sky shines, seeming to be that which the “existential eye” is  focused on. 
The light pulses and I notice the edges of the church waver, the light making them 
quiver. The representation loses its solidity, and becomes unstable. I pass from the 
physical, to the metaphysical again (to a blanket of white). This white does not 
expand and empty (for me) but fills up. As I focus on the “white space” I see that it 
is  filled  with  little  black  specks.  Even  in  the  white  I  find  the  shadow-spirit 
extending. Each of these little black specks I imagine to be one of the num(in)erous 
“black screens” of Joanna's films. The white becomes a spiritual space of black 
“matter.” Black and white exchange places, embracing each other in a “yin-yang.” 
Inside  the  black  there  is  white,  and  equally  inside  the  white  is  the  black. 
Furthermore, inside the white specks I find more black (and vice-versa). Neither 
can  be  without  the  other.  Neither  is  wholly  material  or  spiritual,  physical  or 
metaphysical. Everything is  between. When the shadow is spirit, the white is the 
material which forms a “pleat.” When the white is spirit, the shadow becomes a 
“fold” in matter. Joanna, in her own words, was always interested in “that which 
takes you beyond sensation... I'm interested in the experience that goes beyond, for 
instance, the landscape. It's something you can read in abstract or spiritual terms as 
321Deleuze: “The white... is primarily that which circumscribes a space corresponding to the luminous.” (MI, p93)
322We must remember, as Yasunari Kawabata writes, “Here we have the emptiness of the Orient... but it is not to be taken 
for the nihilism of the West. The spiritual foundation would seem to be quite different.” Kawabata, Japan, the Beautiful,  
and Myself (1968: Kodansha International, 1981) p41. This is an “emptiness” which has the potential to be filled, not an 
“emptiness” opposed to the full. This is a point I will return to in the conclusion. A line from one of Joanna's poems 
springs to mind: “numinous/ luminous/ tremulous/ amorous” (Bisley, p33). In this chapter I move from the 
“numinous/luminous” to the “tremulous” grey, to the “amorous” love of the totally emptied space, in the void. This is 
“emptiness as a field of compassion.”
323Krauss, p17.
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well as representational terms and that isn't a contradiction. Perhaps I am talking 
about “religious” imagery.”324
The  white  space  does  not  “extend”  (as  the  shadow  does).  Instead,  it 
expands.  The  white  seems  to  pulse  and  flicker  within the  eye,  thickening  the 
previously flat space of the screen. In a particularly striking shot I see thin black 
branches silhouetted against a “blinding white” (I cannot even call it “sky”). The 
screen flickers,  the  eye cannot  keep internally  “still”  (though it  does  not  move 
exactly:  it  moves  without  moving!).  The  eye  did  not  change position  in  space, 
moving on the outside. This is a movement on the inside. The white screen seems 
to curve, resembling the lens of an eye. I see black specks in the white. As Joanna 
writes, “The way a lamp-post changes from dark to light from red to green against a 
changing background occupied  me in  many small  watercolours  & all  paintings 
done by 'light of day'; just as stresses in relation to one's own body the continual 
adjustment of the view as one's body/perspective shifts – have engaged me say in 
larger oil window paintings. 'Space is curved'.  My intuition attempts to put that 
knowledge into practice.”325
Deleuze  argues  that  shadows  on  the  face  of  a  character  represent  a 
“struggle” for the character, usually their thirst for “evil.”326 The white represents 
their “spiritual choice,”327 or alternative. Placed in the “existential eye” of a “film 
body” the film itself (its intentional consciousness) is this character (who I have 
become).  The  struggle  is  no  longer  between  the  “moral”  and  the  “ethical”  (as 
Deleuze goes on to analyse in the “narrative-film”) but between perception and 
affection, between flatness and depth, between depth and spirit, and finally between 
the black and the  white,  the  ultimate  “difference,”  leading  to  an experience  of 
philosophical and/or spiritual “indifference” (when we choose not to choose, to let 
the two co-exist, entangled and superimposed, in all times and spaces).328 This film 
itself is a “character” engaged in philosophically reflecting on perception itself (and 
324Paul, in O'Brien, p75.
325Paul and Eagle, p92.
326Deleuze, MI, p117.
327Deleuze, MI, p113.
328“Indifference has two aspects: the undifferentiated abyss, the black nothingness... in which everything is dissolved – but 
also the white nothingness, the once more calm surface upon which float unconnected determinations.” Deleuze, 
Difference and Repetition (1968: Continuum, 2004) p36.
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more  importantly,  the  difference  between  perception/representation  and  the 
imperceptible).  In  what,  at  first,  seems like a classical  Hegelian dialectic  “eye” 
have  moved  from  the  subjective-mind  of  the  shadow  (eye  cannot  see)  to  the 
objective-mind of the white (eye see! white is not the shadow) to the absolute-mind 
of spirit. But within this “absolute” mind there is no “one” synthesis (an “absolute”) 
but two more: the white-in-black and the black-in-white. I move from a Hegelian 
synthesis  of a thesis (black) and antithesis (white)  to a  yin-yang pattern,  which 
repeats what is outside on the inside. To the Taoist there really is no black and no 
white. They are illusions. Black is white and white is black. They are not opposed 
(as in Hegelian and Aristotelian philosophy) but complimentary, and reversible (as 
in Merleau-Ponty). Black is immanent to white. White becomes the ground upon 
which  black  emerges.  Only  the  space  between them is  real.  As Merleau-Ponty 
writes, seeming to echo Taoist thought, “What we have to understand is that there 
is no dialectical reversal from one of these views to the other; we do not have to 
reassemble them into a synthesis: they are two aspects of the reversibility and this 
is the ultimate truth.”329
Due to the “existential” nature of the “eye” there is no “synthesis,” instead 
there is a “folding” of terms into a multiplicity. Thinking as the “film's mind” (the 
“screen-brain,”  the  “mindscreen”)  no  longer  commenting  on  events,  or 
remembering them, but experiencing them in the present, produces a philosophical 
becoming,  leading  me  back  to  “nothingness”  (both  luminous  and  numinous, 
representation moved to the background). As Joanna writes, “If you're interested in 
the play of light then the subject can be as matter-of-fact as a post or a letter box; 
I'm looking for something that's almost nothing.”330 And as Greg O'Brien notes of 
her painting, but equally applicable to her films, “While landscape painting is one 
of Joanna's principal concerns, she does not consider it an end in itself. Rather, it is 
a way of investigating perception and spirituality.”331
329Merleau-Ponty, in Sobchack, AoE, p4.
330Paul, in O'Brien, p73.
331O'Brien, p75.
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3. Any-Space-Whatever: De-Connected
“Last night I was in the Kingdom of Shadows. If you only knew how strange it 
is to be there. It is a world without sound, without colour. Everything there - 
the earth, the trees, the people, the water and the air - is dipped in monotonous 
grey. Grey rays of the sun across the grey sky, grey eyes in grey faces, and the 
leaves of the trees are ashen grey. It is not life but its shadow, it is not motion 
but its soundless spectre.”332
“What clarity  is  sought  will  more than likely have  to  do with attention to 
detail, with the careful calibration of scale, with the limits of relationship, with 
the coherence of sequence, and with the exact syntax of duration.”333
“Grey our uncertainty, our seeking, our indifference.”334
“LIKE curved headstones / grey slabs / rest in the / sculpture garden.”335
In the last section I entered the mind of the film; not only the “brain” (the 
physical mechanisms revealed in the last  chapter)  but the mind, that “thinking” 
part. This thought, taken from the point of view of fragments and shadows, began 
as a theory of difference, a difference between imperceptible dark and perceptible 
light. This gave way to the difference (and repetition)  between the light and the 
dark, the alternation of the spirit, the interlacing of black and white. Finally there 
was no “difference,” the two exchanged places, spirit/shadow and matter/light in 
constant  reversal,  each  folded/pleated  into  the  other  (the  white  rays  of  the 
silhouette, and the black specks of the white space).
Between the two are the shades of “grey.” The grey does not “fall on the 
332Maxim Gorky (1896), in Frampton, p1.
333Wedde, p15. My italics.
334Deleuze, MI, p117.
335Bernadette Hall, “Bread for Isaiah: Joanna Margaret Paul,” in Ross (ed.), p60.
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film's face,” but is in the thick of the world. The shadows and light fall “here” in the 
film's body (where I am: the theatre), while the grey is “there,” still apart from me, 
at a distance. If the black and white might be considered the emptying of the film's 
body,  the  grey  is  what  fills this  space  (with  intensities,  energies,  speeds,  and 
waves).  As Deleuze writes,  “This time,  it  is  the empty space which is  all  of  a 
sudden filled.”336
The shadows, the light, the black and the white make up the any-space-
whatever,  but  what  is  the  “any-space-whatever”  filled  with?  In  Gravestones 
fragments of gravestones, one after the other. In Roses fragments of roses, and in 
Auckland fragments  of  Auckland.  Nothing  is  ever  seen  whole:  I  never  see  the 
graveyard itself, only tiny little pieces of gravestones, building the space “fragment 
by fragment” (a space made up of de-connected “ideas” or “thoughts,” floating in 
an “any-space-whatever”). All of Joanna's films, however, return to grey: especially 
the grey of concrete, of gravestones, of side-walks, of car-parks, of walls, and of 
buildings. From black, to white, to grey: a phenomenology of “tones” (approaching 
spritual indifference). Joanna's film  Gravestones, being comprised exclusively of 
close-ups of “grey” s(tones), is the perfect site for analysing and thinking through 
this “spiritual indifference.”
The “gravestones”  are  firstly  fragmented.  I  see  bits of  gravestones,  and 
never the whole. There are never wide shots in which to locate previous close-ups. 
In Joanna's films the close-up is used in almost every shot, fragmenting objects and 
people.  Auckland  is  shown  as  so  many  fragmented  moments,  and  Roses are 
shattered into thousands of tiny pieces. As Deleuze writes, “The law of this space is 
'fragmentation'. Tables and doors are not given whole.”337 When a film is comprised 
only of affection-images, when the whole film is a collection of fragments with no 
predetermined relation  to  one  another,  the  “affection-image”  becomes  an  “any-
space-whatever.”  This  “fragmentation”  exists  at  the  level  of  both montage  and 
mise-en-scene: 1) the gravestones brought to the foreground of the mise-en-scene 
(closer and closer and closer)  and then,  2) repeated  over and  over again in the 
montage, fragment (of gravestone) by fragment. At the end of the last chapter I 
336Deleuze, MI, p121.
337Deleuze, MI, p108.
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described the effect of the continuous stream of gravestones as equivalent to saying 
(or writing) “gravestones! gravestones! gravestones!” In the any-space-whatever I 
become  acutely  aware  that  a  more  precise  translation  (taking  account  of  the 
fragmentation) would be something like “grav-, -tone, -aves, sto-, -vest-, -rave-” 
(and so on).338 In a “perceptive” mode of viewing I did not see the fragmentation. I 
saw objects, re-membered by an “unknown body.” Now the “film's body” itself is 
fragmented  across  time  and  space.  Time  and  time  again  I  appear  before  the 
gravestone: nothing but grey(ve s)tones.
What effect does this have on my experience of space? Classically space is 
used to “orient” the viewer and the characters, to “place” things in a causal relation 
with eachother. Robert Bresson (central to Deleuze's definition of the any-space-
whatever) argues that fragmentation, or rather, foregrounded fragmentation (as an 
“any-space-whatever”) causes the usual dependence on space as “homogeneous” 
(as a singular, monolithic hyperdoche) to break down and reveal  new linkages. If 
space  is  no  longer  “one”  (fragmented  instead)  then  what  “connects”  things? 
Perhaps, that which is unseen: the  spirit. As Bresson writes, “On fragmentation: 
This is indispensable if one does not want to fall into representation. To see beings 
and things in their separate parts. Render them independent in order to give them a 
new dependence.”339 In Gravestones I see the gravestones, but I do not see them as 
a  representation of a “graveyard.” I  never  see the graveyard.  The usual way of 
organising the “stones” is removed and I am opened onto new potentials.340
For  Deleuze  this  begins  the  process  of  awakening  a  “camera 
consciousness,”  which  meditates  on  a  single  image:  on  the  “gravestones,”  in 
Gravestones, the “roses” in  Roses, the “napkins” in  Napkins.  Deleuze uses two 
films by Joris  Ivens,  Rain and  Bridge,  to illustrate his reading of silent,  poetic, 
experimental “any-space-whatevers.”341 In  Rain I see shots of rain, one after the 
other, as it falls on the city. In  Bridge I see a “rapid montage of seven hundred 
338One might image a similar “poem” for each of the titles of Joanna's films: “Motorway,” “Roses,” “To the Bay,” 
“Peonies,” “Napkins,” “Green” and so on (titles from Paul, “Shibusha,” p11). In the last chapter I investigated “pivot-
words,” here these terms become “cut-words.”
339Bresson, Notes on Cinematography (Urizen Books, 1977) p46. In Bresson's original the words “fragmentation” and 
“representation” are in capitols, not italics.
340We pass from the actual to the virtual, which restores the pure potentiality of the any-space-whatever. As Deleuze 
writes, “It is a potentiality.” (MI, p111)
341The Bridge (dir. Ivens, 1928) and Rain (dir. Ivens, 1928).
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shots,”342 the bridge not built “bolt by bolt” but “fragment by fragment.” As Bela 
Balazs  writes  of  Bridge,  “This  metallic  construction  is  dissolved  in  immaterial 
images, framed in a thousand different ways. The fact that this bridge can be seen 
in a multiplicity of ways renders it, as it were, unreal... These are visual variations 
on which it would be difficult for a goods train to travel.”343 Similarly, as I watch 
the “gravestones” pass by I do not find myself imagining that a “mourner” would 
exist here; I cannot place anyone in the space, for there is no “space.” Rather, there 
is an “any-space-whatever” into which “eye” fall, an endless expanse of shadows, 
whites and lights.
Deleuze,  quoting  Balazs,  writes  that  the  rain  of  Iven's  Rain is  not  “'a 
determined rain which has fallen somewhere. These visual representations are not 
unified by spatial or temporal representations. What is perceived here... is not what 
rain really is...'  [rather] it is a set of singularities which presents rain as it is in 
itself...  which combines all possible rains and makes up the corresponding any-
space-whatever.”344 In a sense then, I do not perceive the shots of the rain or bridge 
(or gravestones) as organised in Cartesian space and time “co-ordinates.” Instead, I 
enter into the feeling of rain as a pure quality, the essence of the “rose” or “napkin” 
in-itself. This essence is ineffable and cannot be grasped or described exactly. It 
can only be  felt.345 I am not the  seeing the rain or bridge (as rain or bridge) but 
neither is it “a concept of bridge... [nor] the individuated state of things defined by 
its form... It is a pure potentiality.”346 This potentiality is “qualisign,” the “spirit” of 
the  thing  which  flows  between the  images:  not  its  physical  being,  but  its 
metaphysical becoming.347
But what is this potential? What is the “essence” of a gravestone, or of a 
rose, or of rain? To propose a theory of an essences is to begin a metaphysics and in 
making a metaphysical distinction we must first confront the distinction between 
“matter” and “spirit” (between an Aristotelian  ontology of matter and a Hegelian 
342Deleuze, MI, p111.
343Balazs, Le Cinema, p167 (in Deleuze, MI, p110-11).
344Deleuze, MI, p110-111.
345The any-space-whatever, like self-conscious free-indirect-discourse is felt through expression (the reversal of 
perception). Both are recesses of the movement-image as 'poetry'.
346Deleuze, MI, p111. My italics.
347Deleuze, MI, p117.
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phenomenology of “spirit”). Aristotle's theory runs something like this: if there is a 
gravestone (which there is) and this gravestone is a part of the set of “gravestones” 
(every gravestone in existence) then there must be something “essential” to every 
“gravestone”  in  the  set,  something  which  constitutes  the  singular  “essence”  of 
“this” thing here, and not “that” thing there. This constitutes a theory of “being,” of 
what the gravestones are “being” in-themselves, differently from all other things 
which are also “being.” This then, is an ontology (and for Aristotle ontology is the 
cornerstone  of  metaphysics).  As  Marks  writes,  quoting  Merleau-Ponty,  “Words 
most charged with philosophy are not necessarily those that contain what they say, 
but rather those that most energetically open upon being.”348 For Aristotle the object 
of metaphysics was ontology: a theory of what is “being.”
As  if  to  illustrate  this  Gravestones is  punctuated  with  the  odd  shot  of 
something which is not a gravestone: a pole fallen on the ground, a dog ferreting in 
the grass, a chequered floor, some trees, concrete broken on the ground. Given that 
the  film  is  called  “gravestones”  and  most  of  the  shots  make  up  a  set  of 
“gravestones,” these “other” shots must belong to the set of “not-gravestones.” I 
notice that the pattern I have established in the section on shadows is now repeated 
on the gravestones. From perception, to the imperceivable. From gravestones, to 
things that are “not-gravestones.” This way of thinking, oscillating between “being” 
and  “not-being”  is  where  Western  philosophy  begins:  it  is  a  kind  of  “first 
thought.”349 This “difference” is an ”opposition” and collapses the gravestones into 
secondness, into a kind of “action-image.” The “gravestones” build up a steady 
rhythm and then suddenly  collide with that which is not a gravestone.350 As the 
images collide there is a new kind of becoming: the trees, the fallen over pole, the 
dog, all participate in the any-space-whatever (taking on the qualisign). I start to 
see “graves” everywhere: the concrete in disrepair a grave for stones. The fallen 
348Marks, SoF, p141. My italics.
349Since the times of ancient Greece Western philosophers have devoted much time to this 'problem' of 'being' (Plato, 
Aristotle, Hegel, Heidegger, Delueze, et al.). F.E. Peters writes, “The question of the nature of being first arose in the 
context of Parmenides' series of logical dichotomies between being [on] and non-being (me on).” Peters, Greek 
Philosophical Terms (New York University Press, 1967). Being is such an important word to metaphysical philosophy 
that when it disappeared from the language of Latin, philosophers and thinkers (notably Benedict Spinoza) perceived its 
absence, and invented words to stand in for it (in Spinoza's case, 'esendai'). As Spinoza writes, “Latin does not lend itself 
to such a mode of expression [as 'being'].” Spinoza, Ethics (1677: Wordsworth Classics, 2001) pLXXXIV. As Deleuze 
and Guattari write, “After all, is not Spinoza's Ethics the great book of the BwO?” (TP, p170)
350Deleuze describes the any-space-whatever as a “a space of tactile value.” (MI, p108)
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over pole becomes a “dead sign.” I see trees and imagine falling leaves, the stark 
trunk a  “gravestone”  for  the  winter.  A broken gravestone  itself  having  passed, 
nothing more than an incomplete utterance: a bro  / ken, sen  / te  . nce (a stutter). 
Everything becomes a “gra–” in the mind of the film.
The  emptiness  of  the  film's  mind  is  filled  with  “gravestones”  and  yet 
everything which one might “say” to describe the gravestone is exhausted.  Is a 
gravestone only in a graveyard? No, gravestones occur everywhere. A gravestone is 
anywhere there are graves made, or to be made. A gravestone is a marker for a 
“passing” of any kind. But it is more than this too: a gravestone is a kind of poem, a 
way of describing the trees, or the fallen down sign, a way of making these things 
live again (just as Joanna's films have done for so many “dead” images). Poetry 
brings to life that which has died. As Bachelard writes, the 'poetic' is made from 
those kinds of “images which have not [yet] been experienced, and which life does 
not prepare, but which the poet creates; of a living what has not been lived.”351 I 
look harder and harder at the gravestones: they start to lose their material reality. I 
strain my eyes more and more peering into the b(g)rain of the screen, wondering 
what it is I am looking at.
Then I enter the grey(e s)tones in search of the gravestone. The gravestones 
are made up not only of grey, but also tiny bits of pure “white.” Against them I see 
stark silhouettes of small withered trees and old rusted gates (everything a “grave”). 
Inside  the  grey  I  also  notice  specks  of  black:  tiny  living  shadows.  Everything 
begins to come together. The two spirits, the two matters: difference emerging in 
the indifference of the any-space-whatever. The grey I suddenly notice is not the 
same from greystone to  gravestone (from fragment to fragment). One is a darker 
grey, the next lighter. But darker and lighter than what? What “grey” do I mentally 
compare them to? I find I have no answer for this question. Each grey becomes a 
singularity, as if it were its own colour. Pavement-grey is not the same as sky-grey, 
or gravestone-grey. But this gravestone and that gravestone are not the same either. 
What does it mean to say, “These things are the same colour.” This statement, once 
sensible to me, is now completely insensible. Nothing is the  same. Sameness can 
only be found in absolute difference (everything is the same, because everything is 
351Bachelard, pxxvi.
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different). What at first seemed like a Hegelian synthesis of black and white into 
grey, now explodes into a multiplicity of variations and tones. I wonder how many 
different colours there are  inside grey? And how many other differences which 
words  and  concepts  unify  without  us  noticing.  I  think  of  what  I  would  say  if 
someone asked me what “colour” a gravestone was. Once I might have said “grey.” 
But now, what I am used to calling “grey” is not actually grey but so many concrete 
variations colliding. As Joanna writes, “by allowing  difference  between what are 
virtually identical signifiers [to be experienced] we are pressed up to the limits of 
what  can  be  said.”352 Grey  is  a  word  which  collects  together  many  different 
“colours,”  unifying  them  into  “one”  thing  (grey).  Further  straining  my  eyes, 
looking only at  the grey,  I  notice for the first  time that there is a thin layer of 
“grain” over the image. Though this layer is thin, the more I look the thicker it 
becomes (and how much  thinner the representational  image gets).  The harder I 
look,  the  more  the  image  breaks  down  into  shimmering  multiplicities:  all  the 
images abstract and turn to star dust.
Laura  Marks  writes  often  of  the  grain  of  the  film and its  effect  on  the 
audience. She notes that, in one film, “The large grain of the images... breaks down 
any figure  ground relationship.”353 In  Gravestones I  let  the  grain  dominate  my 
vision, every image shattered turning into tiny particles, like a fine  fur over the 
surface of the film's eye (the film becoming animal, growing hair). This dissolves 
all previous differences into one seething mass of gaseous plasma. Nothing is left 
but a vast, infinite sphere, completely emptied of matter: there is only energy. I am 
flung into this chasm, it reaches around me and I get smaller and smaller till I am 
nothing but a single atom/grain in the gravestone. In “becoming grain” (becoming 
atom) I become everything. As Deleuze and Guattari write, “If one reduces oneself 
to  one  or  several  abstract  lines...  then  one  becomes-everybody/everything.”354 I 
notice in watching Joanna's other films that they all have this layer of grain, some 
thicker and more affective than others. This atomic intensity spreads out over the 
films. I see nothing but grain! As Marks writes, “The effect of this surface density 
is to invite a kind of vision that spreads out over the surface of the image instead of 
352Paul, NPL, p1.
353Marks, SoF, p154.
354D&G, TP, p309.
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penetrating into depth.”355 No more the spaces of shadow and white (neither deep 
nor shallow) but an endless see/thing mass. When I watch Task with this in mind I 
hardly see the woman ironing the clothes: I see atoms and the grainy surface of the 
screen. The film starts to boil, to create gaseous linkages. As I peer into the atoms I 
notice that between each one there is further space, an emptiness which is space 
inside space. An emptiness which is within emptiness.
I feel my own eye made of atoms and I become the screen, the projector, the 
gravestones,  the  roses,  Auckland  –  I  become  everything.  My eye  tingles.  This 
sensation  begins  to  spread  out  over  my body.  I  feel the  images  with my body 
suddenly,  the rich textures of the film on my skin. These are what Marks calls 
“haptic images.” As Marks writes, “The works I propose to call haptic invite a look 
that moves on the surface of the plane of the screen for some time before the viewer 
realises  what  she  or  he  is  beholding.  Such images  resolve  into  figuration  only 
gradually, if at all.”356 Marks continues (referring to a film in which she gets closer 
and closer to images of material), “I realize that the tape has been using my vision 
as though it were a sense of touch; I have been brushing the (image of the) fabric 
with the skin of my eyes, rather than looking at it.”357 Here I have moved (without 
moving) closer and closer to the gravestones, eventually becoming them. I do not 
touch them with my hands, but they touch me as atoms, on the inside (which is 
actually the outside: the within that folds without). As Deleuze and Guattari write, 
“Kerouac's dream, and already Virginia Woolf's, was for the writing to to be like 
the line of a Chinese poem-drawing. She says it  is necessary to “saturate every 
atom,”  and  to  do  that  it  is  necessary  to  eliminate,  to  eliminate  all  that  is 
resemblance and analogy, but also 'to put everything into it'.”358 
At the level of my “actual body” I am me sitting in the theatre, but at the 
level of my “atomic body” I really am everything. My body suddenly feels alive, 
every atom awake and full of energy. I look back at the film (still Gravestones, it is 
one of Joanna's longer films) and I get a whiff of something, like musty air, or dirt. 
355Marks, SoF, p137.
356Marks, SoF, p162-3.
357Marks, SoF, p127.
358D&G, TP, p309. Both Kerouac, and Woolf were Christian Westerners (like Joanna) whose lives were significantly 
changed by Taoist beliefs and philosophies. This is the empty-fullness of the Orient, rather than the empty-not-full of 
nihilism.
130.
I  get  a  cold  feeling  under  the  the  still  grey  skies.  I  realise  I  am smelling  the 
gravestones and I am feeling the chill of the air where they are, in a time which I  
have never experienced.  I  feel  a  shadow fall  on my face.  This time it  is  not  a 
philosophical (in)difference: the grey-shadow-tone and I are one. I am the light. I 
am the roses. I am trees and cars and flowers and stones. I am I am I am I am–
     Fig. 5. Yin-Yang
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4. Conclusion: The Third Meaning
“It spreads an “experimental night” or a white space over us; it works with a 
“luminous dust”; it affects the visible with a fundamental disturbance, and the 
world  with  a  suspension,  which  contradicts  all  natural  perception.  What  it 
produces in this way is the genesis of an unknown body.”359
Something Joanna said about an exhibition of hers in an eight sided room 
applies, I think, to her entire oeuvre; “They pursue a line of enquiry generated by 
the need to connect. Some patterns emerge – they also ponder a question; at what 
point does a house/a community disintegrate and cease to function.”360
No longer the old questions: what is this being (and what is it not being). No 
longer is this an author or isn't it. No longer fixed categories. New questions: at 
what point does the perceivable  become imperceptible?361 At what point does the 
author,  or  language,  for  instance,  cease  to  function.  At  what  point  does  matter 
become atoms? Or hot  become cold? Or white  become black? And at what point 
can they reverse and cease functioning as absolute, or uniform, in their difference. 
The Taoist, following the principles of the yin-yang, might answer: there is always 
hot in cold, waiting to become, and of course there is cold in hot as well. Hot and 
cold are only perceptions,  or illusions (maya).  In reality the water is water and 
nothing more. Hot and cold are the two sides of the yin-yang and its message is: 
they do not really exist! They are relative (no longer absolute). But also: they are in 
each other, intersubjectively entwined.
As Arthur Cooper writes, yin and yang “were originally topological terms, 
359Deleuze, in Marks, SoF, p127.
360Paul, Fragile Communities – Intimate Maps (Exhibition Catalogue, Wellington City Gallery, April 1986). In the same 
exhibition, a number of bonsai-trees were assembled to accompany the paintings: “Lastly to Mr and Mrs Barlow and the 
Bonsai Society for lending and looking after the bonsai trees.” Paul, Paris is Changed, Alas! (Exhibition Catalogue, 
Wanganui, February 19 – April 30).
361D&G, TP, p309.
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like 'shine'  and 'shade',”  yang for the “sun itself,” and yin for the “moon,” the 
shadows, and that which “reflects the suns light.” It is a balance between the two 
sides,  in  any  binary  situation  (and  not  all  situations  are  binary)  which  brings 
“harmony”  and  constitutes  one  path  of  the  Tao.  All  perceived  opposites,  once 
placed  in  the  “yin-yang machine”  becomes  “intersubjective,”  as  Merleau-Ponty 
describes. There is no “black” or “white,” but only “tone-singularities,” each as rich 
and  variant  as  the  last.  But  equally,  white  is  black  and  black  is  white,  each 
becoming the other. This becoming, or change, indicates an “energy” between them 
(grey).  We mediate this “changing” thing with the body (perceptions) and form 
binary states. I say water from the fridge is cold (indicating a solid state) but to an 
icicle the water is not cold. The icicle is too cool to be “cold.” Hot and cold are 
only indicators of your “temporal” state, relative to your own temperature. The sun 
is extremely hot. To the sun the things we call “hot” are “cold.” All those terms 
which I had believed were fixed suddenly come unhinged and I am deeply moved. 
A tingle spreads out inside me: is that the movement of atoms?
In  Gravestones (and  all  Joanna's  films)  I  found  the  “struggle”  of  black 
within black and the “alternative” of the white in white. Then I found the black in 
the white and the white in the black (a yin-yang). Then they vanished (no black! no 
white!)  and  produced  “grey.”  Then  the  grey  dissolved  and  turned  into  the 
multiplicity  of  “grains.”  The  “essence”  of  the  gravestone  was  not  found  in 
opposition, but in “difference and repetition.” White is different from black, but it 
repeats black and is essentially made of black. Black is different from white, but it 
repeats white somewhere within it. “Black” and “white” as “solid” concepts do not 
exist. In the second section I found that form and matter broke down into atoms: 
everything becoming “grain.” I  become everything,\ and yet everything  becomes 
me. The macrocosm is the microcosm. In terms of “reading” each film, or thinking 
“concretely” (rather than in the abstract) there are an infinite number of concepts 
we might put in the spaces of 'yin' and 'yang'. Many thoughts float around, some 
taking hold and developing. Other drifting away–
0) I realise, I am scientifically “one” with the universe and yet this “one” is 
a  multiplicity  of  atoms  in  a  flow  of  energy,  each  with  their  own  potential 
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consciousness. When I am the size of an atom, I think like an atom (and I return to 
myself convinced the atom  thinks).  This is more akin to Leibniz's theory of the 
monad, than modern science's view of the atom. This means that I am “me,” but I 
am also intersubjectively entwined with so many other consciousnesses (atoms) 
inside my body (which also intermingle with the real  outside: on the inside). As 
Gene Youngblood writes, “The First Law of Thermodynamics states that energy is 
constant:  it  cannot  be  created  or  destroyed;  its  forms  can  change  but  not  its 
quantity.”362 This means the energy which makes up my body was present at both 
the beginning and end of the universe. I am so very old.363
1) Although differences (between men and women, between East and West, 
between Maori  and  pakeha)  exist  at  the  perceptive  levels,  and  really  do  effect 
people's  experience of  this  world,  these differences do not  really exist  (outside 
experience). They are social constructions. Binaries are certainly useful in everyday 
thought (to  make simple decisions  involving our  tastes)  they cannot  access the 
'real', the virtual multiplicities of the non-actualised strata. Really we are all made 
of the same particles, the same space, all mingled into this non-actualised 'plane of 
immanence' (as Deleuze calls it). This is what the Dali Lama calls an “emptied 
space” of “compassion.”364 In this emptiness there is “nothing,” but this nothing is 
not  “no-thing,”  but  the  “no-difference”  which  repeats  in  everything.  This  “no-
difference,”  or  “indifference”  is  compassion  (I  become  like 
everybody/everything).365 As  the  Dali  Lama  writes,  “'Empty'  means  self-less, 
without   self...  it  is  like  zero...  [It]  is  nothing.  But  yet  it  is  something...  It  is 
emptiness, and at the same time it is the basis for everything. We can investigate. 
When we investigate we cannot find any thing. We will just find emptiness. As to 
362Youngblood, p62-3.
363As Deleuze and Guattari write, “To be present at the dawn of the world. Such is the link between imperceptibility, 
indiscernibility, and impersonality – the three virtues.” (TP, p309)
364See His Holiness, The Dali Lama of Tibet, “Compassion as a Field of Emptiness,” in Rene Weber (ed.), Dialogues with 
Scientists and Sages (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986) p127-35. “It is from the point of view of objects that have the 
quality of emptiness [sunya, or “space”], that you get compassion.” (p135) That is, it is from the point of view of the 
gravestone that has the qualisign of emptied (and de-connected) sunya, that I feel a sudden and unmistakable 
compassion for everyone and everything (compassion in-itself). In the last chapter, similarly, the bodies produced a 
series of “compassions” for my mother and past women's experiences.
365The Dali Lama says that everything is “dependant” on everything else and that independence is an illusion. This is the 
process of the emptied and de-connected film-body becoming re-connected (intersubjective). If everything is “inter-
dependent” then the key to happiness is “compassion.” (p134)
134.
their nature things do not exist in accordance with how they appear.”366
2) Joanna was from New Zealand, and in New Zealand there is a colonial 
(majority)  and  indigenous  people  (the  Maori).  Like  other  cultures  in  similar 
positions racism, and racial tension, often gives rise to protesting and nationwide 
awareness of racial issues. Along with this, the Springbok tour happened in 1981 
(during the period Joanna was making films) fuelling New Zealand's awareness of 
its  own  colonial  history.  Key  to  political  disputes  between  the  (still)  largely 
“colonial” government and Maori  activists  is  the  Treaty of  Waitangi,  the treaty 
which  supposedly  gave  the  Queen  of  England  sovereignty  over  Aoteoroa. 
However, while the Maori text indicated a “yin-yang” style arrangement of sharing 
and interrelations, the Western text indicates a kind of Aristotelian binary in which 
one side (England) dominates the other. As I.H. Kawharu writes, “The Maori text 
predicates  a  sharing of  power  and  authority  in  the  governance  of  the  country 
between Crown and Maori. The English text is about a transfer of power, leaving 
the  Crown's  sovereign  and  Maori  as  subjects.”367 This  difference  mimics  the 
differences between the “author function” and Benjamin's  “author as producer.” 
The author function “subjects” the spectator, while the “author as producer” shares 
their power to create. Equally I might put the concepts of males and females in the 
“yin-yang machine” and reach a similar conclusion: men are women, women are 
men. It is only through social conditioning that we think of ourselves as “binary.” 
The yin-yang suggests dissolving all oppositional, binary thought so that we may 
find ways of becoming each other.
3) In New Zealand feminist politics, and racial politics are never far from 
one another. As Eagle writes to Joanna, “I remember you read and re-read Monique 
Wittig's  The  lesbian  body –  you  assimilated  a  lot  of  her  ideas,  a  kind  of 
internalisation that I  went through, other women went  through, of claiming our 
bodies  back  –  much  like...  I  imagine,  the  tangata  whenua  claiming  back  the 
land.”368 And later, in the same series of letters, Joanna writes, “We were in your 
'cigarette' box car, Allie, arguing as we do about politics – I got out at the traffic 
lights where the street was filled with a procession of black people – I could see the 
366Dali Lama, p134.
367I.H. Kawharu, Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, 1989).
368Paul and Eagle, p85.
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sweat on their faces. The moment I joined them the procession dissolved & I was 
climbing a hill with gleaming furrowed brow... I cd see the light/      shadows in the 
white.”369
4) In Gravestones I might think of Joanna's first child who died after only a 
brief period on this earth, imagining the slow release of her spirit into the universe 
(becoming universe). I do not find a sadness in this representation of death (though 
it is sad) but a kind of life which lives again: matter returns to energy. Everything 
is  everything.370 As  Bisley  writes  about  Joanna's  poems  concerning  this  tragic 
event, “however, while death is constantly present in the poems, it is not so much a 
lamentation as a reflection.”371 In one poem, Bisley notes that, “while a large full 
stop at the end of the poem signals  the finality of death,  the large comma that 
parallels  it  at  the  top  of  the  page  modifies  this  effect.  Imogen  is  described  as 
“numinous,” a figure that reveals the presence of divinity as well as the “numen,” 
the presiding divine power. Coupled with these references to divinity, the comma 
can be  considered as alluding to  Paul’s  belief  in  an afterlife.  Imogen has  been 
wrested from life, but she is “not dead not/ rested.” Paul negates death by locating 
it between two nots.”372 These are the two “nots” of the yin-yang and the “nots” of 
metaphysics (“meta” is the plural of “me,” meaning “nots” in Greek). These are 
rhizome knots in a forest of trees: not living, not dead. No longer either “either/or” 
or “both/and” but now “neither/nor.”
4) For all the things I can think about, which come to me later, none are so 
interesting as the experiences I find in the film itself as I watch. The yin-yang is not 
the end of Taoist philosophy but only a beginning point. Let us say that space and 
time are in the yin-yang. Usually I think of space and time as separate entities. In 
the  yin-yang  space  and  time  are  intermixed.  They  are  a  part  of  each  other 
(spacetime). Classical physics believed they were separate, but the binary is only a 
perception,  a  useful  way  of  referring  to  experience  (as  modern  physics  has 
discovered).  If  time  and  space  are  intertwined  and  wholly  together  from  the 
beginning, then, as the Buddhist says: “No space, no time!” When one becomes a 
369Paul and Eagle, p92.
370Not everything is “one.”
371Bisley, p13.
372Bisley, p33.
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Buddhist, or Taoist (or Zen) monk, there are a series of questions you have to go 
through. A series of riddles: adventures with the shadow and light.373 These develop 
the  mind  toward  higher  and  higher  planes  of  consciousness,  until  you  can 
“become” the wind, the sky and the babbling brook. One such riddle is: “What are 
you?” The answer to this riddle is not to use words. There are no words which can 
describe what an “essence” or “spirit” is.
The “answer” in Buddhism is to step forward with the body and to thump 
your hand on your chest. Of course, one cannot just perform this action. You must 
mentally mean the act and understand it as “real.” I thump my chest to show I am 
my body first  (space and time,  second).  As the thump hits  the body the atoms 
resound and I feel my body in its true multiplicity (as a “body-without-organs”). 
My body empties, in order to  feel the “real” intensities of energy within the body 
(the  tao).374 What we feel with the “everyday-mind” is not the atomic-body, the 
“body first” (or first-body). We are seated in the “second body,” the body which 
defines things through opposition (secondness, action). “Non-action is advised by 
the Tao Te Ching... Do nothing and do everything.”375
In this “non-action” however I find a new kind of “action.” I find smells, 
and  sounds,  and  tastes,  and  touches.  I  find  everything  which  I  had  previously 
thought absent from the images. I see in a way I had not thought possible before. It 
was as if I were seeing Joanna's films for the first time. Suddenly I experience what 
Marks calls a haptic-image. As Marks writes intercultural cinema often shows us 
that “memory may be encoded in touch, sound, perhaps even smell, more than in 
vision.”376 This is the action of inaction, a movement without movement. This is a 
kind of Taoist cinema, which plunges me into confusion, in order to clear the mind. 
After Joanna's films finish I feel almost as if I have meditated, the rhythm of the 
shots like the click of the “rosary beads.” I had never really noticed this connection 
between Taoism and Catholicism before. Joanna was a Catholic and yet she was 
also attracted to Zen, to Taoism and to Buddhism. Thoughts pull at the edge of the 
universe–
373Deleuze, MI, p117. Or meditations (both in the Buddhist and Cartesian sense!).
374“The all-pervading energy of nature.” (Nauman Jr., p329)
375Nauman Jr., p332.
376Marks, SoF, p129.
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Chapter 2
Actions
(of an unknown duration)
Fig. 6. Task [film still]
(dir. Joanna Paul, super8mm, 1982)
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0. Bodies & Light: Words in the Snow
“Women might try to do filmically what literary  theorist Helene Cixous had 
urged women writers to try: 'Write yourself, the body must be heard, then will 
spring forth the immense resources of your unconscious, which are associated 
with wealth and abundance'.”377
“Given the nature of memory, the audiovisual image necessarily evokes other 
sense memories, perhaps even memories that belong to that “unknown body.” 
For example, when I am watching a scene shot in a garden in Sahani Mootoo's 
Her Sweetness Lingers (1994), close-ups of magnolia flowers remind me of 
how they feel and how they smell, and the buzzing of the insects remind me of 
the heat of summer.”378
“Is it really so sad and dangerous to be fed up with seeing with your eyes, 
breathing with your lungs, swallowing with your mouth... Why not walk on 
your  head,  sing  with  your  sinuses,  see  with  your  skin,  breath  with  your 
belly.”379
“It ain't no sin, to take off your skin, and walk around in dem bones.”380
Returning from nothingness,  my body made of pure energy,  every atom 
saturated in feeling and expression, I find myself alive to the films in a whole new 
way. Having exhausted both perception and the archives of my philosophical and 
scientific “memory” I look back (turning about face). I see perceptions again, but I 
have  no  need  to  analyse  (or  synthesise)  them. These  perceptions  unwrap  and 
enwrap me, as I have said, in an “any-space-whatever.” In the previous chapters I 
377Shepard, p127-8.
378Marks, SoF, p148.
379D&G, TP, p167.
380William S. Burroughs on the Tom Waits album The Black Rider (1993). William Burroughs is a BwO par excellence: 
his books are comprised of fragments, cut-ups. He also organised himself (his life) differently to the state organisation of 
the organism (TP, p166).
141.
passed  from the  “perceptible”  to  the  “imperceptible”  to  the  “unthought”  (from 
movement to time, and into the uncharted regions of the spirit). Now we pass from 
“perception” to the unhearable, the untouchable, the unsmellable, the untasteable 
(to the insensible).
Marks calls  these experiences “haptic visuality.”  Authors  of  intercultural 
cinema (and more generally, experimental film-making practices) construct haptic-
images “in part by refusing to make their images accessible to vision, so that the 
viewer must resort to other senses, such as touch, in order to perceive the image.”381 
Marks continues, “Haptic visuality is distinguished from optical visuality, which 
sees things from enough distance to perceive them as distinct forms in deep space: 
in other words, how we usually conceive of vision... Haptic looking tends to move 
over the surface of its object rather than to plunge into illusionistic depth, not to 
distinguish form so much as to discern texture.”382 This experience happens slowly, 
not all at once, just as it has in my experience of all Joanna's films. Gradually I 
realise that I am watching  grains of light and that I am  bodies made of energy. 
There is no “film body,” but neither is there “my body.” In the grey(n) of Joanna's 
films I found the film and myself were not “one,” but “all” (at once).
These  sensations  are  sometimes  fleeting,  sometimes  very  strong.  They 
happen in all sorts of ways. As I have noted, Joanna's films are full of close-ups, 
constantly  panning  quickly  over  things  (wall,  ground,  flower,  window).  While 
watching Body House, for instance, my eyes get a strange sensation, as if they are 
'running' over the image, in the same way that I might run my hands over a texture 
(the same way water might  run over my hands). As I think “water” my eyes feel 
colder. My eyes conjugate the verb, transforming “to run” into the “running” of the 
eye. An eye cannot “run,” but things can run over it (see with your foot! walk with 
your eye!). The perception-image, or noun, turns into an action-image, or verb. As 
Marks  writes,  the  “camera  treats  them  like  bodies,  caressing  the  buildings, 
searching  the  corners  of  shutters  and  stone-latticed  windows  like  folds  of  the 
skin.”383 Body House continuously brings me (too) close to concrete walls: falling 
over. I perceive the quality of the temperature from a distance (the cold stone wall) 
381Marks, SoF, p159.
382Marks, SoF, p162.
383Marks, SoF, p157.
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and then I  feel it. Marks writes, “In haptic  visuality, the eyes themselves function 
like an organ of touch.”384
I  notice  in  Port  Chalmers Cycle,  for  instance, that  I  feel  colder  in  the 
shadows and warmer in  the  sun.  Folded into darkness:  floating  in  light.  These 
“sens” are created by a “heat” happening in the  past, which for a brief moment 
exists now, changing my experience of the present. As Joanna writes, “it excites me 
when the past & present are bonded together.”385 Obviously the temperature in the 
room (here, where I am watching Joanna's films) has not changed, but my body 
feels a change (there, where “eye” am). These images are created by “that” (the 
sun) happening in the  past  (there), which for a brief moment, exists  now (here), 
changing my experience of “this” space and my existential body temperature. In 
Aberhart's  House  something even more profound happens.  Outside  (there)  it  is 
windy:  green  shadow leaves  tremble.  I  drift  off.  I  am watching,  but  I  am not 
attentive. Then suddenly I feel something different in my body: I feel warmer. My 
mind comes back and I find that I am looking at a shot from inside the house now 
(while before I was outside). When the eye goes outside again (later in the film) I 
feel the sensation again, more attentive to it this time. Wind is another constant 
sensation in Joanna's films: many times I see wind flapping washing furiously on 
the line and grass/trees/leaves trembling. At other times the wind murmurs, gentle, 
like a summer's day (a cool and welcome breeze). Wind, then, has a multiplicity of 
possible “sens,” many different “haptic visions,” depending on the kind (care) of 
wind. I feel  that wind  there on this skin  here. Is this a  virtual memory of wind 
which my body invents? Or is it an  actual memory of  that wind  there  which the 
camera retains?
Sobchack sees these “haptic images” (what she calls “cinesthetics,” after the 
term “synaesthesia”) as a kind of freedom, or 'poetics',  available to the modern 
theorist.  Sobchack  suggests  that  the  “body”  and  its  “haptic,”  or  “cinesthetic” 
sensations constitute “an attempt...  to explicate the way in which the cinema is 
somatically intelligible and, moreover, richly meaningful in this register, I want to 
alter the binary structure suggested by previous formulations and, instead, posit the 
384Marks, SoF, p162.
385Paul and Eagle, p97.
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film viewer's lived body as a carnal “third term” that chiasmatically mediates vision 
and language, experience and image.”386 I might call the first chapter (perceptions) 
the  first term,  and  the  second chapter  (affections  and any-spaces-whatever)  the 
second term.  My  “body,”  as  a  spectator,  and  the  “film's  body”  (as  a  single 
intersubjective system) mediates these two images, rendering them as two “layers” 
(in a rhizome) which enables perception and affection to come into contact. This 
body  does  not  synthesise  these  two  layers,  but  finds  them co-existing,  seeing 
“perceptions”  and “any-spaces-whatever,”  representation  and grain,  at  the  same 
time.
Sobchack aligns these moments with moments of “almost blindness” she 
experiences in the mainstream film The Piano.387 She writes, “It offers... a relatively 
rare instance at the movies in which the cultural hegemony of vision is overthrown, 
an instance in which my eyes did not “see” anything meaningful and experienced 
“an almost blindness” at the same time as my tactile sense of being in the world 
through  my  fingers grasped  the  image's  sense  in  a  way  that  my  forestalled  or 
“baffled”  vision could  not.”  In  Joanna's  films I  am constantly  faced  with  such 
images,  constantly  in  a  state  of  blindness  (as  I  have  looked  at  in  the  second 
chapter). Sobchack goes on to say that, “My experience of  The Piano was thus a 
heightened instance of our common sensuous experience of the movies: the way in 
which we are in some way touched by the substance of images, to feel the visual 
atmosphere  envelop  us,  to  experience  weight.”388 In  Joanna's  films,  and 
intercultural  cinema  in  general,  “haptic  vision”  often  dominates  my  vision,  no 
longer  a  mere “moment,”  but  a  veritable  “monument” to our  vision's  ability  to 
translate touch, smell, sound, and taste.
As  Sobchack  writes,  “Positing  cinematic  vision  as  merely  a  mode  of 
objective symbolic representation, and reductively abstracting – “disincarnating” – 
the spectator's subjective and full-bodied vision to posit it  only as a “distancing 
sense,” contemporary film theory has had major difficulties in comprehending how 
386Sobchack, “What My Fingers Knew: The Cinesthetic Subject, or Vision in the Flesh” [WFK] (2000) Senses of Cinema 
on-line journal. Internet WWW page, at URL: <http://www.sensesofcinema.com/contents/00/5/ fingers.html> (version 
current 1/1/2008) p6.
387Interestingly enough, The Piano (dir. Jane Campion, 1993) is a New Zealand production.
388Sobchack, WFK, p7-9.
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it  is  possible  for  human  bodies  to  be  really  “touched”  and  “moved”  by  the 
movies.”389 In this  sense,  the classical  model of “space and time”  distances the 
audiences (places them in an objective relation to the screen). “Haptic visuality” is 
never at a distance, but always at “close-range.” This is what Deleuze and Guattari 
call “nomadic art” (art made by a “body-without-organs”).390
In this section I become one of Joanna's art-works:  unpacking the body. I 
could go on listing the ways in which I feel certain touches, or smell certain smells, 
or  hear certain sounds.  There are so many moments and so many more micro-
moments  of  “sens”  in  Joanna's  films,  that  to  continue  listing  them  would  be 
redundant. However, the BwO allows not only for these new “sens” to occur, but 
also for a “gap,” which enables the thoughts from the “unknown bodies” (of the 
first chapter) to populate the BwO (of the second). The BwO is always populated 
by packs, by multiplicities. This is not a “reading” of Joanna's films (at a distance) 
but a kind of “speaking” (or seeing)  as her films. Clusters of images form visual 
poems everywhere: in the thick of things, without warning.
The first section of this chapter deals with my experience of “haptic vision” 
in  Joanna's  films.  The  second section  concerns  another  effect:  the  spontaneous 
hearing  of  words  and  writing  of  poems.  Laura  Marks  writes,  “In  any  case  an 
audiovisual image evokes bodily associations, so that when I hear crickets and see a 
magnolia I remember the prickle of sweat on my skin, and (nanoseconds later) the 
words for the smell of a magnolia –  pungent, sap-like, always about to rot (!) - 
emerge from the emotional associations I formed with magnolias when I did smell 
them.”391 As I watched Joanna's films I  had a similar experience: words started 
coming to me. These words I realised were haiku poems. It is worth noting that the 
words Marks writes down has a haiku structure of three lines:
389Sobchack, WFK, p5.
390As I have said rhizomes, nomads, refrains, becoming, multiplicity: these are all strata of the BwO or “parastrata” 
through which the nomad war machine moves (the vortex). “Desert traveller and nomad of the steppes.”  (TP, p166) The 
grain of the hot blind desert sand skin. Nomad Art: “First, “close-range” vision, as distinguished from long-distance 
vision; second, “tactile,” or rather, “haptic” space as distinguished from optical space.” (TP, p543) As Laura Marks 
astutely point out “optical visuality” is not the same as an “optical-image” (belonging to Deleuze's time-image model of 
cinema). Optical visuality in A Thousand Plateaus refers to “movement-image cinema,” while “haptic visuality” forms 
in the fragments of the “any-space-whatever,” and the “time-image” (just as “nomadic art” and close-range vision 
arises/a rhizomes/ from the assemblage of the BwO).
391Marks, SoF, p148.
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pungent
sap-like
always about to rot!
Marks has become a haiku poet and seemingly without her knowledge (she 
certainly never mentions this). Marks' arrangement of words, like a haiku, requires 
a frame/body to be added by the audience member. Marks did not write the words: 
“I smell pungent magnolia,” but found the words fragmented, one at a time, in a 
'literal' any-space-whatever. Like the rhizome structure of the haiku and the use of 
shadows and light in Joanna's films (and poems, and paintings) the lines float. What 
is pungent? I know because I have read Marks description of the writing of the 
poem, but without it, these new words may inspire a number of images to arise in 
the spectator. After Joanna's films I found myself full of words. I found myself 
writing poems frantically and when I looked back on the pages and pages of notes I 
had amassed earlier, I found poems there too. I became a poet. I had not intended to 
write poetry, to become poet. It  was not consciously enacted. What seemed the 
most  significant  in  this  final  becoming  was  that  even  though  I  didn't  know if 
anyone else would enjoy my new poems, I didn't seem to care. I like them and this  
is all that matters. I felt a satisfaction in writing them which was not “hegemonic.” 
The satisfaction I  found in writing these poems was like that of the women in 
Joanna's films: I did not need validation, I liked them for what they were, my “little 
phrases.”392
392When I wrote this I got a tingle, and looked again. “My children,” it read. I felt compassion toward words as if they 
were real, living things.
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1. Bodies & Light : Meditations
“afterward: the hallowed days/
                                               scoured by God.”393
As I come out  of the grey,  from the indifference of  being,  into the full 
becoming of the body-without-organs as sensation creator, there is a particular shot 
which comes to mind from Joanna's film Auckland 1971. I see a cloud-grey-sky, 
my body dissolved into atomic vibration and grain. Then I notice, at the bottom of 
the screen, a sudden burst of colour: a rainbow. The “grain” turns into “rain” and I 
am soaked in drops of colour. I sniff the damp earth smell after the rain and I feel 
the cool wind on my face. I think of these “colours” as a bow which plays the 
strings  of  my  body-instrument.  The  “sens”  are  a  “song,”  a  sort  of  concert  of 
feelings, thoughts and emotions, all suddenly re-membered from various sites and 
sights:  an  assemblage  of  spirit-images.  As  Joanna  writes,  “The  TONES  (of  a 
landscape) are delicate vehicles of emotion... while colour can express the spirit.”394 
As I have said, Deleuze and Guattari align music as the art form most suited to 
“becoming.” Music is inherently “abstract” (in that it does not re-present anything). 
It  is not like a film, or a painting,  which is “there” to my “here.” Music is all 
around. It is in things. Joanna's films I find music everywhere. The “film's body,” 
which I have been kinetically “listening” to (as Sobchack would say), suddenly 
sings! No words, just a “sens” of rhythmic tones–
In the same film, just a moment earlier, I had seen black concrete with white 
flowers drawn on them. Concrete and flowers are two images which continuously 
occur in Joanna's films. In concrete the black, the grey and the white all merge. The 
flowers, carved in white, stand out, shimmering. The flowers are drawn in chalk. 
393Paul, in Bisley, p35.
394Paul and Eagle, p92. Joanna writes; “If the intellect enjoys LINE – line is everywhere under siege from the stress of 
coloured fact.” (Paul and Eagle, p92)
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The image of the sky and the image of the chalk-flower come into contact. Between 
the two images there is a “gap” in which I sense the flower-dust washed away in 
thought. As Wedde notes, “Drawing rain on the hills: this might be done not by 
making marks, but by thinking. The thinking might appear as blank sheets of paper, 
as blank spaces on sheets of paper; or not at all (except in thought).”395 I become the 
dust of the flowers, the rain pounding on the pavement. I become the pavement. To 
the pavement the rain is not “cold,” or “wet,” or even “falling.” It is just “rain.” Not 
the concept “rain” but as Deleuze says, the “qualisign” (the essence, the spirit, the 
being  and  finally  becoming of  rain).  The  pavement,  like  the  animal,  does  not 
experience  subjectivity  and  objectivity,  or  any  “binary”  (the  pavement  opposes 
nothing,  it  has  no  “secondness”).  The  pavement,  if  it  experiences  anything, 
experiences the pure ineffable “essence” of firstness,  of  affection (compassion). 
The pavement is in continual, spiritual reverie. This reminds me of a poem I had 
recently read by the Japanese haiku poet Raizan, pointing out of Joanna's texts. I 
walk to my bookcase and find the book. I open it:
spring rain―
reflected in the ox's eyes
unaware it falls396
* * * *
I return to the Bosshard's, this time feeling like a welcomed guest. I have 
been here many times now. The first time I was a stranger, looking at the house as 
if it meant nothing to me. Then, through the intersubjectivity of the mother's eyes I 
became the house itself and the body of the mother intermingled with the house's 
body,  the  one  standing  in  for  the  other.  Then the  house  turned  to  nothing  but 
shadows  and  light.  This  time  I  return  fully  embodied,  sensing  the  previous 
perceptions and affections, as actions in my body. I feel the warm sun outside as I 
approach the house. I feel the car rush past and a sudden gust of particles gather 
395Wedde, p15.
396Raizan, in Keene, p63. My translation.
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around me. I smell the car exhausted. Cut to the garden: I hear birds and I smell the 
grass, the trees, the sky. I notice that everything is still:  there is no wind today. 
These images work off one another, always in contrast, reminding me in reverse of 
what I am experiencing. Then we cut inside and it is shadowy. In the bedrooms 
upstairs I feel the stuffy heat of a summer's day indoors.
And smell! And taste! When the bread is cut I smell it. I smell the browning 
bananas in the fruit bowl. When I see the family butter the bread and eat it, I begin 
to taste it.  I  experience the food, in a sense. But what kind of food do I taste? 
Sobchack notes that Richard Dyer, for instance proposes that “all cinema [is], at 
base, a 'cinema of sensation'.”397 Dyer argues, for instance, that the “musical” is not 
exclusively 'narrative' but, like the experimental and intercultural film, engages the 
audiences 'sensations' directly through non-narrative affects and even 'poetic' events 
(particularly in the colour and movement of dance, the songs, and, by extension, 
taste, smell and touch). He suggests that the musical was a direct response to the 
“depression,” offering visions of abundance, energy and intensity, which allowed 
their  audiences,  even  if  just  for  a  moment,  to  escape  the  reality  of  scarcity, 
exhaustion, and poverty.398 I remember something: a scene from Meet Me in St.  
Louis.  There is food piled on the table:  an abundance of food.  I  remember my 
mouth watering and desiring (if you are following the psychoanalytical subtext) 
that food  there. In Joanna's films, on the other hand, I see a meagre, or “minor” 
feast. Bread, butter, and some spreads. Fruit. And then tea on the grass. All things I 
usually have around the house, which I could eat right now if I want.  Because the 
food she has chosen to focus on is easily attainable, I do not fantasise about eating 
that food and I do not want their actual food (I do not “desire” anything). Instead I 
have my own experience of “food” as this (virtual) “food” in my mouth.
This food I ingested with my eyes (eat with your eyes! become a BwO!). It 
is  not  my stomachs (nihilistic)  emptiness and  desire (blocked)  which is  played 
upon, but rather my mouths “empty-fullness” which is  driven to the creation of 
sensation.399 This is experienced not in the mouth, but in the eye and the brain. My 
397Sobchack, WFK, p3.
398Richard Dyer, “Entertainment and Utopia,” in Simon During (ed.),The Cultural Studies Reader (Routledge, 1993) p376.
399D&G talk of an emptiness which is blocked, a “botched” BwO. This is the emptiness of nihilism, of the West, of 
nothingness. The BwO empties in order to allow intensities to pass across it. The desire of lack is the desire of 
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eye was emptied and then filled with atomic awareness. And then it expresses like  
a  mouth.  It  empties  the  mouth  of  its  actual/real  “sense”  and  fills  it  with  a 
virtual/potential “sens.” All cinema may indeed engage our sensations, but the kind 
of sensation can differ markedly in its politics, and the choices which it suggests (to 
experience this mouth, this food, or to covet that one). As Marks writes, “Theorists 
who call for a return to the senses often treat sense experience as prediscursive and, 
hence, as natural. This is a position I dispute... They tend not to acknowledge that 
sensuous knowledge is cultivated.”400
* * * *
Marks writes, “I have come across a handful of works that use images of 
fabric to appeal to memory, to invite a more tactile kind of vision, and to call upon 
a  specific  cultural  knowledge  associated  with  specific  fabrics.”401 In  Task the 
woman firstly irons a white piece of clothing: bright. It optically flattens the screen, 
as she literally flattens the material with the iron. I am reminded of the various 
shots of white fabric flapping on clothes-lines in  Aberhart's House, alive with a 
furious gusto. The “white” (as we looked at in chapter two) is equivalent to the 
“alternative of the spirit.”402 In becoming the mother (this time) I am flattened by 
the task of the ironing as it “piles on top of her” (my spirit flattened). I am a pile of 
leaves  in  the  hot  sunlight,  smouldering.  I  am the  hot  and  tired  grass  beneath, 
praying for the wind to free me. I feel the heat of the iron. The alternative to heat 
here is the wind. Th alternative to the flattened spirit is the curved and wild spirit. 
Where is the mother now? What does she do when I do not see her? When her 
work is done for the day?403
Another shot: coloured pegs on the clothes-line. I imagine them clamping 
the mother's spirit to the line. In “nomadic art” (a body-without-organs, or a stage 
psychoanalysis. The filling of emptiness is the drive of the BwO.
400Marks, SoF, p144.
401Marks, SoF, p168-9.
402Deleuze, MI, p117.
403Maybe she is making an experimental film? Joanna says,  “As a woman painting is not a job, not even a vocation. It is 
part of life, subject to the strains, and joys, of domestic life. I cannot paint unless the house is in order. Unless I paint I 
don't function well in my domestic roles.” (Spiral 1)
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in its becoming) Deleuze and Guattari speak of a “smooth space,” rather than a 
“striated space.”404 The washing-line is like a striated space, with a narrow length 
and markers which segment the line, each of them tying the mothers spirit to the 
line-task. Colour, Deleuze writes, is defined by its “absorbent characteristic.”405 The 
coloured pegs absorb a part of her spirit and attach it to the striate of the washing. 
But she is free for the time being, like the wind which blows the clothes into a wild 
fluster.  Suddenly I feel the wind. This gives me a feeling of “freedom,” a special 
kind of freedom I only feel when the wind is in my face.406
The second piece of fabric she irons in  Task is black (forming a yin-yang 
with the first piece). Here we find the struggle of the spirit. This struggle is with the 
“mother” herself. As E. Ann Kaplan notes, “feminism was in part a reaction against 
our mothers... This made it difficult for us to identify with Mothering, and to look 
from the position of the mother... The mother as a complex407 person in her own 
right, with multiple roles to fill  and conflicting needs and desires.”408 As I have 
said, Joanna's films (her “subjective,” and “objective” films in particular) “focussed 
on her immediate world and the day to day realities of being a mother caring for 
small  children.”409 Perhaps  Joanna's  films  do  not  only  deconstruct  a  “male” 
audience, but possibly some “feminist” audiences as well? This has a curious effect 
on  my use  of  language:  I  say  “some”  feminists,  rather  than  “feminist”  in  the 
singular. I find it hard to think in terms of “feminist,” or “feminism.” Both of them 
imply  a  'unified'  cause,  which  may not  be  the  case.  As  Annette  Kuhn argues, 
feminism,  and  feminist  activity  “cannot  be  defined  either  a  priori or 
universalistically.”410
There may not even be “feminism” then. Instead there are different kinds of 
feminisms and different kinds of real people who believe a 'multiplicity' of things. 
Unlike the classical Aristotelian binary, which perceives of a problem between the 
'singular' and the 'plural' (which must be 'unified' in some way) there is no problem. 
404D&G, TP, p389.
405Deleuze, MI, p118.
406There is a “distinction between “free action” in smooth-space and “work” in striated space.” (D&G, TP, p540) When my 
wife proof-read this text she wrote in the margins, “This describes my experience of laundry, the wind is the good part.”
407Remembering that Deleuze calls the “affection-image” a “complex.”
408E. Ann Kaplan, “The Case of the Missing Mother,” in Erens (ed.), p126.
409Shephard, p125.
410Kuhn, p10.
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Perhaps  there  is  no  uniform  “feminist,”  who  forms  a  part  of  the  plural  of 
“feminists,” which has an essence (a totality, an absolute). Instead, I find a Taoist 
view in which the “one” and the “plural” are not problems, but illusions. Between 
them there is a gap: why is there not a word to signify a person who has feminist 
beliefs,  which  doesn't  “subject”  them to  being  a  part  of  (a  pre-defined)  set  of 
“unified” feminists (who do not exist). There seems to be no way to avoid this: it is 
inbuilt into the unity and plurality of every word (which implies a “totality,” an 
“essence”).  Martin  Heidegger,  an  existential  phenomenologist  whom  Sobchack 
draws  on  (particularly  in  reference  to  space),  shifted  the  meaning  of  the  word 
'existence' to “existenz” (referring to non-universal, lived existence). Existenz is not 
subjective or objective, it is always intersubjectively  between. Take a seemingly 
simple description of myself: I say I am 'here', for example, instead of 'there'. 'Here' 
and 'there' in traditional terms are opposed (what is there cannot be here). However, 
as Heidegger notes, “the there points to a here,”411 and equally the 'here' points to a 
'there'. When I look at things, the 'there' is drawn 'here' into my body (as an image) 
and equally my 'there' is constantly enlightened 'there' (as an image for others to 
see).
In a similar shift between the 'feminine' (here) and 'not-feminine' (there) I 
start to think of 'feminism' and the 'feminine' as “feminenz,” a kind of feminine 
quality, not specific to women, which is enacted in a multiplicity of varying ways. 
Heidegger's philosophy, like Taoism, is based on a sense of existential “care,” or 
“compassion”  which  occurs  in  the  “gap”  (spread)  between  existence  and 
existences,  in  the  “emptiness”  of  these  concepts  (rather  than  the  “opposition” 
driven philosophy of Aristotle).412
* * * *
In  Jillian Dressing I  do not look  at Jillian's body. As I have said she is 
firstly in silhouette and secondly, shown as a mirror reflection. Still, I become her. 
How? And when? As I watch I notice that her  real elbow is in the corner of the 
411Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (1926: Blackwood Press, 2004) p171. My Italics.
412As Heidegger writes: our being's “existential meaning is care.” (Being and Time, p65)
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frame for much of the film. At certain times it flicks over the frame, drawing my 
attention to it, as an intersubjective “pivot.” I become Jillian. Continuing to watch, 
my eye is drawn to the shadow (struggle) of her arm. I struggle, moving between 
watching her in the mirror, and watching her real arm. The weird thing is, I had 
never  noticed  it  before.  I  go  through  my  notes  on  the  film  (and  my  earlier 
descriptions). None of them mention it. The arm was invisible to me, even though it 
is clearly there. Suddenly it is this arm here, my arm, and my body which is in the 
mirror. She begins by brushing and arranging her hair, and I feel tingles up and 
down my scalp, a kind of spreading out of sensation.413 When she brushes her hair I 
feel that warm, tingly feeling which I always get when someone else brushes my 
hair.  Jillian is  brushing my hair! When she  takes  off  her  top I  am,  again,  not 
looking at her, but feel my skin suddenly come alive to the cool air. It is doing it 
again now as I write. I feel cold, but in a nice way. As Deleuze and Guattari write, 
one kind of BwO is populated by “intensities of cold, refrigerator waves.”414
When Jillian puts on make-up I feel her fingers on my face, smoothing its 
surface, bringing my sure-face to life. I start to make weird expressions as I watch, 
stretching my face. My face feels  energetic. It is like being given a massage. For 
Joanna, as I have said, the medium (of film) becomes subject (message). Here the 
subject (me) becomes the medium of the “film's body” (massage). This reminds me 
of Siegfried Kraucer, “who saw the uniqueness of cinema in the medium's essential 
ability to stimulate us physiologically, and sensually, to address the spectator as... 
“a human being with hair and skin.” Kraucer writes, “The material elements in that 
present  themselves  directly  stimulate  the  material  layers of  the  human  being: 
[their] nerves, [their] sense, [their] entire physiological substance.”415
These “haptic images,” these experiences of “touch,” are unusual for me. 
They are not things I am used to (especially as a male). I do not sit in front of the 
mirror and look at myself. When I do look in a mirror it is only for a few moments. 
When I brush my hair I do not look in the mirror. To be perfectly honest, I could do 
413As Deleuze writes, the affection-image is “suitable for extracting the birth; the advance and the spread of the affect.” 
(MI, p110, my italics). I remember the bread of Bosshard's House, of Aberhart's House and the butter spread on its lunar 
surface, smoothing the space.
414D&G, TP, p168.
415Kraucer, in Sobchack, WFK, p3.
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without  mirrors.  But  for Joanna,  “I  used to  feel  vis  a vis  a  familiar  landscape, 
completed by it; as much as by my face in a mirror.”416 It is in the application of 
make-up  that  I  feel  the  most  out  of  place.  I  am  reminded  of  the  “mask”  in 
Bosshard's House. I realise make-up is like a mask. I do not like wearing it. As 
Cynthia Heimel writes, “Wearing make-up is asking for approval. Wearing make-
up is an apology for our actual faces.  Wearing make-up makes it  seem as if  a 
woman has something to hide.”417 Perhaps it is here that I find “darkness and the 
struggle of the spirit.”418
Behind Jillian is a window which provides the alternation of spirit in the 
light: “As a transparent vehicle, the window is that which admits light – or spirit – 
into  the  initial  darkness  of  the  room.”419 I  alternate,  oscillating  between  the 
enjoyment of being a woman (of doing things that are  for women alone) and the 
pain of being a woman (constantly looked at by men, her image appropriated by 
male viewers). I do not feel this way very often as a “man,” or at the very least, as 
“me.” Women who I have talked to tell me that this is a common feeling for them: 
caught both in the cold glass gaze of a social-mirror, and in their own loving gaze. 
As Krauss writes, the window/mirror moves “first, towards the flow of birth...the 
“source” – but then, toward the freezing into stasis or death.”420
This struggle was particularly visible when Joanna was producing films, 
prevalent especially in feminist discussions surrounding representation in general. 
As  Sonia  Michel  notes,  “According  to  one  school  of  thought,  any  cinematic 
representation of women within patriarchal culture inevitably constitutes them as 
objects of desire. Lesage disagrees with this position, arguing that it is possible to 
“decolonise women's sexuality,” to overcome objectification.”421 As Michel writes, 
this struggle is played out between the “de-sexualisation” of the image (Jillian is 
placed  in  silhouette)  and  the  “re-sexualisation”  of  the  image  (the  eye  of  the 
mirror/spectator). These are connected by an alternating light, framing the struggle. 
416Paul and Eagle, p93.
417Cynthia Heimel, “Ageing: Fact or Fiction?,” in Get Your Tongue Out of My Mouth, I'm Kissing You Goodbye (Pan, 
1993) p136.
418Deleuze, MI, p117.
419Krauss, p16-17.
420Krauss, p16-17.
421Sonia Michel, “Feminism, Film, and Public History,” in Erens (ed.), p244.
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But  perhaps  this  alternation  is  more  personal  than  political?  I  am reminded of 
something I read by Joanna, concerning the connection of certain art-works to her 
real life: “But the interstices of a not so happy marriage, or a bereavement, might 
be visible between things or in the shadows of a window or a mirror.”422
* * * *
In  Sisterhood423 there is  more attentive detail  to the specifically “haptic” 
feelings of fabric and material. The opening shot is covered in white textured light 
which “folds” into the screen and seems to pulse. I emerge from the “fold” into 
images of a house which seems to be empty. A thin, transparent “veil” of fabric 
remains over the eye of the camera for the duration of the film. This covering of the 
eye engages my haptic sense directly. When I see someone walk on grass and then 
feel this, the effect could be said to be “indirect.” When something actually touches 
the  film's  eye  (and  mine)  it  may  be  considered  a  “direct-haptic-address,”  an 
assemblage, or “dressage” for the eye.  The fabric brushes over my eye. I feel its 
surface.  It  is  kind  of  spongy  and  soft,  and  very  smooth.  As  Marks  writes, 
“Following the folds of silk as they dissolve into grain and resolve again... I realize 
that the tape has been using my vision as though it were a sense of touch; I have 
been  brushing  the  (image  of  the)  fabric  with  the  skin  of  my eyes,  rather  than 
looking at it.”424
How odd  to  have  the  eye  caressed.  What  I  find  most  interesting  about 
“haptic-images,” is that when they “touch” the eye it is an  enjoyable experience 
(unlike the same effect in the “real” world). As I peer through the fabric, my eyes 
become attentive to the the “grain” of the “reel” screen as well. Marks, drawing on 
Deleuze, aligns “haptic-images” with “attentive recognition” (which I have already 
discussed in reference to “time-images”). This “attentive recognition,” in Joanna's 
films, as I have said, becomes alert to its own multiplicity, to its own “perceptive 
organ.”
As I find my eye attentive to its own “skin,” as an “eye-without-organs,” so 
422Paul, A Chronology, p5.
423Also labelled as Detail of a House Interior.
424Marks, SoF, p127.
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to speak, the “veil” of my totalised vision is lifted and I see the back of my eye. It 
has its own thin, watery “film.” It is made of thousands of tiny luminous spheres, 
all shimmering. I feel closer to my eye, as if I am looking at it in “close-up” rather 
than “at a distance.” Images of the world become blurred and abstracted to me and 
my own eyes are pulled into focus. I do not really see “one” image, I see thousands 
of  tiny  dots,  like  a  pointillist  painting.  My  eye  loses  its  usual  organisational 
sensibility, and shatters into multiplicitous sensations. As Marks writes, “tactility 
cannot be a distance sense.”425 The closer one gets to something, the more “haptic” 
vision becomes. Connected to the “minor arts” Joanna worked in, Marks writes that 
haptic visuality, what Deleuze and Guattari call nomadic art, “is usually relegated 
to minor traditions”426 like weaving, patchwork quilts, or watercolours.427
The layers in  Sisterhood are complex: there are the “things” (nouns), the 
“film's  eye,”  the  perception  of  things  through the  veil  (the “pronoun”)  and the 
“grain of the screen.” These layers all seem to 'leave' one another, like the pages of 
a book (read one by one, layer by layer). The “veil” moves between all these layers 
of the film, folding them into one another. The “veil” is the “fold.” The “film's eye” 
is no longer theoretically “folded” into the world, but literally intermeshed with the 
objects it sees. It is woven into the world it perceives, colours becoming like water. 
This folding of the eye into the world is what Sobchack, after Merleau-Ponty, calls 
the reversibility of perception and expression. Significant to my line of thought, 
Sobchack writes, “perception and expression are interwoven threads, the woof and 
the  warp  that  together  form  a  seamless  and  supple  fabric,  a  whole  cloth  of 
existential experience.”428 In Sisterhood this description comes to life.
Deleuze  and Guattari's  analysis  of  “nomadic  art,”  which  includes  haptic 
vision,  smooth  space,  close-range  vision  (affection,  any-space-whatever),  and 
fabric (all of which are intimately connected to each other in the BwO) is useful 
here.  The nomad is  always “moving,” never still.429 The nomad wanders in the 
425Marks, SoF, p132.
426Marks, SoF, p168.
427D&G also relate the “patchwork quilt” to fragments and assemblages of space, or “Reimannian space.” As D&G write, 
“Reimannian space is pure patchwork. It has connections or tactile relations. It has rhythmic values not found 
elsewhere.” (TP, p536) Just as the any-space-whatever it is rhythmic and tactile.
428Sobchack, AoE, p13.
429D&G, speaking of the BwO write: “Nomadism as the movement (keep moving, even in place, never stop moving, 
motionless voyage, desubjectification).” (TP, p177)
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desert, in the  grains  of experience. Nomadic art is made of a “smooth space.” I 
imagine the “veil” as just such a “nomad,” wandering through the various “strata” 
(the other layers of the eye). If the “nomad” is that which moves, and the “strata” 
are the layers moved between, then the movement itself is the “parastrata” of being. 
Nomadic  thoughts,  as  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write,  “cross  thresholds  of 
deterritorialization on their own stratum and between strata.”430 The term strata is 
used in geology to designate a layer of earth. The movement between them, their 
becoming visible, and the deterritorialisation of the strata, is the work of Foucault's 
archaeology. The “official archive” fixes the strata, and archaeology pulls the strata 
apart.  Nomadic art moves between the strata, doing the work of archaeology in 
itself, as Marks writes of intercultural cinema. What does archaeology actually do? 
Nothing but sift through the layers of sedimentary thought, in search for that which 
shatters thought, of that which gets in between the “gaps” of thought.
* * * *
As I have said, “smooth space” is essential to nomadic art. The two modes 
of smooth space are, 1) The process of creating “enveloped distances,” such as the 
“veil” effect I have described above, and, 2) A process where “determinations... are 
connected by the process of frequency or accumulation.”431 In Sisterhood I find that 
there is a process of accumulation of the images of windows and bowls. In single 
sequence of four shots I note; 1) Light from a window on the wall, engulfed in 
shadow and distant  from the eye.  I  cannot  see the source of the light,  only its 
reflection; 2) A close-up of a window, the frame forming a black cross. I do not see 
through the window, it is dirty, and luminous. However, it is not white, but a steel 
grey mottled with black and white specks; 3) A woman (silhouetted) drawing back 
blinds (I  see  through the window, a clear view of the outside world,  no longer 
obscured). In these three shots I have moved from light struggling in the dark (shot 
one), to the grey  indifference of concrete across which the 'struggle' was striated 
(shot two). Then the “blinds” are made to see, the struggle eases, and I  open my 
430D&G, TP, p60. My italics.
431D&G, TP, p536.
157.
eyes (shot three). All this is mediated by the white 'cross' of the window. How does 
this construct a religious metaphor?
In the first shot I am distant from god (light). In the second shot there is a 
white “cross” silhouetted in black (the spirit struggling with the cross) against the 
grey  indifference.  I  will  call  the  cross  the  “spiritual  alternative,”  indicating 
oscillation between two things. In the indifferent grey 'white' and 'black' arise in 
chaotic patterns (specks of dust and light). Joanna was a Catholic, who had a great 
deal of interest in Eastern thought (particularly the Tao). Could I see her struggle 
with  the  “cross”  here?  Not  wanting  to  end  her  relationship  with  Christianity, 
struggling to reconcile it with Taoism? Oscillating between the two, I wonder how 
they  might  be  reconciled  myself.  Perhaps  the  “veil”  is  that  which brings  these 
views closer and closer together, which forms an inter-religious nomad?432
What  of  the  bowls?  There  are  vases  and  bowls  everywhere  in  the 
background, but it is three bowls picked out (pulled close) that I am interested in 
here. There is; 1) A bowl covered in flowers; 2) A plain wooden bowl on the dining 
room table,  and; 3)  A cloudy fish bowl,  emptied of  fish.  The bowl covered in 
flowers I see twice and the wooden bowl I see twice also. The fish-bowl I see only 
once.  Many  argue  that  the  “bowl”  or  the  “cup”  in  Christian  mythology  is  an 
indication of the “sacred feminine,” a balancing power equivalent to the masculine 
God.433 One name for the sacred feminine is “Sophia,” which means wisdom, from 
the Greek word “philosophia” (the love of wisdom).434 Significant to my stream of 
thought, Sophia is likened to a veil and to the void (the emptiness of compassion).435 
Sophia,  in some senses, is a decidedly Eastern image. This causes me to recall 
432Joanna: “You now keep confronting me, Allie, with this question of christianity.” (Paul and Eagle, p90)
433As popularised by Dan Brown's novel The Da Vinci Code (Corgi, 2004). The original research that Brown is drawing on 
can be found in Michael Baigent, Richard Leigh and Henry Lincoln, The Holy Blood and the Holy Grail (1982: Arrow 
Books, 1996).
434Sophia is, for instance, mentioned in the Apocrypha. She says, “I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, 
before the Earth came into being. When there were no depths I was brought forth... When God prepared the heavens I 
was there. When God established the clouds above I was there. When God assigned the boundaries of the sea, when God 
laid the foundations of the earth, I was by God's side.” Alexander Waugh, God (Review, 2002) p19. Sophia was always 
with God in the beginning.
435“Sophia, who is called Pistis, wanted to create something, alone without her consort; and her product was a celestial 
thing. A veil exists between the world above and the realms that are below; and shadow came into being beneath the 
veil; and that shadow became matter; and that shadow was projected apart. And what she had created became a product 
in the matter.” Anon, The Hypostasis of the Archons, The Nag Hammadi Library. Internet WWW page, at URL: 
<http://www.gnosis.org/>  (version current 1/1/2007).
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something: in the 1940s there were a number of texts discovered in Egypt which 
caused the Christians worldwide to reconsider some of their fundamental views (or 
to reaffirm them, depending on how they are read). These texts are possibly those 
which were cut out of The Bible early in Christian history. Sophia was entirely cut 
out of The Bible, and the “sacred feminine” is nowhere to be found (although, as I 
have said, she is mentioned in the Apocrypha).
In one shot (of this bowl) light gathers between its edges and the screen. 
Light  is  given a  visible  energy,  streaming from the top of  the bowl out of  the 
frame's edges. Here light is not distant and flat, but suddenly alive. How is it made 
alive? Through a tension between the frame, and the object in the frame. It is the 
empty gap between them that the light “fills” (a pure energy). This image of light is 
not made of rays (like the light discussed in chapter one) but of light-dust (grains). 
God is called “light” in  The Bible, and Sophia, it would seem, is the “shadow.” 
Does this light grain imply that God is not “one,” but a multiplicity? This thought 
takes on an urgency when one notes that the “Old Testament” of The Bible uses the 
word “elohim” constantly to refer to God. As Alexander Waugh writes, “The word 
elohim, strictly speaking, means 'gods' (it is a plural word) and most specifically 
refers to the heavenly assembly of the sons and daughters of El which, at one time, 
ruled over the ancient Canaanite and Israelite religions. The word has caused no 
end of embarrassment in Jewish and Christian circles since it occurs over 1500 
times in the first fifteen books of the Bible... in which only one god is supposed to 
exist. To solve the problem Elohim has been mistranslated as God (with a capital 
G) such as we find at Genesis 1:26, 'And God said, Let us make... in our image... 
after our likeness' – Whoops!”436
Perhaps Joanna is suggesting that the true “light” of God is found in the 
multiplicity of the  feminine “cup,” the “chalice” (rather than in the distance of 
reflected light entering into struggle, or the “second,” unified God who rules us as 
“subjects”).  Or  am I  reading too closely,  too intimately? Joanna herself  writes, 
“perhaps I am talking about “religious” imagery – the natural world as a garment of 
G-D [the Hebraic device Joanna uses suggestive of a divinity] and also a storehouse 
436Waugh, p30.
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for metaphor.”437 I was never interested in religion to this extreme before I studied 
Joanna's films. While studying her films I had my own “crisis of faith,” in a sense. I 
found myself suddenly unsure that there was definitely no “God.” I asked myself if 
I believed in spirit, in God and I found myself unsure. By God I do not mean any 
kind of God which has been described, and certainly not a Christian God. I use the 
word to refer to something which cannot be explained. What is Spirit? What is 
God? What is Soul? More and more questions, and no answers to attach them to. I 
feel an opening, a sudden rushing, a welling up–
Something  is  beyond  words,  beyond  even  sensation.  Between  the  two 
windows, the first which I have read as the distant light of classical Christianity, 
and the second which reaches a point of indifference, there is a shot of a woman 
sleeping. The woman rises and opens the curtains letting light into the room. Later 
we see her look at the camera. I become woman. Her eyes are weary, her expression 
tired. I  feel  like the tiredness of women, of the daughters of Sophia (a kind of 
wisdom lost to men). I feel the weariness of a thousands years of dust in my heart. 
But I also feel love.
All  the  writers  who  closely  analyse  Joanna's  work  mention  Joanna's 
relationship with God, and she herself spoke openly of  both her Catholicism and 
her  relationship  to  the  Tao  (as  well  as  the  (somewhat)  unusual  practice  of 
combining  religious  metaphor,  with  feminist  politics,  experimental  poetics,  and 
personal  documentary).  In the West  these subjects  sit  uneasily.  As Allie  Eagle, 
commenting on Joanna's work, writes, “domesticity and the pleasures of spirituality 
make an awkward match.”438 In Eastern forms of poetry this is not the case. The art 
of  the  “haiku”  is  a  celebration  of  “spirit”  in  simple,  everyday  and  ordinary 
language.  Where does the “spirit” of haiku come from? The realisation that  no 
situation is really ordinary, or everyday. Every moment itself is new and exciting. 
But where do we find the 'scale' of a moment? Perhaps I say that each of Joanna's 
film is a new moment for me. Then I say that scene is a new moment. And then that 
shot. And then that thing in the shot. And then that grain of light.  And and and. 
Then I think of the shot of light distant on the wall. I am in Plato's cave watching 
437O'Brien, p75.
438Lonie, p25.
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shadows on the wall. The grey window striated with struggle. Grey walls of the 
stone cave cold on my hands as I feel my way out of the dark.  Then I open the 
blinds, and step into the light–
2. Words & Snow : Origami Thoughts
On one side of my body I feel the film as a skin, as a second body, a body 
house which I can reside in, a vast emptied/full space which I may pack, unpack 
and sift through like an archaeologist on a dig, sand in their eyes and between their 
clothes and skin. Or perhaps I am more like a miner, knee deep in mud panning for 
nuggets of go(l)d.
Throughout this process (which takes place across the main three chapters, 
as well as between them) I have become more and more aware of “me.” But what 
about the film's body? Sobchack argues that the “film's body” is “transcendental,” 
something which is above, over and invisible.439 The traditional Christian God is 
also “transcendental.” To claim to know the essence of anything other than the self 
is  to  “transcend” the  “limits  of  perception.”  Our  perception,  as  philosophy has 
classically understood it, radically cuts us off from the world, it is a “problem.” If 
we perceive only light and not any thing, then we cannot perceive the (real) world. 
Joanna's  film-body was  not  transcendental,  but  “immanent”  (in  movement,  and 
light-images). This caused the body to unravel itself in the “difference machine” of 
shadow/light. Giving the body “time” is also, in a Deleuzian sense, giving it an 
immanent self-consciousness, a brain which becomes the cinema. I have spoken in 
the previous chapters of the size of the film's eye, which is always  bigger than 
mine.  As  the  film  makes  me  aware  of  its  immanent  existentiality  (which  is 
transcendentally  realised in  Sobchack's  work)  I  increase in  size.  Then the  film 
increases in size again, “becoming affection.” I get smaller. Slowly I get smaller 
and smaller and smaller, until I am nothing but an atom. This caused my skin to 
come  alive  and  all  my  other  sensations  with  it.  Then  the  film  and  I  became 
439Sobchack, AoE, p25.
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equivalent in size, “sizeless” in a sense (there can be “no size” when everything is 
the “same size”). So began this chapter, in a state of equivalence.
But what of the film's  existential presence? So far, I have only dealt with 
how the film shifts my thoughts and never how my thoughts (or eye) shift the film's 
experience? For instance, the image is “big” on screen, and my eye, where it ends 
up,  is  “small.”  Take  Gravestones as  an example.  A shot  of  a  gravestone is  set 
against a mountain, framed so that the gravestone dwarfs the mountain. The affect 
is an enlargement, and here the gravestones are contrasted for extra-enlargement. 
The expanse of grey space further expands the image on screen. Then I imagine the 
gravestone hurled at me (rather than me thrown into the emptiness) becoming light. 
The light, on its way to my eye, folds down (origami light) and “becomes image.” 
Then it goes into my mind, as pulses of energy, and floats into the back of my head. 
It gets smaller and smaller and smaller. I forget the image. Then I see a new one 
and the same thing happens. Gravestones gather in my mind. When the film ends 
all the gravestones vanish from my thoughts, and I feel clear and very calm, as if I 
had just meditated.
As I sit there I realise that I feel very aware of something, but I do not know 
what. Then I start to realise it is a poem. It is a poem about the film Gravestones. I 
had not written a poem in years. I used to write a little bit, but eventually gave up. 
Why did I  give up? I  didn't  feel  like my work was worth anything (honestly). 
Poetry (back then) made me feel very small. It was a very large thing, very close to 
me and yet indistinguishable from any ground. When I tried to write a poem in my 
mind it was like looking into a black hole, or alternatively, if I tried to look out 
there for one, I found nothing but a blinding light. Now I see (in my mind) a grey. 
In the grey there is both black and white. It is the grey of one of the gravestones 
(and it is the yin-yang  spinning). Then a poem came to me. I did not “write” it. 
Rather, it simply appeared, as if from nowhere, said by no-one. It was as if the 
images  (which  had  gotten smaller  and smaller)  had  been somewhere,  and then 
when they could get no smaller they turned “about face” and headed back to me 
with news–
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still grave stones remain
still grave stone remains
still grave stones–
The poem was a haiku (of course). This is not all Joanna's doing. Years ago, 
when I was trying to write better poetry I had learned how to write a simple form of 
haiku. I would go into nature and look at things and try and write poems about 
them. They were painful experiences in the end and I kept none of the poems I 
wrote.  Here,  I  found  a  poem I  was  pleased  with,  but  not  because  I  expected 
someone else to like it (a kind of action-image, an expected result). I did not mind 
what anyone else thought of it, because I liked the way it made me feel. I loved this 
poem and that was enough: my first in more than six years! There was something 
so satisfying  in  the experience  of  writing  it  outside  the  worry of  what  another 
person might think of it. I felt kind of energised. I wondered if it would work with 
another film? I watched Task. Afterwards I sat very still again, and thought about 
the experience. I started to “get” words. I wrote them down:
all those folded clothes
must have been a thankless task–
I had a brother too!
It made me laugh and weep (I sent a copy to my mum). This was a strange 
experience. I did not  want to write these poems exactly. Once I shifted my brain 
into the gear of thinking about writing them it just did it. The first one was not of 
my doing at all. I had no thought of writing a poem when I put the tape in. It just 
happened. These particular films had moved me deeply when I first saw them and 
remain favourites of mine. Watching  Task again a year later I found more words 
arising in my mind:
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hands
iron
fold
This illustrates perfectly the “pivot words” which are used in haiku to shift 
meanings between the strata (lines). The terms “iron” and “fold” refer to the ironing 
and folding of the washing, obviously. But fragmented as they are, the terms might 
refer to a more 'poetic' meaning such as the “iron fold” of handcuffs which tie her 
to the ironing board.  It  was this  understanding that  had been missing from my 
understanding  of  haiku  previously.  I  had  thought  the  secret  was  to  unlock  the 
essence of things and describe it. Rather, it was to create poems which allowed the 
reader to do the work of an archaeologist: to dig and sift for meaning. By the same 
token  the  haiku  allows  for  easy  digestion,  having  a  surface  meaning  which  is 
readable to anyone. In this moment of creation I felt a transformation of myself into 
a “poet” of some kind. Not a poet who is determined by capitalist measures (the 
striated  space  of  charts  and  best-seller  lists)  but  by  my  own  determination. 
Becoming intensities which fill the white page. Are these poems “war machines” or 
“images of thought.” Is this noology?
“Noology,” pure “images of thought” and “war machines.” What do I make 
of these curious terms? What connection can I make? Deleuze and Guattari write a 
kind of poetry too: assemblages taking the form of slogans (at times) and haiku (at 
others).  As  Deleuze  and  Guattari  write,  “They  come like  fate,  without  reason, 
consideration,  or pretext,”440 just  like the poems I found in my mind. Note that 
Deleuze and Guattari use a pronoun with no subject: What does the term “they” 
refer to? Who are they? And what comes? Images of thought. What are they? The 
“war machine,” they claim, “is exterior to the State apparatus.” How is it exterior to 
the state? By converging at the inner-most point (where the gravestones went in 
order to “become the poem”). Let us say there is an inner and an outer, which are 
opposed in the classical way (such as subjectivity and objectivity, space and time, 
the body and the mind). Let us then say that our “inner-most” self (our atomic self 
440D&G, TP, p390.
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perhaps) is a “thirdness.” This inner-most may also be a kind of outer-most, a point 
of  “intersection” between the two.  Perhaps there is  no inner and no outer.  As 
Joanna writes, “painting, for me, is a dialogue between the inner and the outer. I am 
a tentative person but I have more certainty on the page than off it. Painting is like 
touching, like touching your subject. I don't want to  nail it down.”441
One of  the places “war machines” are  found is  in certain  games.  Haiku 
poetry began as an almost Hegelian game of “thesis-antithesis” called  Haikai no 
Renga.442 In Haikai no Renga a group sits around and one of them comes up with a 
phrase containing a “contradiction” (for instance: I want to cut but don't want to 
cut, I am sad and I am not sad, and so on) which each poet then “solves”with a 
haiku  poem.  Haikai  no  Renga poems  are  not  written  by  one  person,  but  a 
multiplicity, a pack (like the way dogs and children play “games”). It is not played 
to “compete” but to “think.”443 There is no winner of the game of poetry,  only 
players. There is no one way to complete the synthesis but endless ways.444 The 
best  beginning lines are remembered and played again and again.  And the way 
these  players  are  arranged  in  space  is  different  also.  The  space  of  the  “war 
machine” is smooth and allows for “the possibility of springing up at any point,” 
just as I now find finished poems springing up at any point while watching Joanna's 
films, without thought, concrete lines in my head. And I like them! I collect them. 
They are a way of remembering my experiences with Joanna, someone I never met 
(and yet feel so close to). Complete before I have written them, arriving finished.445 
As Deleuze and Guattari writes, “At any rate, here they are; it seems that every 
morning there are more of them.”446
441Paul, in O'Brien, p77.
442Keene, p11.
443D&G use the Eastern game of Go to example the “smooth space” of the “war machine.” They say; “Go is war without 
battle lines [striate], with neither confrontation nor defeat, without battles even; pure strategy.” (TP, p389) They contrast 
this to chess, which occurs in “striated space.”
444This is why Haikai no Renga are only 'almost' Hegelian. George Hegel's reading of the 'dialectic' maintains that there is 
one “absolute” synthesis.
445“One speaks without knowing while the other replies without having understood.” (D&G, TP, p417)
446D&G, TP, p390.
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grey
stone after
light image–
poetry
all things float
Deleuze and Guattari describe the nomadology (a minor science) of the war 
machine as a process which moves from “turba to turbo,” rather than from point to 
point. This they call the “vortex.”447 Time moves from A to B to C, but at each 
point time is taken for A to reach my eye, and B to reach my eye, and so on. The 
flow from the “object” to the “eye” to the “image” in my mind, to wherever these 
images go, is the vortex. Images go into the memory. From the memory I can recall 
them. But here images have been  created for me, arriving ready made from the 
depths of my being. As Deleuze and Guattari write, “from bands or packs of atoms 
to the great vortical organisations.”448 The yin-yang, though it is represented as a 
“still,”  often  has  arrows  above  and  below  it  indicating  its  movement.  This 
movement is a “spinning,” a vortex which occurs between any two points which are 
placed  in  the  black  and  the  white.  Like  Joanna's  films,  “speed  [and]  swirling 
movement is an essential feature of [the] war machine.”449 As with my experiences 
of Joanna's films as affection (war machines are  affections!) the war machine is 
aligned with “spiritual voyages effected without movement, but in intensity, in one 
place: these are part of nomadism.”450 I get the feeling that I have experienced a war 
machine in Joanna's films, a thought which was transmitted directly from her to 
me: the gift of poetry. As Bachelard writes, “Make of the reader a poet... the joy of 
reading appears to be the reflection of the joy of writing, as though the reader were 
the writer's ghost. At least the reader participates in the joy of creation that, for 
447D&G, TP, p399.
448D&G, TP, p399.
449D&G, TP, p421.
450D&G, TP, p421.
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Bergson,  is  the  sign of  creation.”451 Similarly,  for  Ralph  Waldo Emmerson the 
highest goal of the arts was to inspire new artists to emerge anywhere, arranging 
oneself in an open space, with 452“the possibility of springing up at any point–
wind's shadow―
leaves
tremble
a weary
field of
dust
atoms
made of
concrete
birds sing
the branches
play
451Bachelard, pxxi-xxii.
452D&G, TP, p421.
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silhouette
addressing
mirror
car exhausts
flower garden―
collide
rain bows
chalk flowers
run
whales gather
at dusk
to sing
edges
of the universe?
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every thing
each moment―
superimposed
crayon
lends the page
a hand
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sound―
from the two environments
paper felt
ink
think
169.
four thousand trees rise―
on a single blade of grass
hard edged shadows
cool!
sunlight on a wooden deck
only by contemplating
nonsense does it mean something―
poetry
matter
distilled―
atoms
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an environment for light―
the universe
light
black
white
grey
rainbow!
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rose
rose
frame tilted―
deconnected space
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but we cannot stop for a moment―
her language continues to fold
light
window
moon
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now
you
have
read
these words
,
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Chapter 3
Inconclusions
(of an unknown end)
Fig. 7. Gravestones 2 [film still]
(dir. Joanna Paul, B&W, 16mm, c. 1975)
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New Beginnings
“Poetry makes language care because it renders everything intimate. 
This intimacy is... the result of the bringing-together-into-intimacy of 
every act  and noun and event  and perspective  to  which the  poem 
refers.  There is often nothing more substantial  to place against  the 
cruelty... of the world than this caring.”453
“One could almost imagine Deleuze saying, like Walt Whitman, 'You 
say  I  contradict  myself;  Very  well,  I  contradict  myself.  I  contain 
multitudes'.”454
This  is  not  a  conclusion.  It  is  a  series  of  inconclusions  and  inclusions, 
amendments to certain unavoidable stratifications of thought. I began this essay by 
making a series of fairly rigid distinctions between mainstream-commercial cinema 
and experimental-intercultural cinema. I then suggested that Joanna's films returned 
me to 'narrative' from a 'poetic' perspective, interjecting narrative-images into the 
poetic (liquid) stream, opening onto “unknown (virtual) bodies.” These give me 
two 'analytical' categories: the 'poetic' (P) and the 'narrative' (N), which together 
describe the 'substance' of art (in a classical Aristotelian manner). The “poetic” I 
will  align  with  “time”  (just  as  Deleuze  aligns  experimental  cinema with  time-
images) and “narrative” with “movement through space” (just as Deleuze aligns 
narrative,  action-based  cinema  with  movement-images).  The  classical  mode  of 
analysis (what Deleuze and Guattari call “state philosophy”) then places limits on 
the machine, or (in Foucault's terms) represses and disciplines the categories: some 
things  are  poetic and some things are  not (some things are narrative and some 
things are not). One is good, and one is bad (moral dimension). One is personal and 
intimate and the other is public and distant (and so on). This is a philosophy of 
“being” (enacting an ontologically and ideologically powerful ritual). I look back at 
453John Berger, in O'Brien, p71.
454Marks, SoF, p26.
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the past and feel appalled at the mistreatment of so many minority cultures (and not 
only at the hands of the West; I am thinking of China's treatment of Japan, for 
instance). Ideological analysis re-presents obvious arrangements of power across 
historical situations and allows us to see how the “official archive” has shifted, and 
how it has stayed the same. Ideological analysis, as Bill Nichols writes, “proposes 
obviousness, a sense of 'the way things are' within which our sense of place and self 
emerges...  Ideology  is  how the  existing  ensemble  of  social  relations  represents 
itself.”455 
1. However, what Deleuze suggests is a philosophy of becoming. No more 
ideology: noology is exterior to the state apparatus.456 No longer the questions “Is 
this  either poetic  or narrative?”  and  “What  one  thing  is  this  being?”  or  the 
statements “This is poetry! This is good!” and “This is narrative! This is bad!” (or 
visa-versa, depending on whether or not you like your expectations to be met).457 I 
found that  Joanna's  films allowed for  modes  of  'becoming'  through interjecting 
'narrative' images into 'poetic' ebbs and flows. These produced the becomings of 
unknown bodies, the film's (intersubjective) body, the film's (philosophical) mind 
and my own nomadic wanderings – sandstorms of light (all lines lead to Egypt). 
This  mode  of  interjection  I  will  call  “P/N”  (signifying  “narrative  interjecting 
poetry,”  or  poetry  becoming narrative).458 Hence,  though  Joanna's  films  are 
dominantly 'poetic', their poetry is not in  staying absolutely “poetic,” but through 
changing into something else (keeping on the move, wandering and exploring). 
“P/N” practices are very rare in modern culture and are dominantly referred to as 
'poetic cinema'.
2. P/N is only one possible 'synthesis' of P and N, in terms of experimental 
film  practices.  I  have  mentioned  a  second  in  this  text,  which  Kuhn  calls 
'deconstruction'. Kuhn used Brecht's plays (with their clashing of narrative forms 
455Bill Nichols, Ideology and the Image (Indiana University Press, 1981) p1.
456D&G, TP, p387.
457I find my tastes are variable rather than fixed. A movie I thought was great, can suddenly take a turn for the worse, 
while films which seem to be empty, suddenly fill with poetry. But there is always the possibility of returning to the 
other view, of getting from one to the other and back again.
458On the one hand an ideological function (interjection) and on the other a noological function (becoming). They are 
reversals of one another. Reversals are central to the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty, Sobchack, Deleuze and Foucault 
alike. All their philosophies produce functions consisting of four categories (derived from two reversible layers, or 
strata, of time/duration).
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and sudden distances) to example deconstruction, drawn from Walter Benjamin's 
analysis. Deconstruction, as I am defining it, works primarily through interjecting 
“minor” narrative forms and unexpected interruptions, or situations, into “major” 
narrative forms (or the other way around). For this reason I will call deconstruction 
“N/N”  (signifying  “narrative  forms  interjecting  narrative  forms,”  or  narrative 
becoming other-narrative). Deconstruction constitutes a second 'experimental' (and 
sometimes  intercultural)  cinematic  practice.  One  can  observe  deconstruction  at 
work  everywhere  in  modern  culture.  Self-reflexive  (mainstream,  Hollywood) 
comedies  like  Airplane,  or  Scary Movie are  examples of  deconstruction,  as  are 
William Burroughs'  experimental,  cut-up novels like  The Soft Machine  and  The 
Ticket That Exploded, or Jean-Luc Godard's  Two or Three Things I Know About  
Her. Assemblages of  de-connected,  fragmented fissures,  lines,  scenes,  thoughts, 
and paragraphs, pages and photographs ripped from a vast pulsing, seething textual 
multiplicity (newspaper articles, poetry, crime novels, and medical textbooks, to 
Hollywood, mythology and pop music).459
3. I  have also discussed pure “assemblages,” a special  case of the “any-
space-whatever” in which poetic-image follows poetic-image, without the fusion of 
narrative-images. Joanna's films began this way for me, and at all times they float 
between P/N and what I will call “P/P” (which signifies “poetic-images interjected 
into other-poetic-images,” and the poetic  becoming other-poetic).  Joanna's films, 
before watching them as a series and arranging them into the triad of subjective, 
objective and semi-subjective (perception-images), were entirely comprised of P/P 
images from my perspective. It was only with “time” and contemplation that P/N 
images began to a-rise from (a-rhizome) the ruins of inter-poetic-images.
4. I have already suggested one manner in which mainstream narrative films 
might engage with experimental practices (as textual production):  deconstruction 
(N/N). In conclusion I would like to suggest a fourth category in which the poetic-
image  interjects  within  the  narrative-image,  thus  creating  a  “becoming”  in  the 
opposite direction of Joanna's films. Paul Coughlin calls these poetic interjections 
into  commercial  and  popular  narrative  cinema  “sublime  moments”  in  which  a 
459One can also see the deconstructive impulse in narratives within narratives, like the play within a play, or film within a 
film, or play within a film (and so on).
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particular image subtly shocks the spectator out of the narrative, prompting them to 
experience  something  “individual,  personal,  and subjective.”460 Like  Bachelard's 
poetic-image, the “sublime-image” causes the spectator to see something they are 
familiar  with  in  a  new,  or  unexpected  way  (or  indeed,  something  they  are 
unfamiliar with seen in a new way). As Coughlin writes, when “the spectator re-
sees something for the first time... the sublime moment occurs within the spectator, 
it is the subjective appraisal of the image which is significant.”461 This process is 
known as defamiliarisation.
Defamiliarisation involves 'ordinary' or 'banal' subject-matter, which would 
not normally be the focus of a film, or the focus of the spectator's everyday vision 
(which  ranges  from  house-work  to  explosions)  transformed  by  the  affective 
qualities of the cinema. Coughlin argues that “This may be a gesture, a look, a 
movement,  an  object;  the  more  ordinary,  the  more  profound  the  process  of 
defamiliarisation.”462 Coughlin  distinguishes  these  more  subtle  forms  of  'poetry' 
from  Brecht's  deconstructive  forms  which  work  with  “sudden  and  incessant 
displacement of images by other images.”463 'Sublime moments', on the other hand, 
might  be  said  to  include  all  the  quieter  “moments  of  various  and  manifold 
natures”464 in which 'poetics' interject with more classical 'narratives'. I will define a 
poetic-image in narrative as any image working against  the spectator remaining 
within the narrative, which causes them to think of the “means of production,” or 
the  “production  of  meaning.”  This  final  category  I  will  call  “N/P”  (signifying 
“poetry interjecting narrative,” or narrative becoming poetry). These four categories 
I  have  worked  out  according  to  a  mathematical  methodology,  introduced  to 
linguistics by Roman Jakobson, echoing yin-yang logic (rather than an absolute 
Hegelian “synthesis”).  While  Hegel  says  “where there are  two,  they will  make 
one,”  Jakobson  says  that  “where  there  are  two,  there  will  arise  four”  (a 
multiplicity). In this case there are no “problems” between the two concepts, no 
opposition per say, but only multiple points of contact between their various layers 
460Paul Coughlin, “Sublime Moments,” Senses of Cinema. Internet WWW page, at URL: <www.sensesofcinema. 
com/contents/00/11/sublime.html> (first published 2000, version current 1/1/2008) p1.
461Coughlin, p3.
462Coughlin, p3.
463Coughlin, p2.
464Coughlin, p2.
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(rhizome). The categories within these points of contact are the manifold ways in 
which a text passes/changes/shifts from one to the other (from P to N, from N to P, 
from N to N and from P to P).
Each of these four experimental textual practices indicate choices which an 
author  (or selection of  authors)  make consciously and intentionally,  in order to 
practice experimental  thought, indicating that they are, in some way or another, 
dissatisfied with the “state” of things (of unities and opposites: in which narrative 
and poetry forever skirmish). These movements are not only found in what I have 
previously been calling experimental cinema, but everywhere and anywhere people 
feel oppressed and subjected to invisible power. I think of all those people in the 
world who feel that culture subjects them to positions they do not want to fill, who 
feel that culture denies them a basic kind of free-will (who doesn't feel this way?). 
In Hollywood, and mainstream cultural production, I imagine there would be a vast 
number  of  people  who  feel  oppressed  within  these  high-stress  commercial 
institutions (from cleaners, to writers, to drivers, and so on). Wherever there are 
bad working conditions, and 'invisible' social prejudices, there are real people living 
and  becoming.  One  kind  of  author  makes  ethical  sacrifices  to  reach  a  large 
audience, while another remains true to their ideals, but is hardly known.  No-one 
wins. It was never meant to be a game!
The functions I have pointed to should suffice to illustrate four possible exit 
points for an investigation into experimental authorship practices at the level of the 
text, just as Foucault's  four functions in “What is an Author?” delimit authorship 
practices at the level of the legal, social and historical discipline and punishment of 
authors  (genealogy  and  archaeology).  On  the  one  hand  a  “political  function” 
(making poetics all the more urgent). On the other a “poetic function,” leading back 
in the other direction. A “name” does not make a film. Who makes movies move? 
Real people,  actual “bodies” interacting physically with cameras and the worlds 
they exist in every day. I am suggesting an existential reading of authors which 
observes their choices at both the political and poetic levels (and those points of 
contact  between  the  film  and  the  spectator,  in  terms  of  thinking 
phenomenologically).
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The  “personal/public  function”  designates  an  author's  “personal”  (Pr) 
choices in terms of interaction, or non-interaction with the “public” (Pb). These two 
categories (personal and public) combine (at  first) in four ways, indicating four 
kinds of personal becoming. I will call these four affections: Pr/Pb, Pb/Pr, Pr/Pr and 
Pb/Pb.  These  functions  cross  strata  with  Foucault's  description  of  the  “author 
function.” 1) Pr/Pb indicates the author's “personal” choices when relating to the 
“public.” Do they organise their work to be mass-produced, or produce only what is 
needed? Does their production create a lot of waste? Do they screen their films in 
multiplex theatres, or on street-corners? Does the author produce writings on their 
text? Or make any public statements? Do they perform for crowds? Do they have a 
persona, or are they shy? (and so on);  2) Pb/Pr indicates the manner in which the 
public  chooses  to interact  with the text  in  their  own personal spaces.  Does the 
spectator sit quietly? Do they speak, and yell at the screen? Or do they gather with 
friends and talk though the film? Does the spectator pay to see it in the multiplex, 
or to “illegally” download it for free?; 3) Pr/Pr indicates the manner in which the 
author personally chooses to relate to themselves on “set.” Do they put themselves 
at the head of hundreds of citizens, in command of a veritable army? Do they have 
“power”? How do they act when given this power? Do they choose to work as an 
artisan? To make works entirely by themselves, operating outside the mainstream 
industry? and;  4)  Pb/Pb,  which indicates  the way the  public  interact  with each 
other, and in particular the existing writings about the author and their  works by 
critics, and theorists (which crosses paths with “reception theory”).
* * * *
These  three  “functions,”  or  “machines”  (the  personal/public,  the 
political/personal,  and  the  poetic/narrative)  create  a  triad  comprised  of  three 
“regimes of knowledge,” all contributing to various consistencies, unities, flows, 
and inconsistencies, multiplicities and blocks (all at the same time, superimposed 
and entangled) in the becoming of the film and the choices the author makes in this 
becoming (from production, to distribution, to reception and reflection).
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The method of working out a function's 'categorical imperative' intermixes 
two paired “functions” producing four lines of enquiry, four strata, four ways for 
something to change from one thing into another. All texts (and all authors) are 
undoubtedly  subject  to  capitalism.  This  “being-in”  capitalism  is  currently 
necessary. An author needs to live, after all and presently a 'living' means earning 
money  (and  therefore  working  within  the  capital-machine).  However,  all  texts 
equally construct potential moments of poetry for their audiences. This interaction 
is  never  simply  a  dominance  of  one  over  the  other,  but  a  shifting,  moving, 
amorphous site of power.
I believe the study of “experimental practices” (time-images, poetic-images 
and so on) should not be confined to experimental film-making, but applied to any 
images which “speak” to their audience, which stand out of the crowd and which 
mark a new entry point into classical, stale narratives (and equally classical, stale 
poetry) and redefines the “order of things.” Equally I believe that writing criticism 
about  the  personal  and  political  practices  of  authors  is  a  necessary  discipline, 
revealing  the  ways  in  which  real  people  struggle  with  capitalism,  poverty, 
subjectivity,  individuality,  community  (and  so  many  other  very  real concepts) 
every day (in many multiplicitous and different ways). Once I began looking for 
existential,  ethical,  caring,  compassionate,  experimental  practices  in  mainstream 
culture,  I  began  to  find  them everywhere  (anywhere!).  For  all  the  functioning 
repressive  institutions  and  socio-legal  concepts,  there  are  as  many  real  people 
trying to remain indifferent to the horror of the modern world, trying their best to 
make some kind of difference (in-difference).
Experimental practices are what I would call an “existential authorial ethical 
aesthetic.” There are two ways to interpret “ethics,” a kind of “turning” around 
which ethics establishes itself. 1) Ethics concerns firstly those moments when one 
chooses  to  transgress,  or  oppose  certain  moral  laws,  codes,  or  conventions.  2) 
Ethics  secondly  involves  a  landscape  of  thought  outside  pre-determined  codes, 
which Deleuze and Foucault have argued leads to the evolution of thought, care, 
creation, art, expression (and so on). This is the ethics defined by the “self” (no 
longer in opposition to morality). This is Spinoza's ethics. His work was a radical 
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departure  from  the  dominant  thought  at  the  time  (in  which  God's  laws  were 
absolute  and  unquestionable).  This  may  be  why  Deleuze  and  Guattari  regard 
Spinoza's Ethics as the book of the BwO.
* * * *
In  Foucault's  terms  “genealogies”  and  “archaeologies”  determine  the 
manner in which social constructs subject people to more and more ordered (and 
fixed) states of being, behaving and thinking. This is the organisation of the “state 
body,” of the “consumer body” and even the “slave body.” Ethics might be said to 
reverse this state and come at the same problem from another angle. Ethics: what 
existential, ethical choices can a person make in their “practices of the self” (their 
everyday living) to produce new thoughts, and new experiences? How does one 
produce change, and energy, with thought?
In order to live in society I must obey the laws of the state. If I do not, then I 
am dominantly  perceived  as  transgressive  and  must  be  punished.  This  kind  of 
thinking would be fine if there was not (still!) invisible forms of institutionalised 
racism, sexism and homophobia flowing (often subtly) throughout most cultural 
production. If no-one produced ethically transgressive material, no-one but white 
males would have legal access to land-ownership, basic human-rights (and their 
perceptive and expressive citizenship).  I  do not  blame anyone for  this.  It  is  so 
“invisible” that it is often hard to notice. But, equally, poetry flows through every 
text, every moment–
Within this function-machine, real author's make real decisions. I feel that 
the  complex  relationship  between  those  who  choose  to  explore  “experimental 
practices”  (at  the  level  of  the  personal,  the  political,  the  poetic,  and  any 
combination of these) in public forums and those who “do not perceive the choice,” 
are only just beginning to be properly understood. I hope that this work might add 
to the growing body of knowledge on 'poetics' and its positive contribution to the 
socially communicable images of thought. The categories which I have supplied 
here (politics, poetics, personality) are only three of many more which will arise in 
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the author's embodiment of the film-body there and then (and our re-embodiment 
of it here and now). No longer absences, no longer lack.
Psychology is,  for instance, another thought which comes to mind, as is 
'phenomenology',  'philosophy',  'perception',  'powers'  and  'passions'  (these  two 
belonging to “affections,” and modes of “becoming,” as central to Spinoza's Ethics 
as they are to Deleuze, Guattari and Henri Bergson). It is these notions which came 
to dominate Foucault's late works also. As James Bernauer and Michael Mahon 
write,  “A special  curiosity  motivates  [Foucault's]  final  works,  the curiosity  that 
“enables  one  to  get  free  of  oneself.””465 Gerald  Bruns  also  connects  Foucault's 
“ethics of the self” to his early writing on modernism's fragmentation. As Foucault 
writes, “however erudite my books may be, I've always conceived of them as direct 
experiences aimed at pulling myself free of myself.”466
* * * *
What  I  am suggesting is  that  both the moral  and ethical  choices of  the 
author as a “real (some) body” (personal-political) grounds the “film's (unknown 
becoming known) body” and “brain” (poetic-narrative) allowing for infinite points 
of contact between a multiplicity of strata (the personal is the political is the poetic  
is the personal is the political...) from which the “private thinker” might draw out a 
virtual philosophy of authors; to dig into the earth of cultural production, to “finally 
SEE.” The choices I have shown Joanna making illustrate one unfolding, in one 
particular direction (digging her rock-like meditations on seeing!).
The  less  writings  an  author  produces,  the  less  we  know  about  their 
existential thoughts. The less an author discusses their actual filmmaking processes, 
the more their practices become invisible (for the spectator). This does not mean an 
author did not make them, but they are harder to map (easier to trace). What is 
interesting in these functions is not “what” they say, but “how” they function to 
structure what  we say and what interventions might be made into these structures 
by  me in  the  here  and  now.  How  is  an  author  perceived?  How  can  they  be 
465James Bernauer and Michael Mahon, “Foucault's Ethical Imagination,” in Gutting (ed), p161, 2nd edition.
466Gerald Bruns, “Foucault's Modernism,” in Gutting (ed.), p350, 2nd edition.
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perceived?
Interventions  (and  inventions)  cannot  be  located  without  a  thorough 
knowledge of the “order of things” as they stand. Perhaps what I am suggesting is 
that  all authors are intercultural.  Perhaps I have been learning to walk with my 
eyes? Through the mapping of  repressive state  structures I  find so many gaps, 
intervals and fissures, so many fragmented, and forgotten fossils, which allow for 
the smoothing out of capitalism's striated space. I find so many bodies-without-
organs and so many becomings, that it  is impossible to continue maintaining an 
absolute distinction between narrative and poetry. These experiences exist in texts 
everywhere, of any kind (from televised sport  to home-movies, to greeting-card 
poems and everything  in  between).  The  poetic-image allows for  the  traditional 
existential questions concerning “understanding the self” (being and nothingness: 
emptying the body) to fall away and for questions of “understanding others” (care, 
ethics,  fields  of  compassion)  to  emerge  (filling the  emptiness).  The poetic  also 
opens the path to enjoyment of the self as an incarnate “body” (the BwO). Take 
televised sport: perhaps I become the player as I watch? Does my body become the 
player  (covered  in  sweat)?  Do I  understand the  pressure  that  each  player  goes 
through, caught in the heavily competitive job of being a sport's star? Do I care? Or 
do I keep all this at arms distance (its just not my thing).
I am beginning to suggest (tentatively) that there may be no more need for 
questions  like  “Who am I?”  and “What  am I  being?”  No more why why why. 
Instead new sayings assemble: “I am being me!” “How do I become you?” “How 
do you become me?” “What else can I become?” and most importantly “How do I 
get back to me again when I am finished with all this becoming?” Only through 
finding  out. No  more  thought  “at  a  distance,”  but  rather  intimate,  close-range 
models  of  aesthetic  phenomenology,  noology  and  archaeology.  These  “minor” 
sciences  would  seek  not  only  to  analyse  art  for  the  pleasure  of  others,  but  to 
radically change the (my) self in the process of reading through aesthetics, taking  
seriously  the  ways  in  which  you play  at  becoming others. Just  as  a  child  runs 
around the house on all fours becoming horse or dog or cat, so the adult must learn 
to play again. To laugh and draw and sing. No longer the old questions “To be or 
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not to be?” (what one thing will I be when I grow up) but instead “Is there anything 
I can  do?” and “In what ways can I do this to function as an ethical and useful 
member of people-kind?” (the minor and major things I can do to effect real change 
in the only person I really know: myself). The question then becomes:  How do I  
continually effect change in myself? How do I avoid stasis?  The answers arrive 
without thought: By continually resisting change. By staying perfectly still.
In conclusion: I maintain this is not a conclusion. These are beginnings and 
inconclusions. As with the rhizome layers of Joanna's films (origami verbs) this 
chapter may have arisen where you expected a concluding “situation” to be. I have 
attempted to resist the “unifying-function” of a traditional conclusion, and suggest 
that where the conclusion of a thesis would usually be there might be a multiplicity 
of unfoldings, inclusions, silences, collisions, cohesions/
a nd fra     g       m     e    n t s –
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